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Introduction
Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal and Andrew Sims
What is the relationship between mind and body? Even in antiquity, the con-
trast between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the relationship be-
tween soul and body anticipate this anthropological debate, which has recently 
been taken up under the banner of a “naturalisation of consciousness.” In the 
modern period, the dialogue between Descarte’s neo-Platonism and Spinoza’s 
monism—and later, the Kantian critique—can be interpreted as a continua-
tion of these themes. The passionate discussions in the 20th century between 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty about phenomenological “Being-in-the-World” of-
fer a new approach to that which is specifically human. At the heart of all 
these traditions, language and the capacity for meaning-making play a deci-
sive role. Paradoxically, it is at the very moment when philosophy discovers 
the corporeal dimension of humanity—in dialogue with the natural sciences, 
furthermore—that the ubiquity of language in all behaviour is freshly brought 
into view. Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas are exemplary of such a position. 
A human being is a corporeal entity but human behaviour is unintelligible in 
abstraction from the role of language.
Recent developments in neuroscience have led to a fresh perspective on this 
set of issues. The relationship between mind and body is not only a philosophi-
cal matter. A close dialogue with the experimental sciences is not only possible 
but indeed also necessary. In recent decades, new methods for studying the 
brain have produced important theoretical advances and led to the rapid de-
velopment of various disciplines, among which are neuroscience and the cog-
nitive sciences. The philosophy of neuroscience has itself grown considerably. 
In this context, one influential line of thinking tends toward the thesis that free 
will is pure illusion and that the principle of causation in all its rigor leads in-
exorably to the rejection of a concept of free will likely to contribute to an un-
derstanding of human behaviour.
This conducts us to propose two introductory developments : free will and 
causality.
1 Free Will
There are several epistemological positions that yield different conceptions of 
free will. Beginning from his work in cognitive psychology, Daniel Wegner 
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(2002) constructs what he calls a “theory of apparent mental causation” which 
explains the conscious experience of our own causal efficacy during action as 
a post-hoc reconstruction. On the basis of Libet’s (1985) experiments, he ar-
gues that the conscious experience of acting is pure illusion. It is language—in 
an a posteriori reorganisation— that inscribes a particular action in the auto-
biographical memory. The subject then acquires an illusory sense of herself as 
the author of that action.
In the same line, in the course of a discussion of theories of self- organisation, 
decision theory, and cognitive models, Henri Atlan (2011) proposes a neo-Spi -
nozist interpretation of human behaviour which is characterised by its total 
determinism. For him there is a kind of freedom that is linked to the impossi-
bility of predicting behaviour, but this impossibility is purely epistemological. 
Human behaviour is deeply determined and freedom consists in making this 
determination our own. In this context, free will proper has no place and is 
qualified as a “necessary illusion” in that, while we must act as if our decisions 
were efficacious, this efficacy is fictive on account of the principle of total de-
terminism. Both of these perspectives just discussed are characterised by the 
conception of a deterministic world and the conception of scientific explana-
tion in terms of causation. Free will is understood as calling into question a 
principle of causal continuity that these conceptions imply.
This introduction is not the place for a detailed discussion of each of these 
sorts of models. Simply put, our working hypothesis is that the concept of free 
will remains pertinent without coming into conflict with any scientific prac-
tice that requires the concept of causation in its explanations. Language, as an 
emergent process of brain activity, contributes to the development of behav-
iour which count as unified actions taking place over long intervals of time and 
which makes it possible to conceive of an acting body which is both corporeal 
and yet aptly described as “free.”
More precisely, intentional action in human beings is a function of both the 
initial conditions of the distributed neural networks that are involved (that is, 
the “brain state”: emotions, physiological state, autobiographical and implicit 
memory) and the circumstances and events at some moment (rest, activity, 
social interactions, etc…). The expression “free will” is used in order to describe 
this situation of interaction between an agent whose nervous system reacts to 
a prior set of events according to both its state at that point and according to 
an intentional logic. Intentional action refers explicitly to an operation that 
involves the capacity to represent a future state of the world. The concept of 
free will refers both to behaviour that has this intentionality and for which it is 
not entirely determined. Our hypothesis is that the use of language is an activ-
ity that allows such an operation.
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To defend this conception, we have to analyze more precisely the relation 
with causality.
2 Causality
From the philosophical point of view, the study of the concept of causality start-
ed with Aristotle (384 bc–322 bc) who proposed four different types of causes 
(material, formal, efficient, final; Physics ii and Metaphysics v 2). During the fol-
lowing centuries, the concept of causality has continued to be interpreted in 
Aristotelian terms. David Hume initiated the modern approach of causality. He 
recognized the importance of causal beliefs for human understanding. Howev-
er, he convincingly demonstrated that causality itself is not observable. Describ-
ing colliding objects, David Hume wrote: “When we consider these objects with 
the utmost attention, we find only that the one body approaches the other; and 
the motion of it precedes that of the other without any sensible interval” 
(Hume 1739). The argument of David Hume seems logically impossible to con-
tradict: a necessary connection between events cannot be observed or mea-
sured. Only contiguity and succession can be observed. Causality seems indis-
pensable to human understanding but could not be founded rationally and 
causal inferences are made on the basis of non-causal co-variations. If we follow 
David Hume’s philosophy, the mind is a white sheet of paper and only learned 
associations can form the base of human knowledge. Immanuel Kant consid-
ered Hume’s conception of causality as deeply unsatisfactory. In Kant’s ap-
proach, causality is an a priori category of understanding, a logical necessity for 
the possibility of experience. Categories of understanding are a priori features 
of the mind. Therefore, for Immanuel Kant, the mind is not a white sheet of  paper. 
The British philosopher Bertrand Russell tried to clause the debate by declaring 
the concept of causality obsolete: “The law of causality, I believe, like much that 
passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the 
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm” (Russell 
1912). However, we suggest that simply giving up the concept of causation at the 
macroscopic level is unsatisfactory. More specifically, the concept of causation 
is central to the notion of free will. Indeed, free decisions could cause behavior 
if humans enjoy free will and this question is central in modern philosophy.
The modern concept of causality has been deeply influenced by physics and 
psychology during the xxth century and has a deep impact on causality in 
neurosciences.
According to the physicist Max Born (1949): “Causality postulates that there 
are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class depends on 
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the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word ‘entity’ means 
any physical object, phenomenon, situation, or event. A is called the cause, 
B the effect.” The concept of “lawlike” necessity is important in the contempo-
rary approach to causation. Moreover, Max Born added that the cause should 
precede (or at least be simultaneous with) the effect and that there must be 
some sort of spatial contact between the cause and effect (even if it is by way 
of a chain of intermediaries). Albert Michotte (1949/1963), profoundly influ-
enced by Immanuel Kant, considered the possibility that humans actually 
“perceive” causality directly through the activation of an encapsulated spe-
cific brain detector receiving a particular pattern of spatio-temporal inputs 
(Wagemans et al. 2006).  Michotte used abstract visual stimuli, such as shapes 
that moved and collided in various ways, and made detailed manipulations of 
their spatial and temporal properties. His subjects responded with verbal de-
scriptions of the resulting “scenes,” and Michotte determined whether they 
thought there was a causal percept (“object A caused object B to move”) or 
not. Michotte concluded that humans perceive causality as a Gestalt, similar 
to the way they perceive shape, motion, or other fundamental qualities in the 
world.
Michotte’s results have been replicated in contemporary experiments (for 
review, see Scholl and Tremoulet 2000). Whatever their interpretation, Mi-
chotte’s experiments and those of his followers clearly show the prevalence of 
causal judgment in psychology and behavior (Badler et al. 2010; Badler et al. 
2012). Suggesting that causality is an illusion is epistemologically counterpro-
ductive. Similarly, idea that causal beliefs are elaborated on the basis of passive 
observations of covariations suffers from obvious limitations. Indeed, readings 
of a drop of atmospheric pressure on a barometer covaries with storms occur-
rence. However, nobody will claim that manually changing the reading of a 
barometer could cause a storm. Genuine causation must be distinguished 
from spurious. The modern approach to causality inference that is emerging 
can be thought of in terms of graphs and probabilities. The fundamental idea 
is that a cause raises the probability of occurrence of an effect. Making causal 
hypotheses is very similar to elaborating a scientific theory from experimental 
data (Glymour 2001).
More recently, any works are specifically oriented to causality in neurosci-
ence. Craver distances himself from “law-like” necessity causality and defends 
a mechanistic conception of causality. To explain is to show multilevel mecha-
nisms conducting the transition from state 1 to state 2. In the same line, Wood-
ward proposes an interventionist concept of causality where the articulation 
between levels of organization in the brain is essential.
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These diverse conceptions of causality are present in this book. Each author 
dialogues with one or other conception in order to think the possibility of free 
will.
3 Content
The relation between free will and causality is an important focus of this book. 
That is why we organize it into three parts. In the first part, “Intention and Con-
sciousness,”, the objective is to consider a priori theories of the meaning of in-
tentional action in light of our increasing knowledge about the architecture of 
cognition, and to probe intuitive ideas about the relationship between control, 
intention, and consciousness. The compatibility of intention with efficient cau-
sality is also analysed. In the second part, “Libet-Style Experiments,” while 
 Libet’s famous experiments are generally considered as defending a causality 
which reject free will, we would like to reconsider these experiments in light of 
the variety of ways in which they have been instantiated as well as the sorts of 
theories which they are intended to refute. The third part, “Causality and Free 
Will,”, aims to clarify the ways in which language has an impact on human be-
haviour, and in the way that it allows a rich scope of flexibility and planning that 
would otherwise be out of reach. The relation with causality is the main topics, 
first in articulation with mental causation, finally in the context of emergence.
Specifically, in “Perceptual Decision-Making and Beyond,” Andrew Sims and 
Marcus Missal extend models of perceptual decision-making in psychophysics 
in order to elaborate a theory of intentional action that does not rely on the 
propagation of content from abstract propositional attitudes to sensorimotor 
representations in the concrete moment of action (e.g. Pacherie 2008). Instead, 
this model conceptualises intentional action as a process in which quasi- 
perceptual representations bias the evolution of a “decision variable” into a 
state space which represents the sensorimotor consequences of a particular 
outcome. This is intended to be an alternative to the sort of causal theory of 
action that links action to causation by propositional attitudes.
Markus Schlosser is more optimistic that the traditional picture of action 
and control can be retained, and illustrates this by walking us through a chal-
lenge posed to that picture by dual-process theories of cognitive architecture. 
In his piece “Dual-System Theory and the Role of Consciousness in Intentional 
Action” he carefully distinguishes between various kinds of control and guid-
ance, and concludes that the traditional picture can be preserved given quali-
fications about the role of consciousness.
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Nahmias, Allen, and Loveall ask their participants the question: “When do 
Robots have Free Will?” They do so in order to further probe the importance 
that attributions of phenomenal consciousness have to ascriptions of free will. 
Their guiding hypothesis is that phenomenal consciousness matters because 
for an agent to be free and responsible requires that agent to care about one’s 
choices and their consequences, and that care requires the capacity to feel 
emotion. Their results provide tentative support for this hypothesis.
The second part of the book contains two chapters that revisit themes in the 
empirical literature. In his “Free Will and Neuroscience,” Alfred Mele considers 
Libet-style arguments against free will in light of recent updated instances of 
these studies. He considers two specific arguments for the nonexistence of free 
will that he takes to be refuted and concludes that recent studies do not do 
anything to salvage them.
Then, in “Why Libet-Style Experiments Cannot Refute All Forms of Liber-
tarianism,” László Bernáth argues that such experiments are able to serve as 
evidence against forms of libertarianism that do not make metaphysical dis-
tinctions between types of decisions. However, he claims that there are a class 
of libertarian positions for which they are powerless: those that restrict the set 
of free decisions in a way that rules out their testing in existing paradigms 
(though he suggests ways in which those paradigms might be modified).
In “Actions and Intentions,” Sofia Bonicalzi argues that recent findings in 
cognitive neuroscience militate against a proposition-style causal theory of ac-
tion. Instead, she claims, we are better off thinking of action as the product of 
complex interactions between a number of different systems. Under such a 
scheme, intentions are not plausibly context-independent, inherently causal, 
discrete entities. On the basis of specific Libet’s experiment interpretations, 
she suggests that neuroscience can play a constructive role with respect to ba-
sic concepts in the philosophy of action.
Finally, the third part of the book returns to the articulation of language and 
causality in agency and free will in human beings. Anna Drozdzewska argues 
that the problem of mental causation is of central importance in the free will 
debate, despite the fact that it is often missing from discussions in the extant 
literature. In “The Mental, the Physical, and the Informational” she suggests 
that the right approach in this context will be to consider the causal role that 
information can play in the brain. She motivates the view that this may provide 
a new approach to the problem of causal exclusion.
Last, in “Free Will, Language, and the Causal Exclusion Problem,” Bernard 
Feltz and Olivier Sartenaer address a similar theme, by considering the ways in 
which the use of language might instantiate emergent causal powers that pro-
duce downward-causal effects. In doing so they bring recent ideas about 
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 diachronic causation into contact with the neuroscience of learning and phi-
losophy of language.
4 Opening Perspectives
The question of free will admits of a diverse number of positions. Even in this 
book, which brings together contributions by authors largely open to the pos-
sibility of free will, it would be hazardous to propose general conclusions to 
which all could agree. However, in our role as editors of this book, we would 
like nonetheless to propose some final thoughts on the relation between lan-
guage and causality with respect to the question of free will.
From a social point of view, it seems difficult to defend the idea that lan-
guage lacks causal power. We need just be reminded that science is language, 
and that the products of science—technology—are unthinkable without the 
causal efficacy of language. Law, economics, political science, rhetoric, all of 
these are equally languages for which it seems superfluous to argue for their 
efficacy. Now, if language has causal power from this social point of view, the 
monist presupposition requires that we posit its efficacy at the individual level 
as well. If one wonders about the causal efficacy of language at the level of the 
individual, then in a certain sense the question is how to understand this effi-
cacy and not if there is any such efficacy. Language operates just as much on 
the individual level as it does on the social.
On this point, the contributions on language in this collection demonstrate 
that it is possible to think about the effect of language on the brain while re-
specting the principle of causal closure. Such a result is important since it al-
lows us to give language a decisive place in our thinking about free will and to 
bring about a rapprochement between certain philosophers of language and 
the experimental work of contemporary neuroscientists. In decision-making 
processes, language is not epiphenomenal. It is perfectly coherent to defend 
that language has a causal influence in decision-making processes.
However, this causal efficacy of language does not correspond to free will. 
For example, some thinkers inspired by structuralism defended the idea that 
language itself determines behaviour through the unconscious (in Lacan’s 
(1966) “Return to Freud”) or determines collective behaviour through ideology 
(as in Althusserian (1970) Marxism), and without the knowledge of the persons 
concerned. So in order to intervene in the debate over freedom on the basis of 
language, one needs to go beyond its efficacy.
In contrast with structuralism, Habermas (2007) develops the idea of a pro-
ductive language in culture that gives rise to meaning: this is what he calls 
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“objective mind.” The human subject, by learning language, becomes part of 
this cultural dynamics and becomes able to participate in social conversation, 
becomes capable of inventiveness, creation, and novelty. The latter is what 
Habermas calls “subjective mind.” For Habermas, then, language is not an 
oppressive structure but an open and dynamic structure that allows each indi-
vidual within it to choose the meaning of her existence. To be free is to behave 
according to the system of meanings that we have chosen and helped to con-
struct. Not only is language causally efficacious then, but it brings with it the 
potential for novelty.
Habermas’s philosophy of language leads us to defend the idea that the 
causal power of language allows for a wider efficacy of the processes that in-
volve the self-determination of human behaviour. Language, through which 
the individual participates in objective mind, allows each person to construct 
a system of meaning by which he gives sense to the world and orients himself 
behaviourally. Neural plasticity and learning as implemented in neural net-
works are the mechanisms which allow to understand the effect of language 
on the brain. These mechanisms bring us back to these processes themselves 
as the conditions of possibility for the production of language. Such a perspec-
tive makes it possible to meet the difficulties related to the problem of causal 
exclusion. It produces reconciliation between neuroscience and a conception 
of the human being as free.
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Chapter 1
Perceptual Decision-Making and Beyond:  
Intention as Mental Imagery
Andrew Sims and Marcus Missal
The standard view in the philosophy of action is the Causal Theory of Action 
(cta).1 On this view, a behavioural item counts as an intentional action if and 
only if it is caused by the appropriate sorts of mental states in the right kind of 
way. On most popular contemporary accounts (e.g. Searle 1983; Bratman 1987; 
Mele 1992; Pacherie 2008), the appropriate sort of mental state is an intention, 
with the intention construed as an attitude towards a proposition. The “right 
kind of way” is thought to be one in which the content of the intention propa-
gates from an abstract level of description (e.g. the intention to investigate a 
noise) through to more fine-grained specifications that give a bodily move-
ment a rational structure at the moment of bodily movement (e.g. the inten-
tion to switch on this light), and finally culminating in motor commands 
required to execute the right bodily movements. These levels of abstraction 
respectively correspond to so-called distal intention, proximal intention, and 
motor intention. These three kinds of intention have distinct roles in the over-
all dynamics of intentional action (Pacherie 2008; Mele this volume).
In our contribution to this volume we offer an alternative theory of inten-
tion, on which it is not a propositional attitude at all but rather a distinct kind 
of mental imagery. For the purpose of our argument, we can provisionally de-
fine a mental image as a quasi-perceptual representation that occurs in the 
absence of the corresponding stimuli. Such imagery need not be conscious; it 
can also be unconscious. It may manifest in one or more perceptual modalities 
(Nanay 2017). The main difference that we wish to mark is that mental imagery 
has a quasi-perceptual format rather than a quasi-linguistic or propositional 
one. That idea will be developed in more detail in Sections 1 and 2.
Our account is inspired by work in the perceptual decision making litera-
ture, where decision is modelled as a process of evidence accumulation under 
conditions of uncertainty and noise. In the paradigms that are central to this 
1 This work is supported by the Action Recherche Concerté project “Causality and Free Will.” 
We would like to thank Anna Drozdzewska and Daniel Burnston for some helpful comments 
on an earlier draft.
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literature, the subject is required to make a simple movement (e.g. look left or 
right) depending on a perceptual condition (e.g. a visual signal which indicates 
the “correct” direction). As time passes, the accumulation of perceptual evi-
dence biases the drift of a single value called a decision variable, which when 
it hits a bound (i.e., becomes equal to a specified value, or set of values, if the 
variable is multidimensional) propagates a signal to the relevant effectors and 
causes the bodily movement. Models of this kind have great predictive power 
when it comes to the way that error rates (“wrong” decisions) and response 
times are distributed in experimental samples.
It could be argued that these studies lack ecological verisimilitude: not 
many decisions are of this nature (though some are, like crossing the street 
when the light turns green). However, it’s nonetheless possible that the mod-
el we describe could profitably be extended to contexts beyond perceptual 
decision making. For example, it’s been suggested that in cases where an ac-
tion is more or less endogenous (i.e. not simply produced in response to a 
cue), the same model could be used without there being any specific percep-
tual evidence to be integrated with the decision variable (Schurger et al. 2012; 
Murakami 2014; Schurger et al. 2016). In this case, Schurger et al. (2016, 78) 
argue, “the process of integration to bound is dominated by ongoing stochas-
tic fluctuations in neural activity that influence the precise moment at which 
the decision threshold is reached.” In other words, in these cases it is just 
neuronal noise which biases most strongly the decision variable, without any 
real perceptual evidence to speak of.
In this context, we should certainly want to know what it means for some-
thing to be intentional: if the evolution of the decision variable during sponta-
neous voluntary movement is dominated by stochastic drift, then this would 
appear to make the outcomes of our decisions implausibly random.2 With this 
in mind, our suggestion is that intentions can be understood as mental images 
that play the role usually reserved in this model for bona fide perceptual evi-
dence (e.g. the onset of a visual cue). Intentional action is therefore to be 
2 We do not mean to attribute such a view to Schurger and colleagues. Those authors do sug-
gest that there can be biasing influence from “anticipation, subjective value [and] clock 
monitoring” and that “parameters, such as the movement type, may be fixed by a prior deci-
sion, which may in turn channel the neural activity leading up to the decision threshold to-
wards a specific effector.” (Schurger et al. 2016, 78) Presumably what they have in mind when 
discussing neuronal noise is endogenous voluntary movements where the agent has no 
strong commitment to any outcome, like in Libet-style experiments. But proposals beyond 
these are largely unspecific at present; it’s our ambition to put some meat on these bones in 
a way that addresses extant problems in the philosophy of action. We are much inspired in 
this by Burnston’s (2017) programmatic remarks.
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construed in terms of this evidence-accumulation mechanism, but with its 
scope expanded so that inner states as well as evidence can play a biasing role.
We see the following merits in this account. First, it sidesteps some pressing 
problems in the philosophy of action; these are problems that we suspect re-
sult from the theory of intentions as propositional attitudes. For example, 
there is an issue concerning the interface between propositionally-formatted 
representations and the representational format that is appropriate to fine 
motor control. That is to say that there is confusion in the literature over how 
the content of a proximal intention could propagate to a motor intention (But-
terfill & Sinigaglia 2014; Mylopoulos & Pacherie 2017). Indeed, some authors 
express scepticism that this is possible at all (Burnston 2017). On our account, 
there is no need to explain such an interface because the representational for-
mat that is appropriate to sensorimotor control is common to all levels of 
intention.
Second, it expands on the Schurger et al. (2012) interpretation of Libet-style 
experiments and the sceptical arguments that issue from them. The orthodox 
interpretation is that the readiness potential (RP) represents the final stages of 
action planning and preparation, and that this occurs prior to the conscious 
intention to move. That is why it is used in an argument that decisions are 
never caused by conscious intentions: the putative decision (the RP) occurs 
before the conscious intention. Schurger and his colleagues argue convincingly 
that this interpretation is wrong: we should interpret the RP as the stochastic 
drift of the decision variable, which ramps up to hit the bound at about the 
same time as the agent feels the “conscious urge to move.” Our account will 
offer a framework for extending this proposal to action more generally, and for 
the non-sceptical interpretation of Libet-style paradigms and others like them.
However, to explicate it persuasively will be challenging. There will be three 
philosophical objections to our thesis that we must address. First, the mecha-
nism we describe entails that action-producing mental imagery stands in com-
petition with bona fide perceptual evidence issuing from the senses. That 
obliges us to explain how action ever gets off the ground: how is it that motor 
imagery detailing the aimed for state of affairs can bias the decision variable in 
a way that moves it away from what is currently perceived?
Second, it is unclear how mental images could play the quasi-inferential 
role in the rational control of action that propositional attitudes plausibly can. 
Practical reasoning can be expressed in a deductive form quite easily if the 
states involved are propositional, since their syntactic structure allows this. In 
this way, we can understand how standing intentions could constrain practical 
reasoning and the implementation of other intentions. A corresponding 
account needs to be given for mental imagery.
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Finally, we need to be able to show that perceptual or quasi-perceptual con-
tent can represent a state of affairs at the level of abstraction that is appropri-
ate to propositions, and without themselves being propositional. For instance, 
when I intend to go on a holiday at some point in the future, but without any 
specific place in mind, I have a distal intention which specifies an action at a 
very high level of abstraction. But we usually think of mental imagery (like 
perception) as being determinate with respect to all its details, and not ab-
stract in such a way.
These important challenges for our account will be met in the course of the 
paper. But we must begin by discussing the hypothesis in more detail.
1 Perceptual Decision Making and Diffusion-to-Bound Models
A neural decision variable could be defined as a compound signal containing 
sensory evidence, priors, value, and other quantities needed to make a categor-
ical choice. This choice results in a rule applied to the decision variable i.e. if 
enough evidence is accumulated in a certain context, I will choose to do this 
rather than that. Decisions based on perceptual evidence are often conceptu-
alized using diffusion-to-bound models. In these models, a hypothetical neural 
decision signal accumulates until it reaches a threshold value (i.e., the bound) 
causing movement initiation. Response time and accuracy (or the percentage 
of correct responses) are modelled using a noisy evidence accumulation pro-
cess like a continuous random walk or diffusion (Ratcliff & Hacker 1981). The 
diffusion process encodes information about the experienced stimulus and 
other sources of information present in the context that are needed to make a 
decision (Figure 1.1).
This theory was initially developed to model experimental results in a se-
quential letter-matching task where human subjects have to judge whether 
two strings of letters are identical. Typically, the two strings of letters are rap-
idly presented sequentially on a computer screen facing the subject. The sub-
ject has to compare the previously encoded string of letters held in working 
memory with the last one. The decision the subject has to make is: “Are the two 
strings the same or different?” Technically, this type of task is often referred to 
as “two-choice serial reaction time task” (2-CSRTT).
According to Ratcliff and Hacker (1981), if the diffusion process reached the 
upper bound, a “same” response was produced. Alternatively, if the diffusion 
process hit the lower bound a “different” response was produced. The diffusion 
rate towards the upper bound increases as a function of the proximity of 
the two strings and increases towards the lower bound as a function of the 
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Figure 1.1 A (top-left): This is an illustration of the visual stimulus that is presented to the 
subject during the dot motion paradigm. During a single trial the dots all move in 
random oblique direction except for a specified proportion which move either to 
the left or to the right. In the trial shown, 10% of the dots (those which are 
darkened) are moving to the right; B (top-right): This shows the evidence that the 
visual stimulus of Fig. 1.1A is taken to comprise. It is a normal distribution with 
mean = 0.1 and standard deviation = 1. The sensorimotor parameter is the 
direction of movement of the dots in the visual field. In this simulated and merely 
demonstrative example, the relationship between the stimulus and the distribu-
tion should not be taken as necessarily accurate; C (bottom): This shows the 
activity of the diffusion-to-bound mechanism over a single trial. At each 
time-step, a random value is sampled from the distribution in Fig. 1.1B and added 
to the decision variable. This continues until the variable hits the bound 
corresponding either to left-hand movement or right-hand movement. In this 
case, the decision variable hits the move-right bound after about 80 time-steps.
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dissimilarity of the two strings. Moreover, human subjects probably implicitly 
adjusted the position of the boundaries and the zero point of the diffusion 
process (bias) based on previous experience or expectation. For instance, giv-
ing an instruction to the subject before data collection (e.g. answer “same” only 
if you are sure versus answer “different” only if you are sure) changes the bias 
in the model and therefore reaction time is prolonged but accuracy is 
increased.
Several experiments in the Rhesus monkey have tried to find areas in the 
brain where the accumulation of evidence and/or the decision variable could 
be processed. The major problem is to differentiate accumulation of sensory 
evidence from a decision signal at the single neurone level. Indeed, the two 
signals are inevitably linked. Therefore, perceptual decision making paradigms 
have been developed in order to separate in time these two different signals 
(see the review in Gold and Shadlen 2007). For instance, in the random-dot 
motion paradigm, Rhesus monkeys or human observers have to decide wheth-
er a set of random dots move to the left or to the right. The percentage of co-
herently moving dots is randomly and parametrically varied between 
successive presentations (Gold, J.I., Shadlen, M.N. 2002). Even at zero coher-
ence (all dots moving randomly) subjects must make a decision.
Shadlen and co-workers have shown that a neural correlate of the decision 
variable involved in this process can be found in the parietal cortex (area lip; 
Shadlen et al. 2006; Roitman & Shadlen 2002). Interestingly, neuronal activity 
also reflects the choice of subjects at zero coherence (no sensory evidence per 
se). Activity in area lip is compatible with predictions of the diffusion-to-
bound model. Lafuente & Romo (2005) have reached similar conclusions using 
a task in the somatosensory domain where Rhesus monkeys have to detect a 
20-Hz sinusoidal indentation applied on the finger pad. This simple detection 
task was accompanied by neuronal recording either in the primary somatosen-
sory cortex (S1) or the medial premotor cortex (mpc). S1 neurons encode the 
presence of the sensory stimulus, but not the decision variable. On the other 
hand, mpc neurons are good candidates to encode the decision of the monkey 
in the presence (or absence) of the vibrotactile stimulus.
All these experimental paradigms provide strong electrophysiological sup-
port for the diffusion-to-bound theory of decision making. However, most real 
life decisions involve deliberation over topics where repeated experience is 
usually not available (e.g., a first marriage). Perceptual decision experiments 
are often rather simple, linking one particular sensory quantity to one move-
ment (e.g. a button press, an eye movement). It is therefore tempting to posit 
different mechanisms for decision making, one for simple sensorimotor deci-
sions and one for more complex deliberate decisions (Kahneman 2002). 
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However, we suggest that it is more plausible to postulate one decision making 
mechanism that could be instantiated in different areas depending on the con-
text. Indeed, in humans even simple decisions are actually often influenced by 
deliberation. The aim of the present paper is to speculatively extrapolate from 
the theoretical contribution of diffusion-to-bound models to the kinds of deci-
sions discussed by philosophers of action.
2 Extending the Model
As noted, perceptual decision-making paradigms do not accurately represent 
all decisions made by human beings in the wild (i.e. outside the laboratory), 
except perhaps in a highly idealised way. That is because human beings in the 
wild also perform actions more or less endogenously, that is to say, without any 
obvious perceptual cue that directly triggers the decision. Such choices usually 
also take place over more than two alternatives. However, the models for per-
ceptual decision making can be extended to account for these more complex 
cases. Such extension is relatively speculative but it is not without support.
In the paradigms discussed above, there are usually just two alternatives. 
For example, in the dot movement paradigm the choice is whether to indicate 
that the dots are moving left, or whether to indicate that they are moving 
right. One of these choices will be incorrect, depending on the perceptual cue 
(e.g. if I indicate left when the dots are moving right). Simple choices like 
these are easy to model: as we have shown, this can be done in two dimen-
sional space where one decision corresponds to time and the other corre-
sponds to the value of the decision variable. In such a two dimensional model 
we can specify two bounds that correspond to two outcomes, but we cannot 
add any more.
Therefore, to model more complex decisions requires that we add more di-
mensions to our model. That allows us to add more bounds in order to repre-
sent more possible outcomes. For example, we might model a decision variable 
that drifts stochastically through three dimensional space. Strictly speaking, 
the decision variable will have two dimensions <x, y> while the third dimen-
sion <z> represents the evolution of the decision variable through time. In this 
three dimensional space we can add more reachable bounds that represent 
more possible outcomes. The bound will be defined by a hyperplane, which in 
a three dimensional space is just a subspace with two dimensions. At each step 
in the drift of the decision variable, two values are added (plus the time step) 
that dictate how far it moves in this space. Theoretically speaking there is no 
limit to the number of dimensions we can add to our model, despite the fact 
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that it becomes difficult to visualise after the fourth is added. So in principle, 
we can represent any number of possible outcomes within this diffusion-to-
bound style of model.
The dimensions of our model correspond to sensorimotor parameters that 
vary continuously along a scale. Examples of these parameters from vision 
may be the size of an object, or its location in the visual field. Similarly, these 
parameters may encode for motor features that have continuous properties, 
like extension of reach or strength of grasp. For a particular bodily movement, 
then, the dimensions which are integrated into the decision variable at each 
moment reflect the sensorimotor parameters for which these dimensions en-
code. This allows us to improve on our provisional definition of “mental im-
age.” In the context of this paper, we propose to understand a mental image as 
a set of values in n dimensions which correspond to a range of sensorimotor 
parameters, where this range is minimally limited to a specific value in each 
dimension that the image includes, but which may also specify a wider range. 
So, for example, a mental image may specify a set of highly constrained values 
that correspond to my extending a finger to touch a specific point in front of 
me, but it may also specify a looser range of values that correspond to my hav-
ing an arm extended out in front of me, without any particular point being 
specified.
Hommel’s (2004) theory of event files suggests a specific way in which we 
might construe the role of sensorimotor evidence during endogenous action. 
Event files are episodic bindings of perceptual features, a task context, and mo-
tor features. Event files specify a particular directed bodily movement. For ex-
ample, it might specify the action of reaching for a bottle of water. In this case, 
the event file would bind the perceptual features corresponding to the action 
(proprioceptive, visual, and other sensory items associated with successful 
reaching) with motor commands that correspond to the correct extension, ro-
tation, and grasp.
In the context of diffusion-to-bound models, it may be that we can under-
stand the bounds as corresponding to event files, the sense that the event files 
specify the appropriate locations in state space for the execution of a particu-
lar action. Then, different influences bias a decision variable in the state space 
by accumulating evidence for one or another event file. The evolution of the 
decision variable through the state space represents the competition between 
event files for implementation in behaviour (cf. Cisek & Kalaska 2010). The 
outcome of that competition is jointly determined by stochastic drift (i.e. neu-
ronal noise) and biasing influences. These influences are understood here to 
include the following two sorts of item: i) sensorimotor values that are caused 
by stimuli (i.e. perception per se); and ii) sensorimotor values that are not 
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caused by stimuli (i.e. mental images). These two sorts of items both serve as 
biasing influences that drive the decision variable to a bound.
Here is a simple case which is intended to make the proposal clearer. You are 
standing in front of a door. Then you open the door and walk through. What 
happened? A certain kind of CTA-theorist will say that you had an intention 
with propositional content corresponding to something like “open the door 
and walk through.” This intention propagated from higher cognitive areas into 
motor cortex and was somehow translated into the appropriate motor com-
mands, and then bodily movements.
Our story is different. The right bodily movements correspond to a set of 
sensorimotor values that are executed in the right sequence. The decision vari-
able does not correspond to these parameters before you act; it is rather fluctu-
ating around the values associated with the current perceptual state (the 
closed door). Action begins when biasing influences begin to push the variable 
towards the values associated with the successful execution of the action. The 
influence in question will be a set of endogenously generated quasi-perceptual 
representations—that is, a mental image—that is implemented in probability 
distributions over the appropriate values in those sensorimotor parameters. 
The decision variable is continuously updated with randomly sampled values 
from these distributions, and this drives the value of the decision variable to 
the event file that corresponds to you having opened the door.
A story like this can be extended upwards to more paradigmatically inten-
tional action and it can also be extended downwards to what philosophers call 
“sub-intentional” action (O’Shaughnessy 1980). Sub-intentional action is pur-
posive activity that is not intentional under a description, like idly doodling on 
a notepad while focused on something else, or tapping impatiently while wait-
ing for something. Actions of these kinds can be construed in our model as 
biasing influence that results from learned association of perceptual values 
with corresponding “stereotyped” motor values. For example, it may be that a 
pen lying next to a pad is associated with the action of doodling, and so auto-
matically potentiates the sensorimotor parameters associated with doodling. 
This is what should normally happen in the absence of motor inhibition 
(cf. Duque et al. 2017). In cases where we are focused on something else, we fail 
to inhibit those actions that are potentiated. Furthermore, the capacity for 
such motor inhibition may be reduced by brain lesion, in cases such as in utili-
sation behaviour where the affected part of the body engages with nearby ob-
jects in a way that is contextually inappropriate (Shallice et al. 1989).
The upward extension is more complex. It requires that endogenous senso-
rimotor variables can bias the evolution of the decision variable at great tempo-
ral and spatial distances from the corresponding action. For example, if I want 
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to walk to the cafeteria on the other side of campus to get myself a coffee, then 
this requires that I am able to potentiate the right sensorimotor parameters 
in the right sequence, and in a way that respects contextual demands (e.g. not 
taking a route that I know to be closed). We think that in these more complex 
cases propositional attitudes have a role to play, but it is not the role that is 
envisioned by CTA-theorists. We propose to elucidate this upward extension of 
our account by addressing a few key objections from the perspective of cta.
3 Some Conceptual Problems with the Account
First, it’s not clear why mental imagery would sometimes win competition 
with percepts that are immediate to the agent. Secondly, we might doubt that 
mental imagery as a representational format is of sufficient conceptual com-
plexity to be able to exercise the rational control that is required of an inten-
tion. Finally, despite its evidential support in simple contexts, we might doubt 
that models for perceptual decision making could be expanded to contexts in 
which we intend to perform an action that is specified at a very high level of 
abstraction. In this section of the chapter we address these concerns.
3.1 Can Mental Images Produce Action?
A critic of our view might deny that mental imagery can drive action, which 
would make it unsuitable for playing the role of intention. The reasons that 
might be cited for this view are as follows. First, there is the commonsense idea 
of mental imagery and imagination in general as a kind of derivative version of 
ordinary perception. The similarity between imagery and perception is no-
ticed by many authors in the history of philosophy, most notably by Hume 
(1739) in his claim that impressions and ideas are distinct only in their “force 
and vivacity,” and indeed something like this comparison motivates represen-
tational views of perception in which the representational content is made to 
do work in distinguishing hallucination from veridical perception.
Secondly, it might be argued that the default attitude to hold upon the ap-
prehension of some content in imagination—insofar as any attitude is taken 
up at all—would be belief, rather than intention or desire. That is to say, if 
I imagine something, and (in some exceptional case) I forget or I am unable to 
know that I am merely imaging, then surely it is more correct to say that 
I believe my eyes, rather than that I intend my eyes. So here, the objection will 
be to say that for the mental image to play the role of an intention requires 
something more than the image. And presumably the suggestion will be that 
the additional ingredient is some sort of conative intention-like attitude to-
wards that image, which would make our account redundant.
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However, these objections and others like them rely on a commonsense 
notion of mental imagery or imagination which we are not committed to. On 
the mechanism we have hypothesised in Section 2, what is given as input 
to the mechanism is just a set of sensorimotor parameters which correspond to 
the consequences of the action, and which drive it to a bound. This means 
that there is no real representational distinction of type between a perceptual 
representation and the endogenous representation (“intention”) that produc-
es action. This feature of our approach—despite how odd it may seem to 
 philosophers—is not unprecedented. Prinz (1997), for example, outlines the 
“common coding hypothesis,” on which perception and action planning share 
a representational form in common. That is to say that items that are “effer-
ent” (i.e., motor) and those that are “afferent” (i.e., sensory) are continuous 
and overlap; this would mean that none of these representations code 
specifically for afference or for efference, or if they do, then they code for 
both simultaneously, as in Millikan’s (1995) hypothesised “pushmi-pullyu” 
representations.3
There are empirical reasons to think that this common coding hypothesis is 
true. If “event codes” and “action codes” encoded respectively for afference and 
efference, then we would expect their respective functional roles to be well 
defined. Accordingly, we would not expect there to be interference or facilita-
tion effects on action by way of perception, or vice versa. The interference hy-
pothesis states that when a particular code (e.g., corresponding to location) is 
in use for perception, it will be impaired in its use for action (and vice-versa). 
The facilitation hypothesis states that dimensional overlap between a stimulus 
and a response can enhance the speed of the response. These sorts of effects 
are often reported in the literature (see Prinz 1997; Hommel 2004 for reviews; 
cf. Burnston 2017), which motivates for the view that direction of fit is not part 
of these representations.
All this, of course, obliges us to answer the following question: when, and in 
virtue of what cause, is it endogenous mental imagery rather than perception 
which brings about action? That we have a mental image in working memory 
must certainly not be sufficient for bringing about action; sooner or later we 
must accept that such images simply do not correspond with the deliverances 
of perception. So how do such images can drive action, in the absence of an 
encoded direction of fit that allows it to be distinguished from perception? 
Someone taking our view seriously might think that veridical perception pre-
vents action ever getting started, because this constant source of evidence will 
bias the decision variable in preference to any endogenous imagery.
3 This corresponds to the philosophical distinction between “directions of fit” (see Anscombe 
1957, §32 for a classic exposition).
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We can develop the mechanism of Section 2 in order to answer this question.4 
The inputs to the decision variable at some time consist of an array of values 
that correspond to sensorimotor parameters. These values, however, are not 
discrete: given the conditions of uncertainty and noise that prevail, these val-
ues are more likely to be probability distributions. Probability distributions 
have various properties. One of these properties is precision. The precision of a 
probability distribution is inversely related to its standard deviation; it is a 
measure of uncertainty. A distribution which represents a perceptual param-
eter with a very high level of uncertainty will have a low precision; values that 
are sampled from that distribution will not cluster very tightly around the 
mean. The converse is true of distributions with a high precision (Figure 1.2).
With this in mind, our suggestion is that whether or not some mental image is 
perceptual or action-driving is a function of the precision of the corresponding 
4 We are inspired by similar ideas in the context of predictive processing (e.g., Hohwy 2013; 
Clark 2016). However, nothing we say here commits us to that framework as a whole.
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Figure 1.2 This is a demonstration of the concept of precision with reference to two 
sensorimotor parameters. The distribution on the left has a much lower precision. 
As such, a sample from it may fall within a much wider range of values. The 
distribution on the right has a much higher precision. Our claim is that when 
values from distributions are sampled for a mechanism of the kind illustrated in 
Figure 1.1, the decision variable will reliably tend towards the values specified by a 
more precise distribution.
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distributions. Specifically, mental imagery will produce action, rather than be 
revised on the basis of sensory information, in cases where it is higher in preci-
sion than the sensory information that is in tension with it. When it has a high 
precision the values that are integrated into the decision variable will be closer 
to the goal-state value than if the distribution is imprecise. Similarly, when the 
current perceptual state is relatively imprecise then the values that are sam-
pled from that state will be relatively ineffectual in preventing the biased diffu-
sion of the decision variable to the goal state.
To conclude this section of our argument, we accept that our initial account 
was problematic in the context of philosophical orthodoxy regarding direc-
tion of fit. However, we believe that this distinction is only important in the 
present context because it explains why a content would sometimes be affer-
ent (responsive to informational change) and sometimes be efferent (action-
producing). In response to this concern, we have suggested how we can explain 
this in the context of an account that does not rely on the idea that there is an 
action/perception distinction built into the representations that underlie cog-
nitive processes.
3.2 Content and Rational Control
The second conceptual problem that we wish to address corresponds to the 
role of intentions in allowing rational control over action as it unfolds in a par-
ticular situation. This control has a number of different aspects. Pacherie 
(2008), following Buekens et al. (2001), classifies these into two. The first is 
tracking control. Tracking control is our ability to rationally control an action as 
it unfolds in time. For some action, it will include various steps whose tempo-
ral sequence must be respected, and it may be that we are required to imple-
ment an intention in an unforeseen manner if we are thwarted at any of these 
steps. Take the action of fetching a cup of coffee. To successfully perform this 
action I have to leave my office, get to the kitchen, and set up the coffee ma-
chine to make a cup. Tracking control of this action will involve performing 
this action in the right sequence (e.g., not trying to extract the coffee before the 
ground beans are in place) and improvising on the fly (e.g., if there is work be-
ing done in the corridor, I will have to take a detour to the kitchen from my 
office).
The second is collateral control. This involves controlling for side effects of 
my action. When I go to fetch my cup of coffee I may wish to perform the ac-
tion in a way that respects other commitments that are in the background. For 
example, it may be that I implement the intention by taking a circuitous route 
in order to avoid encountering someone I don’t wish to see. I may also wish to 
implement my intention in a way that respects etiquette: if there is someone 
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already waiting for the coffee to brew, then I will not cut in line to take my cof-
fee before they do. The bottom line for both of these types of control is that 
they need to be responsive to, i) other commitments I have, even if disposi-
tional (the commitment to acting politely); and ii) the exigencies of the pres-
ent context in the here-and-now.
For certain instances corresponding to both of these sorts of control, it may 
be argued that the intention needs to be poised to play a role in practical rea-
soning. If I find myself thwarted by contextual constraints (work in the corri-
dor), then I will need to engage in practical reasoning on the basis of the 
intention in order to revise my plan of how best to implement it. For collateral 
control, my intention needs to be rationally responsive to more abstract dispo-
sitional states regarding certain constraints within which I would like to bind 
my behaviour. So it would appear to be the case that both of these types of 
control involve inferential relations between the intentions and propositional 
attitudes like beliefs and desires.
Given the requisite inferential sophistication of intentions, one criticism of 
our proposal might be that mental images are inapt to play that role. That is 
because inference seems to be something that is appropriately performed in 
an amodal conceptual format, rather than a quasi-perceptual format. It is hard 
to see how operations like material inference, disjunction, and so on could be 
implemented in the latter, but these are arguably required in order to exercise 
rational control over action. To see this, say that I have the intention to get a 
cup of coffee and there are two different paths that I could take to the kitchen. 
I also want to pass by my colleague’s office on the way, and this is on one of the 
paths. So I somehow have to be able to implement the intention in a way 
which respects this other intention, and that requires that my intention is ra-
tionally responsive to the other. If intentions are conceptual or language-like, 
then it is easy to see how this would work: just in the same way that inference 
is performed in written or spoken language. But this is not possible on our 
account.
Our reply to this objection is to advance a clarification. It is not a conse-
quence of our position that propositional attitudes can play no role in action 
production whatsoever; our contention is just that they do not play any causal 
role qua intentions. It may well be the case that propositional attitudes play a 
key role in relations between images, and this would not necessitate that inten-
tions are propositional attitudes. For example, van Leeuwen (2013) argues that 
propositional attitudes like beliefs can inferentially govern transitions between 
imaginings. Here’s how he demonstrates the point:
Instructions: imagine a female lion in the bushes looking out on a herd of 
grazing antelope; then imagine she charges them. What do you imagine 
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next? I’m guessing you imagine the antelope run away. But why? Imagin-
ing this wasn’t in the instructions. You could have imagined them staying 
put, though you didn’t. The answer, around which some consensus has 
emerged, is that one’s beliefs inferentially govern transitions from initial 
imaginings to later imaginings.
van Leeuwen 2013, 226
We can imagine a wide range of examples of this basic type, where the way 
mental imagery unfolds in time is governed by our dispositional mental states. 
I can “deliberate” in imagination when it comes to settling on an intention 
(Nanay 2016), and my deliberations will be constrained by what I believe it is 
possible for me to do, and what I think is the likely result of some imagined 
action. Furthermore, we see no reason to limit this governing role to beliefs. It 
seems that desires may play a key role in imaginary transitions, as well. Cer-
tainly, this role is familiar enough from the quite widespread and ordinary ex-
perience of pleasant daydreams. In daydreams, transitions between imagin-
ings are often governed by what we would like to happen, and also by our 
beliefs about potential ways in which such things might occur.
The constraints that propositional attitudes place on transitions in imagery 
provide us with a way to understand how mental images qua intentions could 
exercise the kinds of control discussed above: tracking control and collateral 
control. Let’s take the previous case of going to get a cup of coffee. As I imple-
ment the intention, it’s necessary that I implement it in a way that respects a 
certain sort of temporal sequence. If I try to extract the coffee before I load the 
ground beans into the machine, then my action will not succeed. This is ratio-
nal control as tracking control. Mental images can exert this kind of control 
since transitions between images is governed by our beliefs about the world. 
I have certain beliefs about the way this coffee machine works, and these be-
liefs govern the way in which my imagery-intention represents the successive 
stages of the action that I am engaged in.
Likewise, when I intend to get my cup of coffee, I need to implement my 
intention in a way that respects my other commitments. If I go and get it in a 
way that violates these commitments, then I will not be exercising collateral 
control over my action. Collateral control can be explained by the way that 
our desires govern transitions between mental images. For example, I may 
have the background commitment to talk to a colleague on my way to the 
kitchen. This is to say that I desire that I talk to my colleague. This desire will 
govern the way my intention-imagery represents successive stages on an ac-
tion, by governing the transitions between image stages. So the intention will 




In short, there is no reason to think that images cannot exert the right kinds 
of rational control over action once the role of bona fide propositional atti-
tudes is taken into account. Our claim is just that propositional attitudes do 
not themselves play the role of intentions, as the prevailing orthodoxy states. 
Why then, would this not make our account of intentions as mental images 
superfluous? In other words, aren’t we back now at an orthodox view that in-
cludes both mental images and propositional attitudes? That is not the case; 
our position differs in a subtle but important respect. Specifically, on our ac-
count there is no propagation of content from propositional attitudes to men-
tal images (i.e. motor representations), whereas that is a central feature of cta 
(cf. Pacherie 2008). For us, propositional attitudes merely play an auxiliary role 
in constraining possible transitions between mental images.
The reason that this difference is important is because a key puzzle that 
drives contemporary philosophy of action—the “interface problem”— 
concerns how it is that content could propagate from propositional represen-
tations to sensorimotor representations. Pacherie’s framework is subject to this 
problem, because for her there is such a propagation. But for us there is not, 
and we are therefore providing a way of dispensing with this vexing philosoph-
ical problem about content.
A critic might still object that we are committed to some propagation of 
content as soon as we accept the view that propositional attitudes could gov-
ern transitions between images. That is because such governance requires that 
the content of the proposition plays some sort of causal role in the transition, 
and this amounts to the propagation we claim to be entitled to deny. To this 
objection we can give a suggestion about how this might occur in the absence 
of direct translation from propositional content to sensorimotor content.
Let’s return to Van Leeuwen’s example of the lion and gazelles. In this case, 
there is a transition between the image of the lion charging these gazelles to an 
image of the gazelles fleeing the lion. Let’s say that this transition is governed 
by a belief that gazelles (generally) flee from lions. Our critic will say that what 
happens here must be some sort of propagation of content between that rele-
vant proposition and the image, because the proposition seems to have causal 
influence over the evolution of the episode of imagining. And that would 
oblige us to give an answer to the interface problem.
However, we don’t see that mere causal influence amounts to content- 
propagation. For example, it may be that the proposition <gazelles flee from 
lions> activates a number of high level sensorimotor parameters without there 
being any direct translation of the propositional content into sensorimotor im-
agery. For example, it may be that due to associative processes the tokening of 
the lexical item which expresses that proposition biases the decision variable 
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towards the range of sensorimotor parameters which correspond to a statisti-
cal regularity that holds between its contents (c.f. Burnston 2017): i.e., that a 
large animal charging at a group of smaller animals is usually followed by the 
scattering of the latter in flight. Furthermore, it’s important to note that on our 
account the intentions are sensorimotor images all the way up and down the 
hierarchy of intention, and propositional attitudes only play a role in delimit-
ing the transitions which may occur between these images. In Dretske’s (2010) 
terminology, propositions are “structuring” causes and not “triggering” causes.
One may object nonetheless that this is a version of the causal theory after 
all, since propositional attitudes are exerting some causal influence over deci-
sions. To this we believe the correct response is just to draw attentions to the 
details of our account. What we are interested in establishing is that intentions 
can be understood as mental images (not propositional attitudes), and that the 
mechanisms for bringing about action should not be understood on the model 
of the practical syllogism. If that is nonetheless to be labelled a causal theory 
of action, then in our view it is so distinct from the orthodox causal theory in 
its details as to make the shared label misleading. The cta as ordinarily pitched 
is committed to much more than the bare thesis that propositional attitudes 
play some sort of causal role in action.
3.3 Can Mental Imagery Be Abstract?
Intentions can specify actions at a very high level of abstraction. Someone can 
have an intention to succeed in their career, to find true love, or to make the 
world a better place. Such a level of abstraction seems to require propositional 
content. That is because an intention which is so abstract is compatible with 
very many sorts of imagery. What would the imagery be that corresponds to 
the intention to make the world a better place? That is an abstract idea that 
does not seem to correspond to any specific image whatsoever. However, it is 
ideally represented in a propositional format, and we can easily see how an 
intention could propagate this abstract format into more concrete and inten-
tions proximal to action if it were conceptual in form.
However, it is a mistake to assume that mental imagery cannot be abstract. 
Consider Block’s (1983) discussion of the “photographic fallacy” in debates over 
mental imagery. One objection posed to theorists of mental imagery is based 
upon the idea that imagery-style representations must be determinate with 
respect to all their details. For example, Pylyshyn (1978) discusses the fact that 
when four-year olds are shown and then asked to draw a tilted beaker contain-
ing coloured water, they do not draw the water as remaining horizontal but 
rather draw it as perpendicular to the beaker (as if it did not respect gravity). 
He claims that this result motivates for the idea that visual experience is 
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“descriptive” (by which he means quasi-linguistic) rather than “pictorial,” since 
if the visual representation in memory were pictorial then it should specify 
visual details determinately, in this case, the angle between the surface of the 
liquid and the beaker.
In response to this line of argument, Block replies that there is no need that 
pictorial representations must be determinate with respect to every visual fea-
ture that they represent. Sometimes, they can represent the existence of some 
determinable property (e.g., the way that mountainous terrain is represented 
on a map) while being non-committal on the specifics of the property (e.g., the 
number of mountains, and their specific topography). What sets the image 
apart from a proposition or conceptual content is rather that it is iconic in its 
format.5 It lacks syntactic structure of the kind that language possesses. To 
make this difference stark, note that there is a syntactically correct way to de-
compose sentences. It does not do to split the sentence “Bob is happy” right 
down the middle, since it will make nonsense of the parts “Bob i” and “s happy.” 
By contrast, an iconic representation (like a map) can be decomposed in any of 
number of ways without respect for any sort of syntax, and the parts will con-
tinue to represent just as well as the whole (Fodor 2007; cf. Quilty-Dunn 2016).
With this in mind, we are happy to put ourselves on the line in claiming that 
there can be intentions representing actions at a very high level of abstraction. 
We make sense of this in terms of a hierarchy of parameters, and for which 
specifications of values for the higher parameters will automatically activate a 
range of values at the lower levels in the hierarchy, but will leave them more or 
less unspecified within this range. For example, one may have a mental image 
of a drinking glass that is indeterminate with respect to the precise geometric 
dimensions of the glass. However, there will be a number of dimensions that 
will be primed on account of their likelihood relative to others. If prompted, 
we can make these dimensions more determinate, and presumably some simi-
lar process is at work for unconscious mental images, as well. We contend that 
the making determinate of lower level parameters corresponds to the means-
end reasoning that is characteristic of practical reason once an agent is faced 
with implementing an abstract intention in a specific situational context.
It may be difficult to see how a picture would work like this in specific cases, 
like that of the intention to “make the world a better place.” We think the right 
characterisation of these will need to proceed on a case by case basis. In this 
5 Note that this sets our account apart from that of Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017); although 
they also talk in terms of determinate and determinable properties, they take the representa-
tion of determinable properties by intentions to be propositional while we take them to be 
iconic or quasi-perceptual.
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particular case, the content seems to be so vague that very many things come 
under the description. In fact, we would suggest that even on a propositional 
view of intention it will be difficult to explain what the content of this inten-
tion is. On our view, it is likely that there is no particular sensorimotor content 
that is appropriate to this content, but it also seems that if the agent were to 
deliberate on the meaning of this sentence then it would eventually result in a 
more concrete set of plans which could constitute a bona fide image-as- 
intention, on our view.
In any case, our main aim in this subsection is to dispute the idea that men-
tal images cannot be abstract per se. That is a prejudice, since mental images 
can specify an indeterminate set of parameters or higher order variables that 
range over multiple parameters without ceasing to be quasi-perceptual in for-
mat. We can see the transition from highly abstract (or “distal”) intentions to 
“proximal” intentions implementable in a concrete situation in terms of the 
progressive filling out of the lower-level parameters in a hierarchy, until such 
time as the image is of an appropriate grain to drive the decision variable to 
bound in the diffusion to bound mechanisms discussed in Section 2.
4 Conclusion
Diffusion-to-bound models of decision making are able to accurately model 
performance and response time in a wide range of perceptual decision- making 
paradigms. There is also very strong electrophysiological support of a model of 
this general kind. It is therefore a good place to begin in understanding the 
neural mechanisms which underlie decision-making in general.
Some theorists will demur from this assessment, on the grounds that inten-
tional action has a character wholly different to the kinds of tasks in experi-
mental paradigms modelled using diffusion-to-bound. In the dot motion 
paradigm, for example, the subject is required to make a decision about wheth-
er the dots are moving left or right. But in the cases that are paradigmatic in the 
philosophical literature, an agent is required to choose between two more 
courses of action on the basis of competing reasons. In some cases, for in-
stance, the choice is between a course of action that is pragmatically best and 
one that is morally best (e.g., the choice to help someone at some cost to one-
self). So one may refuse the relevance of diffusion-to-bound models on the 
basis that they seem to lack the rational component of choice that philoso-
phers want to understand.
However, this ruling of diffusion-to-bound mechanisms as non-rational in 
principle seems to us premature. There are good reasons why the extrapolation 
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of diffusion-to-bound modelling ought to be attempted in spite of the superfi-
cial differences between intentional and perceptual decision-making. Primar-
ily, to posit mechanisms distinct from those that are well evidenced in simpler 
contexts is to be committing oneself to a dual-process account on which differ-
ent mechanisms are implemented for different sorts of decision making (Ev-
ans & Stanovich 2013). This is not an invalid path to take, but it comes with 
theoretical costs.
Primarily, positing multiple mechanisms obliges us to explain how those 
mechanisms interact in order to produce behaviour. With respect to intention-
al action, this explanation will need to be twofold. Firstly, it will need to ex-
plain how it is that one or another mechanism for action is selected over the 
other(s) that are posited by the account, and in what circumstances; secondly, 
it will need to explain how the representational format that is putatively ap-
propriate to higher-level intention interfaces with the representational format 
that is putatively appropriate to bodily movement (Burnston 2017). Our ac-
count sidesteps these issues.
A second cost to this approach is that it risks indulging in exceptionalism 
about human action that is at odds with the view that we occupy a non- 
exceptional place in the natural world. Although it is true that human behav-
iour appears to have a remarkably wide scope and flexibility, it seems more 
plausible to think that this is the result of progressive iterations on simpler 
mechanisms that we share with other animals, rather than a discontinuous 
leap from those mechanisms. These costs, while clearly not fatal to the dual-
mechanisms approach or to cta, seem to us to justify the removal of objec-
tions against alternative approaches.
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Chapter 2




The contemporary philosophy of action has revolved around the notion of in-
tentional action, and it is widely agreed that intentionality distinguishes genu-
ine action from mere behavior and mere happenings. In cognitive and social 
psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of 
the workings of two distinct systems (or types of mental processes). System 1, 
as it is often called, is characterized by processes that are fast, effortless, auto-
matic, and unconscious. Examples include intuitive judgments, the recogni-
tion of faces and facial expressions, emotional reactions, fight-or-flight 
responses, and overlearned routines (such as typing a word, playing an instru-
ment, driving a car, and so on). System 2 is engaged in processes that are slow, 
deliberate, controlled, and conscious. Paradigmatic examples are conscious 
and deliberate reasoning, the solution of novel and difficult problems, and the 
exercise of self-control. This dual-system framework has been deployed suc-
cessfully in many areas of empirical research and I will assume, here, that it is 
on the right track in providing an empirically adequate account of human cog-
nition and agency. (For an extensive overview and review see Evans 2008; see 
also Sloman 1996, Kahneman 2011, Evans & Stanovich 2013.)
Interestingly, the notion of intentionality does not occupy a theoretical role 
in the dual-system framework. Occasionally, however, some researchers in this 
area identify intentional actions with actions that are consciously controlled. 
Further, in the empirical literature it is often claimed that most of our behavior 
is driven by System 1 processes that are automatic and not consciously con-
trolled. Given this, we face obvious and pressing questions. Is the philosophical 
account of intentional action compatible with the dual-system theory? If so, 
how can the dual-system theory account for intentional action? And what is 
the role of consciousness? If we simply identify intentional actions with con-
sciously controlled System 2 outputs, we face the unpalatable conclusion that 
most of our behavior is not intentional, provided that most of our behavior is 
automatic and driven by System 1, as claimed in the empirical literature. We 
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face, then, the further question of how much of our behavior can qualify as in-
tentional within the dual-system framework.
In order to address those questions, we will need to get clearer about the 
role of consciousness in the dual-system theory and in intentional action. First, 
I will outline the standard view of intentional action, the dual-system theory, 
and the role of consciousness in the dual-system-theory. In order to discuss the 
role of consciousness in intentional action, I will consider five cases in which 
the activation of a social stereotype influences behavior in different ways and 
with varying degrees of conscious awareness. This will allow us to see how in-
tentional action can be captured within the dual-system theory, and it will al-
low us to see that most of our everyday behavior can qualify as intentional, 
even if most of it is automatic. In particular, on the basis of the discussion of 
those five cases, I will propose a revised version of the standard view according 
to which automatic action (or so called “automatic goal pursuit”) can qualify as 
derivatively intentional, if it has an appropriate history of habit formation.1 An 
important general lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional ac-
tion need to consider the role of consciousness in action more carefully, both 
in the guidance of action and in the history of habit formation. Further, the 
discussion will point to an important distinction between two kinds of inten-
tions, and we will see how intentional action and goal-directed behavior can 
come apart.
2 The Standard View of Intentional Action
In the philosophy of mind and action, it is generally agreed that intentionality 
is the mark of genuine agency. For some time, it was also generally agreed that 
intentional agency can be explained in terms of the roles of the agent’s desires 
and beliefs (largely due to the influence of Davidson 1963). In particular, it was 
widely assumed that to act intentionally is to act for a reason, and that acting 
for a reason is to be explained in terms of causation and rationalization by the 
agent’s desires and beliefs. It is still widely held that there is a close connection 
between intentional action and acting for reasons—that intentional actions 
are usually performed for reasons. But the underlying claim that intentions can 
be reduced to desires and beliefs is now widely rejected (largely due to the in-
fluence of Bratman 1987). According to most contemporary versions of this 
standard theory of action, intentions play a crucial and irreducible role in 
 practical reasoning, long-term planning, and in the initiation and guidance of 
1 For related but nevertheless quite different approaches to this complex of issues see, for in-
stance, Carruthers 2009, Frankish 2009, Evans 2010, and Hommel 2017.
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action. On this view, the intentionality of action is to be explained in terms of 
the initiation and guidance by intentions, construed as irreducible mental 
states (Bratman 1987, Mele 1992, Enç 2003). In what follows, I will assume this 
as the current version of the standard view.
Philosophers of action have tended to assume that most of our everyday 
behavior qualifies as intentional, partly because they have assumed that the 
standard view can accommodate the intentionality of habitual actions. David-
son, for instance, noted that “we cannot suppose that whenever an agent acts 
intentionally he goes through a process of deliberation or reasoning” (1978: 85). 
On his view, actions are intentional only if they are caused and rationalized by 
the relevant desires and beliefs. But it is not required that the agent conscious-
ly considers the relevant desires and beliefs in reasoning. Rather, “if someone 
acts with an intention, he must have attitudes and beliefs from which, had he 
been aware of them and had the time, he could have reasoned that his action 
was desirable” (1978: 85). Davidson’s example is an agent who adds spice to a 
stew with the intention of improving the taste. We can certainly imagine that 
this action is highly habitual, such that the agent’s mind is preoccupied with 
something else. The action would nevertheless seem to be intentional (more 
on this below, in Section 6). Proponents of the view that intentions are irreduc-
ible usually offer a similar qualification. According to the current standard 
view, intentions are defined in terms of their functional roles, which include, 
most importantly, the initiation and guidance of action (Bratman 1987, Mele 
1992, Enç 2003). According to the corresponding qualification, it is not required 
that the agent is consciously aware of the intention. It is sufficient, that is, if the 
action is initiated and guided by an intention that is consciously accessible (see 
Mele 2009: Ch. 2).
With this qualification in place, the standard view can accommodate the 
intentionality of habitual actions. For, even if most of our everyday behavior is 
habitual, as it seems, it is plausible to assume that most of our behavior is in-
tentional, because it is plausible to assume that most habitual actions are initi-
ated and guided by intentions that are consciously accessible (such that the 
agent could tell us his or her intention, if we asked).
3 Dual-System Theory
Dual-system theories “abound in cognitive and social psychology” (Evans 
2008). They were first proposed to account for biases in logical reasoning, but 
are now widely deployed in the explanation of human cognition, decision-
making, and agency. There are numerous versions of this view, but they share 
the same basic structure. Until recently, this structure was usually described by 
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means of dichotomies. System 1 processes were characterized as fast, effortless, 
automatic, and unconscious. System 2 processes were characterized as slow, 
deliberate, controlled, and conscious. More recently, this way of capturing the 
core of the dual-system theory has come under attack (for a summary of those 
criticisms and references see Evans & Stanovich 2013). Proponents of the view 
have acknowledged some of the criticisms, and they have adjusted the presen-
tation of the view accordingly. In what follows, I will base my discussion on the 
recent accounts of the theory provided by Evans & Stanovich 2013 and Kahne-
man 2011.
According to Evans & Stanovich, the mentioned dichotomies capture “cor-
relates” of the two systems, but they should not be taken as definitive (neces-
sary and sufficient conditions). On their current view, the defining features of 
System 2 processes are “cognitive decoupling” and the “strong loading on the 
working memory resources that this requires” (2013: 226). This is in line with 
Kahneman’s view, in which System 2 processes are defined in terms of the kind 
of effort that is required in the simultaneous maintenance of several (and 
therefore decoupled) representations in working memory, and that is charac-
teristic of conscious problem solving, reasoning, and deliberation (2011: Ch. 2). 
Evans & Stanovich define System 1 now solely in terms of “autonomy”. By this 
they mean, roughly, that System 1 responses are triggered by their stimulus 
without the involvement or intervention of System 2 (2013: 236). This coheres, 
again, with Kahneman’s account, according to which the defining and unifying 
feature of System 1 processes is their automaticity (2011: Ch. 1).2
How do the two systems lead to action? The emerging consensus is that 
System 2 is endowed with the top-down control to inhibit or override System 1 
processes. This is what Evans & Stanovich call a default-interventionist archi-
tecture.3 On their account, System 1 usually provides the “default response” to 
a given task or situation, which arises quickly and intuitively. System 2 may 
intervene by overriding or inhibiting the default response, if there is sufficient 
time and if the agent is motivated to engage in effortful System 2 processing. 
2 Evans & Stanovich (2013) now prefer the terminology of dual-processes, because they do not 
mean to imply that there are two separate systems in the brain. System 1, in particular, is not 
one unified mechanism, but an array of automatic processes or modules. Kahneman ac-
knowledges this, but he nevertheless keeps the terminology of systems. This is common prac-
tice, and I will continue to use the systems terminology as well.
3 Evans & Stanovich distinguish between two architectures: parallel-competitive and default-
interventionist. According to the former, the two systems simply compete for control, in par-
allel, and there is no systematic interaction. Evans & Stanovich argue convincingly that this 
is implausible (2013: 237). On this view, it seems mysterious how System 2 can ever gain con-
trol over behavior, because System 1 is always quicker than System 2. Further, System 2 oper-
ates with precious working memory resources, and one would expect that such a high-level 
system is provided with a more systematic access to the motor control system.
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On their view, “most behavior will accord with defaults, and intervention will 
occur only when difficulty, novelty, and motivation combine to command the 
resources of working memory” (2013: 237). Kahneman proposes a similar archi-
tecture. On his view, System 1 continuously and automatically generates “sug-
gestions” (impressions, desires, and intuitions), which are often endorsed by 
System 2 “with little or no modification” (2011: 24). System 2 engages in effortful 
processing and takes over when difficulties arise, when errors are detected, or 
when System 1 fails to provide a default response. In what follows, I will assume 
that a default-interventionist architecture provides the correct account of how 
the two systems lead to action, and the details of this view will be further speci-
fied and qualified in due course.
4 An Obvious but Unsuccessful Proposal
From what we have seen so far, it seems already clear that the standard view of 
intentional action and the dual-system theory are not incompatible. Accord-
ing to one obvious proposal on how to locate or capture intentional action 
within the dual-system framework, intentional actions are simply System 2 
outputs: actions that are generated by System 2 processes. It seems that some 
of the researchers who work on automaticity and dual-system theory hold this 
view of intentional action. It seems that way, because automatic processes are 
sometimes contrasted with processes that are consciously controlled and in-
tentional (see Bargh 1994, Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Bargh 2005, Evans & 
 Stanovich 2013, for instance).4 As mentioned, the reduction of intentions to 
desires and beliefs is now widely rejected in philosophy, but it is still common-
ly assumed that intentions are usually based on desires. One could capture this 
in accord with the view just outlined by adding the assumption that System 1 
generates desires that may or may not be endorsed by System 2, assuming, fur-
ther, that the endorsement of a desire may consist simply in the formation of 
an intention to pursue the desired goal.5
However, as already indicated, this view has a serious drawback. In the em-
pirical literature, it is often claimed that the great majority of our behavior is 
automatic. In an influential review article, Bargh & Chartrand (1999) evoked 
4 According to Bargh 1994, the absence of intentionality is one of the “four horsemen” of auto-
maticity. In this relatively early review of automaticity research, Bargh characterized inten-
tionality in terms of conscious control. In later work, Bargh mentions intentionality only in 
passing, usually as synonymous with conscious control.
5 The endorsement of a desire may of course involve more than that, such as the reflective 
judgment that the desired end is desirable or good. The proposed claim here is that endorse-
ment may consist only in the formation of the corresponding intention.
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the “unbearable automaticity of being”, referring to Baumeister et al. (1998), 
who estimated that only about five percent of our behavior is consciously con-
trolled. Similarly, Aarts et al. (2005: 466) confidently assert that “most of our 
social behavior occurs in an automatic fashion and originates in the uncon-
scious”. If we identified intentional actions with System 2 outputs, and if we 
contrasted thereby automatic System 1 outputs with intentional System 2 out-
puts, we would have to conclude that the great majority of our actions are not 
intentional. Moreover, the implicit identification of intentional actions with 
consciously controlled actions is at odds with the mentioned qualification of 
the standard view, according to which intentional action does not require con-
scious awareness of the relevant mental attitudes (see Section 2). And this 
means, in turn, that one could not accommodate the intentionality of habitual 
actions if one simply identified intentional actions with System 2 outputs.
Further, it is questionable that all desires are generated by System 1 and that 
the endorsement of desires is always due to System 2. Philosophers have long 
noted that many of our desires appear to be reason-responsive, and there is 
now a considerable amount of empirical evidence in support of this view (see 
Dill & Holton 2014). Some desires simply vanish when one learns that the de -
sired object is unattainable, or when one judges that something else would be 
better, for instance. Some desires, that is, are responsive to the judgments and 
intentions generated by System 2, and some desires may even be generated by 
System 2. Given this, it would simply be a mistake to assume that all desires are 
first generated by System 1, and then, perhaps, endorsed by System 2.
Concerning the endorsement of desires, there is no good reason to think 
that this is always a System 2 process. System 2 processes are effortful in the 
sense that they involve cognitive decoupling and a strong load on working 
memory. It seems clear that we often endorse desires, intuitions, and other 
“default suggestions” consciously and swiftly, without engaging in effortful rea-
soning or cognition. Given this, the endorsement of desires need not be a Sys-
tem 2 process. Given, further, that the endorsement of a desire may consist 
simply in the formation of an intention to pursue the desired goal, this means 
that the formation of an intention need not be a System 2 process.
To see why this is plausible, note that many System 1 processes can be flexi-
ble, in the sense that their execution can be sensitive to the features of the 
particular situation and to the agent’s beliefs about how to pursue or realize 
the goal. Examples from priming studies will help to illustrate this point. It has 
been shown, for instance, that when subjects are primed, in a first task, with 
words that are related to rudeness, kindness, helping, or so, they are more like-
ly to engage in rude, polite, or helping behaviors in a subsequent task (Aarts 
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et al. 2005, Bargh & Williams 2006).6 Rude, polite, or helping behaviors are 
typically sensitive to the features of the particular situation and to the agent’s 
background beliefs about how to pursue the action in the given situation. This 
kind of flexibility cannot be explained in terms of rigid stimulus-response as-
sociations, which map a particular type of input (or situation) to a particular 
type of output (or action). For this reason, most researchers in this field agree 
that such actions are instances of “automatic goal pursuit”: actions that are to 
be explained in terms of the activation of goal representations that initiate and 
guide the execution of the behavior (Custers & Aarts 2010).7 On this view, the 
activation of the stimulus leads to the performance of the action indirectly, by 
way of the activation of the relevant goal, such that the resulting goal-pursuit 
is sensitive to the agent’s beliefs about how that goal is to be pursued or real-
ized in the circumstances. (Direct empirical evidence for this kind of flexibility 
is provided by Hassin et al. 2009.)
Now, according to one standard definition in psychology, goals are “internal 
representations of desired states” (Austin & Vancouver 1996: 338). According to 
another, a goal is the “representation of a future object that the organism is 
committed to approach or avoid” (Elliot & Fryer 2008: 244). The former corre-
sponds, very roughly, to the philosophical notion of desire. The latter corre-
sponds to the philosophical notion of intention, again very roughly.8 We might 
say here that the definition of goals in psychology is ambiguous between the 
philosophical notions of desire and intention. Or, more positively, we might 
just as well say that the definition encompasses both the philosophical notion 
6 Recently, some of the seminal experiments in this area have been called into question. Sev-
eral attempts at replication have either failed or produced only significantly smaller effects. 
There is, however, also a very large body of research that corroborates the findings. Even if 
the effects are small and difficult to reproduce, it seems rather unlikely that there are no real 
effects that underlie the results in this area of research. For a recent discussion of those issues 
see Open Science Collaboration 2015.
7 According to Levy (2014: 118, note 5), the evidence does not indicate automatic goal pursuit, 
because the actions in question are merely modulated by the priming. This is a plausible in-
terpretation of many of the classic findings. For instance, in one such experiment, priming 
influenced the accuracy of the task performance by influencing the speed of the task com-
pletion. But it can be argued that even in cases of this kind a non-conscious goal was “super-
imposed on an already activated parallel conscious task goal” (Bargh et al. 2001: 1024). In 
other experiments, an interpretation in terms of modulation is rather implausible. For in-
stance, the subliminal priming of cooperation or helping behavior is not plausibly interpret-
ed as a mere modulation (see Bargh et al. 2001, Aarts et al. 2005).
8 See Bratman 1987 and Mele 2009, for instance, who stress this element of commitment, or of 




of desire and of intention. However, talk of automatic goal-pursuit suggests 
that the scientists in this particular research area have in mind the formation 
of a representational state that initiates and guides the pursuit of the relevant 
action—a state, in other words, that commits the agent to the pursuit of a par-
ticular action. Given this, we can say that the scientists in this area agree that 
automatic goal-pursuit, which is a paradigmatic System 1 process, is to be ex-
plained in terms of the automatic activation of intentions.
One might, of course, reject a definition of intentions solely in terms of the 
functional roles of initiation and guidance, and insist, for instance, that genu-
ine intentions must be consciously formed or accessed. But this would not 
facilitate real progress. For if one simply claimed that intentional action re-
quires conscious intention, without further qualification, one could not ac-
commodate the apparent intentionality of habitual actions, and one would 
once again face the undesirable conclusion that most of our actions are not 
intentional.
We have seen that the standard view of intentional action is clearly not 
 incompatible with the dual-system theory. But a satisfactory account of inten-
tional action within this theory has to be more nuanced than the view consid-
ered in this section. In order to make constructive progress on this, we need to 
get clearer about the role of consciousness in the dual-system theory and in 
intentional action.
5 The Role of Consciousness in the Dual-System Theory
In the previous section, we have seen that consciousness is not a distinguish-
ing feature of System 2, as System 1 processes may also involve consciousness. 
The default suggestions of System 1 appear often in consciousness, and if one 
endorses such suggestions by consciously forming a judgment or an intention 
without effortful reasoning, then the endorsement is itself part of the System 1 
process. What is distinctive of System 2 processes is, more specifically, that one 
consciously conducts individual steps of reasoning in an effortful process that 
requires the simultaneous maintenance of decoupled representations in work-
ing memory. What kind of consciousness is at issue here?
In philosophy, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal and access 
consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is usually characterized in terms of 
what it is like to have a certain experience (such as the distinctive quality of a 
certain visual or auditory perception). According to common characteriza-
tions of access consciousness, a representation is conscious if it is available 
for reasoning, decision-making, and the control of action (including verbal 
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report). Access consciousness is a functional notion—it specifies the function-
al roles of conscious mental states.
In a review article, Evans (2008) points out that there is an operational defi-
nition of consciousness that is shared, at least implicitly, by most dual-system 
theories: “System 2 thinking requires access to a central working memory sys-
tem of limited capacity” and “what we are aware of at any given time is repre-
sented in this working memory, through which conscious thinking flows in a 
sequential manner” (2008: 259). This is a definition in terms of access and it 
specifies how representations become accessible for further processing—
namely, by virtue of being in the central working memory system.
Evans notes, further, that this view is closely associated with the global 
workspace theory of consciousness. According to this view, a representation is 
conscious if it is “broadcast” in the “global workspace”, which makes it available 
to a wide range of consumer systems (Baars 1997). Initially, this talk of broad-
casting in the global workspace was merely a heuristic metaphor. But more 
recently this view has been developed into a global neuronal workspace theory 
of consciousness, which specifies concrete neural mechanisms for the work-
space and for broadcasting. This theory is empirically well-motivated and it 
has been successfully deployed in the neuroscientific study of consciousness 
(Dehaene & Naccache 2001, Baars 2002). There has been some debate about 
whether or not the workspace can simply be identified with the central work-
ing memory system, but it is agreed that working memory is a central compo-
nent of the workspace (Baars & Franklin 2003, Levy 2014). And as Evans notes, 
this “association of conscious thought with such a working memory explains 
the slow, sequential, and low-capacity nature of System 2” (2008: 259).
So, the role of consciousness in the dual-system theory is captured by an 
operational definition of consciousness that coheres with the philosophical 
notion of access consciousness and with the global (neuronal) workspace the-
ory of consciousness. But can we plausibly restrict our considerations to access 
consciousness?
Note, first of all, that we are interested in the role of consciousness in the 
initiation and guidance of action. That is just to say that we are interested in 
the functional role of consciousness, which is precisely what a definition of 
access consciousness is supposed to capture. Note, moreover, that we are con-
cerned here primarily with the roles of desires, beliefs, and intentions. To insist 
that phenomenal consciousness must play a role would commit one to the 
rather implausible view that conscious access to desires, beliefs, and inten-
tions is always accompanied by phenomenal consciousness.
However, one may grant that access consciousness is all that matters in 
most cases and hold that there are other cases in which mental states influence 
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or motivate behavior in virtue of their phenomenal quality. Suppose, for in-
stance, that certain aesthetic or moral judgments motivate actions in virtue of 
the fact that they are based on aesthetic perceptions or moral sentiments with 
certain phenomenal qualities. Would this not show that phenomenal con-
sciousness can play an important and irreducible role in action?
What is at issue in such cases is always the “functional correlate” of the phe-
nomenal experience—that is, the functional role that correlates with the phe-
nomenal quality in question (see Chalmers 1995). It may well be that a mental 
state has a particular functional role in virtue of having a certain phenomenal 
quality. But its role in the initiation and guidance of action is still its functional 
role. Note that there are two different explanatory relations in play here. 
A mental state plays a role in the initiation and guidance of action in virtue of 
being a mental state with that functional role, and it may have and play this 
functional role in virtue of having a certain phenomenal quality. But its role in 
action remains its functional role. The explanatory relation between the phe-
nomenal quality and the action is indirect, mediated by its functional role, 
which is the functional correlate of the phenomenal quality in question.
Note, finally, that the functional role of a conscious intention is by no means 
exhausted by the initiation and guidance of action (including verbal report). In 
particular, by virtue of being a conscious intention it has the functional role of 
being available for further deliberation and decision-making, and it plays this 
functional role by virtue of being broadcast in the global workspace (or central 
working memory system).
6 The Role of Consciousness in Intentional Action
Our main question is how to account for intentional action within the dual-
system theory, and we have seen that we need to get clearer about the role of 
consciousness. As mentioned, in Section 2, it is common to qualify the stan-
dard view with the claim that intentional action does not require conscious 
deliberation or conscious awareness of the relevant intention. The fact that 
this is usually added as a qualification suggests that it is usually taken for grant-
ed that paradigmatic instances of intentional action are initiated and guided 
by conscious intentions (and, perhaps, reasons). I share this assumption, at 
least as a starting point for the present investigation.9 In the previous section, 
9 This assumption is in line with commonsense or folk intuitions about intentional action. The 
empirical evidence provided by Malle & Knobe 1997 and Malle et al. 2000 suggests that, ac-
cording to the folk concept, an action is intentional and based on reasons only if the agent is 
aware of the relevant intention and reasons.
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we have seen that the role of consciousness in the dual-system theory is 
captured by the global (neuronal) workspace theory of consciousness, and 
I have argued that the implicit restriction to access consciousness is unprob-
lematic. With this framework in place, we can now address our main question 
in a more systematic and nuanced manner. We will consider a series of five 
cases, in which behavior is influenced by the activation of a social stereotype 
in five different ways, with varying degrees of consciousness. This distinction 
between five cases is not exhaustive. But it will cover the full range from auto-
matic and unconscious goal pursuit to conscious and deliberate action, and it 
will thereby allow us to consider the full range from full System 1 to full System 
2 engagement.
As mentioned, experiments show that behavior can be influenced by prim-
ing with words that are associated with concepts such as rudeness, politeness, 
or helping. Likewise, it has been shown that behavior can be influenced by 
priming with words that are associated with social stereotypes concerning 
race, gender, or social class, and the same has been shown for the activation of 
such stereotypes by the presence of group members and perception of group 
features, such as skin color (Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Aarts et al. 2005, Bargh & 
Williams 2006). Generally speaking, stereotyping involves generalization by 
way of categorization and association, and social stereotypes are commonly 
defined as “generalizations about the shared attributes of a group of people” 
(Judd & Park 1993). For instance, a person is perceived as Asian, female, or 
working class, due to certain superficial features, and this categorization is as-
sociated with features such as being good at math, bad at driving, or the like.10 
A stereotype is said to be activated when the perception or activation of one 
feature automatically activates an associated feature (or features). Experi-
ments have shown that stereotypes can be activated without the subject’s 
awareness, and they have shown that both the conscious and the unconscious 
activation of stereotypes tends to influence behavior. In the empirical litera-
ture, it is generally assumed that the influence on behavior may be mediated 
by one of the following two mechanisms (Bargh et al. 2001, Aarts et al. 2005, 
Bargh 2005, Bargh & Williams 2006). First, stereotypes may become associated 
with behavioral tendencies, such that the activation of a stereotypical feature 
automatically activates directly the associated behavioral tendency. Second, it 
is now assumed that stereotypes may also become associated with goal repre-
sentations, such that the activation of the stereotype leads to behavior by 
activating the goal and subsequent goal pursuit. The main difference between 
the two mechanisms concerns behavioral flexibility. The first mechanism is 
10 Social stereotypes need not be negative, and they need not be inaccurate. But they tend 
to be oversimplified overgeneralizations (Judd & Park 1993).
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often described as rigid, in the sense that the activation of the stimulus directly 
activates a tendency to perform a certain type of behavior. The second mecha-
nism is flexible, in the sense that it is sensitive to background beliefs about how 
to pursue or realize a goal in a given situation. To use the example from above, 
the activation of a social stereotype may become associated with the tendency 
to perform a certain type of rude behavior. Or, according to the second mecha-
nism, the activation of the stereotype may automatically activate the goal to be 
rude, such that the pursuit of that goal is guided by background beliefs about 
how the goal is to be pursued in the given situation. The empirical evidence 
suggests that both mechanisms can operate entirely without conscious aware-
ness. This evidence on stereotype activation is an important part of the evi-
dence on implicit bias (Greenwald & Banaji 1995, Petty et al. 2008, for instance). 
The discussion of such cases will make it clear that an account of intentional 
action within the dual-system theory provides also a useful and plausible 
framework for how to interpret and diagnose the pernicious influence that im-
plicit biases can have on our behavior.
Before we proceed, let me stress that the main purpose of considering the 
following five cases is to explore the various possibilities in the theoretical 
landscape, as it were—possibilities concerning the role of consciousness in 
intentional action and concerning the underlying mechanisms. In particular, 
the distinction between cases 4 and 5 will be based on the distinction between 
the two possible mechanisms of automatic goal pursuit just mentioned. I will 
provide references to empirical evidence, where possible, but it should be not-
ed that all questions concerning the exact mechanisms and concerning wheth-
er, or to what extent, human agency instantiates any of those five cases are 
empirical questions—and most of them will remain open empirical questions 
for some time to come.
6.1 Case 1: Full Awareness and Deliberate Action
In this first case, the agent is aware of the stereotype activation and its influ-
ence leads to action by way of conscious deliberation. Suppose, for instance, 
that the agent encounters a member of a stereotyped group and that this auto-
matically activates the associated stereotype. The activation of the stereotype 
is broadcast, in the global workspace (or working memory), and this instigates 
conscious deliberation about how to respond, in this situation. The delibera-
tion is conducted by System 2 and the individual steps of the deliberative pro-
cess are broadcast. This, we may assume, results in the conscious formation of 
an intention, which is then executed with conscious awareness.
In this case, the action is initiated and guided by a conscious intention, and 
this intention is based on conscious deliberation. Everyone would agree, I take 
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it, that the action in this case is clearly intentional in the fullest sense.11 Note, 
though, that not all of the mentioned features are necessary to support the 
verdict that the action is intentional. According to the standard qualification of 
the standard view (see Section 2), initiation and guidance by an accessible in-
tention is sufficient for intentional action. When we turn to case 3 we will see 
that this is in need of further qualification. But it is uncontroversial that initia-
tion and guidance by a conscious intention is sufficient, and that conscious 
deliberation is not required. This is why it would be appropriate to describe the 
action in this case as intentional and deliberate or as intentional in the fullest 
sense.
Note that we do not assume that System 2 intervenes by inhibiting a default 
System 1 response. We may assume that System 2 takes over either because the 
agent is motivated to engage in deliberation, or because the stereotype activa-
tion fails to generate a default response. In either case, the core capacity of 
System 2 to conduct individual steps of reasoning in working memory is fully 
engaged, but the process is nevertheless not a pure System 2 process. In con-
scious deliberation, we consider reasons and we evaluate them in accord with 
certain rules (principles or normative standards). Typically, we are unaware of 
why or how we retrieve certain consideration as reasons and we are unaware of 
why or how we select the underlying rules. The relevant reasons simply appear 
in consciousness, and the relevant rules are usually operative in the back-
ground. The retrieval of reasons and the selection of rules has to be conducted 
by System 1, even in fully conscious deliberation. Otherwise, we would face a 
regress of consciously choosing reasons and rules, and consciously choosing 
reasons and rules for choosing those reasons and rules, and so on. Given this, it 
is clear that no cognitive process can be a pure System 2 process.
6.2 Case 2: Full Awareness and No Deliberation
Suppose now that the agent is aware of the stereotype activation, but that Sys-
tem 2 does not engage in conscious deliberation. As before, the stereotype is 
activated and its activation is broadcast (in the global workspace or working 
memory). But this time, the stereotype activation is not followed by conscious 
deliberation. Rather, it directly activates an associated goal representation 
(such as the goal to be rude, polite, or to engage in helping behavior). We may 
assume that the activation of the goal is also conscious, in the sense that it is 
11 This verdict is supported by the standard view of intentional action, as outlined in Section 
2, and by all its main rivals in the philosophy of action. Further, it is supported by the 
empirical evidence on the folk concept of intentional action provided by Malle & Knobe 
1997 and Malle et al. 2000.
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broadcast, and we may assume that the goal is endorsed by the conscious for-
mation of an intention, which is then executed with conscious awareness.
The action is initiated and guided by a conscious intention. This intention is 
not based on conscious reasoning, although it may be based on reasons (which 
are accessible but not accessed in the situation). Either way, the action is clear-
ly intentional, because it is initiated and guided by a conscious intention.12
This case does not involve genuine System 2 processing. The agent is aware 
of the stereotype activation and the goal activation, and the goal is endorsed by 
the conscious formation of an intention. But an engagement of System 2 would 
require, in addition, that individual steps of effortful reasoning are carried out 
in the central working memory system.
The action in this case is clearly intentional. I would suggest that our confi-
dence in this verdict is to be explained, in part, by the assumption that the ac-
tion is initiated and guided by a conscious intention. This will become clearer 
when we turn to the next case, where we will see that matters are far from 
straightforward once we remove the assumption that the action is initiated 
and guided by a conscious intention.
6.3 Case 3: Goal Pursuit and Partial Automaticity
As in case 2, the stereotype is activated and broadcast, and this automatically 
activates an associated goal. But suppose now that the goal activation is not 
broadcast. The agent, that is, is not aware of the goal activation and is therefore 
not in a position to endorse (or inhibit) the goal pursuit by forming a conscious 
intention. The empirical evidence suggests that such automatic goal activation 
may nevertheless result in automatic goal pursuit (for reviews see Bargh & 
Chartrand 1999, Bargh & Williams 2006, Custers & Aarts 2010). Let us suppose, 
then, that the goal activation initiates and guides an action without conscious 
awareness.
How should we judge this case? Is the action intentional? In this case, we 
need to know more. In particular, we need to know whether or not the perfor-
mance of the action is habitual. To see this, return again to Davidson’s example. 
The agent adds spice to the stew, mindlessly and without conscious awareness 
(as we are implicitly invited to assume). Why does it nevertheless seem that the 
action is intentional? The reason, I suggest, is twofold. First, we assume, with 
Davidson, that the relevant mental attitudes are accessible—if asked, the 
agent could readily declare his or her intention (to add spice in order to 
 improve the taste). Second, we are clearly led to believe that the action is 
12 As in case 1, this verdict is supported by the standard view, its main rivals in the philoso-
phy of action, and the empirical evidence on the folk concept of intentional action pro-
vided by Malle & Knobe 1997 and Malle et al. 2000.
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 habitual and that the agent has the right history of habit formation. Clearly, the 
agent is not adding spice for the first time, and also not just for the second or 
third time. We would assume, rather, that the agent has done this over and over 
again. And we would assume that the agent did so on some occasions in the 
past with conscious intent.
With those background assumptions in place, we judge, readily, that the ac-
tion is intentional. In particular, we implicitly assume that there is an underly-
ing habit and an appropriate history of habit formation. There are, I suggest, 
two main types of such an appropriate history. Either the habit has been formed 
by several performances of the action with conscious intent. Or, it may be that 
the agent has acquired the habit in some other way, such as by imitation, but 
has later endorsed the action and its goal by forming a conscious intention. In 
either case, the intentionality of later manifestations of the habit is derivative: 
the intentionality of the action derives from earlier instances of acting with 
conscious intent.
Those considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to our present case 3. If there 
is an appropriate history of habit formation, such that the habit was either 
formed or endorsed by acting on the stereotype activation with conscious in-
tent, then a later manifestation, as in case 3, is derivatively intentional— 
provided, as we should add, that the intention is still consciously accessible.
The assessment of such cases becomes more difficult once we remove the 
assumption that there is an appropriate history of habit formation. Davidson’s 
case would simply appear to be very odd without this assumption. Why on 
earth would one add spice to a stew automatically and without awareness if 
one had no corresponding history of habit formation? In case 3, in contrast, 
there is a possible explanation of how and why the agent acts automatically 
and without awareness. In the literature on implicit bias, it is often assumed 
that we may acquire the relevant stereotype-goal associations without a his-
tory of habit formation (or conscious endorsement), because it is assumed 
that we may acquire such associations by being exposed to them in our socio-
cultural environment. This would explain the association between the stereo-
type and the goal in our present case 3.
So, the stereotype is activated, and the agent is aware of this. But the agent 
is unaware of the goal activation and of the subsequent initiation and guid-
ance of behavior. Is the action intentional? I am inclined to think that the ac-
tion is not intentional.13 But there is one complication that needs to be 
13 As before, this intuition is in line with the standard view and with empirical evidence on 
the folk concept of intentions action (see footnote 11). Note that if an agent has acquired 
the stereotype-goal association by exposure, then the agent is probably unaware of the 
underlying association. That is, the agent is not only unaware of the goal activation in the 
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addressed here. We assume that the stereotype activation influences behavior 
by automatically activating a goal representation. A goal representation is, by 
definition, a mental state that can initiate and guide action. It has, that is, the 
functional role of an intention in the initiation and guidance of action. And 
this may be taken to suggest that the action is intentional. But what this shows, 
really, is that we need to be more careful, and that we need to make a distinc-
tion. We distinguished already between the automatic activation of a goal rep-
resentation and the endorsement of such a goal by the conscious formation of 
an intention. This distinction is by no means ad hoc. One can find various in-
carnations of it in the empirical literature, and evidence from brain imaging 
studies suggests that the workings of automatic goal activations and conscious 
intentions are implemented by distinct regions in the brain (Frith et al. 2000, 
Bargh 2005, Pacherie & Haggard 2010, for instance). There is, that is, good rea-
son to think that the distinction is real, but the terminology is optional. One 
may, for instance, reserve the term “intention” for mental states that have been 
consciously formed. Or one may introduce a technical term in order to distin-
guish between two kinds of intentions. For instance, in the empirical literature 
it is common to distinguish between conscious intentions and “motor inten-
tions”. That is nothing other than the distinction between conscious intentions 
and goal representations (sometimes also called “motor representations”).
So, goal representations may be classified as forming a kind of intention. 
But, of course, this terminological decision should not lead one to conclude 
that all actions that are initiated and guided by goal representations are there-
fore intentional. What matters is not the terminology, but the two substantive 
issues that have already been discussed: Is the action habitual? Is the agent 
aware of the goal activation? Given this, we can uphold the proposed claim 
that the action in case 3 is not intentional, if it is not habitual, and if the agent 
is not aware of the goal activation and its influence on subsequent behavior.
Note, the suggestion is not that the performance of an intentional action 
requires initiation and guidance by a conscious intention. Rather, the sugges-
tion is that if an action is initiated and guided by an automatically activated 
and unconscious goal representation, and if the action has no appropriate his-
tory of habit formation (or conscious endorsement), then the action is not in-
tentional. In such cases, the action is goal-directed, but not intentional.
Note, finally, that System 2 is not involved in the performance of the action 
in any of the variations of case 3. But if the action has a history of habit 
 formation (or conscious endorsement), then System 2 may have been involved 
particular case. But the agent has probably never been aware of the fact that the activa-
tion of the stereotype activates an associated goal.
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on past occasions, depending on whether or not those occasions involved ef-
fortful deliberation.
6.4 Case 4: Goal Pursuit and Full Automaticity
Assume now that the stereotype and the associated goal are activated auto-
matically, and that neither the stereotype nor the goal is broadcast. As before, 
the agent is not in a position to endorse (or inhibit) the goal by forming a con-
scious intention. The empirical evidence suggests that the automatic activa-
tion of the goal may initiate and guide goal pursuit without conscious 
awareness (Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Aarts et al. 2005, Bargh & Williams 2006, 
Custers & Aarts 2010).
This is an example of fully automatic and unconscious goal pursuit, and the 
agent is unaware of the stereotype activation as well. As in case 3, we need to 
consider the agent’s history in order to arrive at a judgment concerning inten-
tionality. It seems, again, that if there is an appropriate history of habit forma-
tion or conscious endorsement, then the action is derivatively intentional, de-
spite the fact that the agent executes the action in the present case without 
awareness. In support of this, consider the following. Suppose that when you 
drive to work in the morning, you take a right turn at the first junction. Some-
times when you approach the junction, you are aware of approaching a junc-
tion at which you have to turn right, and you then automatically prepare for 
taking the turn. On other occasions, you do not become aware of approaching 
a junction at which you have to turn right, but you automatically prepare for 
taking the turn all the same. In the first case, you are aware of the stimulus, in the 
second you are not. This is analogous to the difference between cases 3 and 4. 
In case 3 the agent is aware of the stereotype activation, in case 4 the agent is 
unaware. The analogy suggests that this difference does not make a difference 
concerning intentionality. In each of those four cases, the action is derivatively 
intentional if it is the manifestation of a habit with the right history (provided 
that the relevant intention is still accessible). And if there is no such history, 
the action does not seem to be intentional. Further, as in case 3, the action is 
goal-directed, but not intentional. System 2 is not involved in the performance 
of the action, but it may have been involved on past occasions, in the acquisi-
tion or endorsement of the relevant habit.
6.5 Case 5: Full Automaticity and No Goal Activation
As mentioned, the activation of a stereotype may influence behavior either by 
activating a goal or by activating more directly an associated behavioral ten-
dency. Let us consider, then, a final case in which the automatic and uncon-
scious activation of a stereotype influences behavior by way of automatically 
activating an associated behavioral tendency, and suppose that the agent is 
Schlosser52
<UN>
unaware of all this (for empirical evidence see Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Aarts 
et al. 2005, Bargh & Williams 2006, Custers & Aarts 2010).
As in case 4, the agent is unaware of both the stereotype activation and its 
influence on behavior. And as in cases 3 and 4, we need to consider whether or 
not the action is the manifestation of a habit with the right history. And as the 
difference in the underlying mechanisms appears to be irrelevant, our assess-
ment of intentionality should follow our discussion of cases 3 and 4. If the ac-
tion is the manifestation of a habit with the right history, then it is derivatively 
intentional. If it is not habitual, then it is not intentional, because the agent is 
entirely unaware of being influenced by the activation of a stereotype. As in 
cases 3 and 4, System 2 is not involved in the performance of the action, but it 
may have been involved on past occasions, in the acquisition or endorsement 
of the relevant habit.
This case shows, though, that there is a sense in which an intentional action 
may not be goal-directed—namely, in the sense that it is not initiated and 
guided by a goal representation. But there is, nevertheless, derivative goal- 
directedness in such cases, because such actions must be derivatively inten-
tional, if they are intentional at all.
7 The Standard View Revised
The discussion of those cases made it clear, I think, that the standard view of 
intentional action is in need of modification and further qualification. Con-
sider, then, the following revised version of the standard view, which summa-
rizes the conclusions and suggestions from the previous section (in a rough 
and ready fashion).
An action is intentional if and only if:
Either (1) the performance of the action is initiated and guided by a con-
scious intention.
Or (2) the action is derivatively intentional.
An action is derivatively intentional if and only if:
Either (2a) the action is the manifestation of a habit that has been formed 
by performing actions of this type with conscious intent (and this inten-
tion is still consciously accessible and would still be endorsed).
Or (2b) the action is the manifestation of a habit that has been acquired 
in some other way and has later been endorsed by the conscious forma-
tion of an intention (and this intention is still consciously accessible and 
would still be endorsed).
According to the standard qualification of the standard view (see Section 2), 
intentional action does not require that the relevant mental attitudes are 
53Dual-System Theory and the Role of Consciousness
<UN>
 consciously accessed—accessibility is sufficient. According to the proposed 
revision, conscious access is also not necessary, but accessibility is not suffi-
cient. The agent must either have a conscious intention that initiates and 
guides the action (to satisfy 1), or the agent must have consciously formed the 
relevant intention at some point in the past (to satisfy 2a or 2b). So, according 
to this account, intentional action does depend on conscious intention, but 
the performance of particular intentional actions does not. The account makes 
no explicit mention of Systems 1 and 2. But the discussion of the five cases in 
the previous section made it clear why and how this account of intentional 
action can be captured within the dual-system theory (in conjunction with the 
global workspace theory of consciousness).
It is important to note that this account does not require that the agent has 
at any point the conscious intention to acquire the habit. The condition on 
habit formation (2a) requires that the habit is formed by performing the action 
with conscious intent. This requires, typically, that the action is performed or 
practiced repeatedly, but not that the agent has the conscious intention to ac-
quire the habit. Note, further, that the account does not entail that the endorse-
ment of a habit (in 2b) must itself be a mental action. The condition requires 
that the habit is endorsed by the formation of a conscious intention, and the 
formation of a conscious intention need not be an action. Arguably, the forma-
tion of an intention is an action only if it is motivated by a further desire or 
intention (such as the desire or intention to settle the practical question at 
hand). It seems perfectly possible that the formation of some intentions is not 
motivated in this way, and it seems perfectly possible that we may consciously 
acquire intentions in this passive or “non-actional” manner (for more on this 
see Mele 2003: Ch. 9).
8 Lessons and Conclusions
There is no straightforward way to locate intentional action in the dual-system 
theory, such as by identifying intentional actions with System 2 outputs. But 
we have seen that the standard view of intentional action can be captured 
within the dual-system theory, and it has emerged that doing so suggests plau-
sible modifications and qualifications of the view. Further, we have seen that it 
is important to distinguish between goal representations and conscious inten-
tions, or, alternatively, between two kinds of intentions.
An important lesson is that philosophical accounts of intentional action 
need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. I have sug-
gested that intentional action depends on consciousness. Consciousness, that 
is, must play a role at some point, either in the initiation and guidance of the 
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action or during the formation or endorsement of the relevant habit. This does 
not mean that intentional action depends on the involvement of System 2, 
because the conscious endorsement of a goal need not involve System 2 pro-
cessing, as I have argued.
What can we say about how much of our behavior can qualify as intentional? 
We can conclude that most of our everyday behavior may well be intentional, 
even if most of it is automatic, because most automatic actions may well be 
habitual and derivatively intentional. This, I should note, includes another way 
in which automatic actions can qualify as derivatively intentional. Many auto-
matic actions are sub-routines that are in the service of consciously accessible 
goals and intentions. Common examples are the sub-actions that one performs 
while playing an instrument or while driving a car. This kind of derivative in-
tentionality is included, because the initiation and guidance of such sub- 
routines is always habitual.
To conclude, then, we have seen that the philosophical standard view of 
intentional action can be captured within the dual-system theory, and we have 
seen that doing so offers important lessons on how to think about the role of 
consciousness in intentional action. And we have seen that the findings from 
the empirical research on automaticity are not so “unbearable” after all, be-
cause they do not undermine the assumption that most of our everyday behav-
ior can qualify as intentional.
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Chapter 3
When Do Robots have Free Will? Exploring the 
Relationships between (Attributions of) 
Consciousness and Free Will
Eddy Nahmias, Corey Hill Allen and Bradley Loveall
1 The Often Implicit, Yet Essential, Connection between 
Consciousness and Free Will
Imagine that, in the future, humans develop the technology to construct hu-
manoid robots with very sophisticated computers instead of brains and with 
bodies made out of metal, plastic, and synthetic materials. The robots look, 
talk, and act just like humans and are able to integrate into human society and 
to interact with humans across any situation. They work in our offices and our 
restaurants, teach in our schools, and discuss the important matters of the day 
in our bars and coffeehouses. How do you suppose you’d respond to one of 
these robots if you were to discover them attempting to steal your wallet or 
insulting your friend? Would you regard them as free and morally responsible 
agents, genuinely deserving of blame and punishment?
If you’re like most people, you are more likely to regard these robots as hav-
ing free will and being morally responsible if you believe that they are con-
scious rather than non-conscious. That is, if you think that the robots actually 
experience sensations and emotions, you are more likely to regard them as hav-
ing free will and being morally responsible than if you think they simply be-
have like humans based on their internal programming but with no conscious 
experiences at all. But why do many people have this intuition? Philosophers 
and scientists typically assume that there is a deep connection between con-
sciousness and free will, but few have developed theories to explain this con-
nection. To the extent that they have, it’s typically via some cognitive capacity 
thought to be important for free will, such as reasoning or deliberation, that 
consciousness is supposed to enable or bolster, at least in humans. But this sort 
of connection between consciousness and free will is relatively weak. First, it’s 
contingent; given our particular cognitive architecture, it holds, but if robots or 
aliens could carry out the relevant cognitive capacities without being con-
scious, this would suggest that consciousness is not constitutive of, or essential 
for, free will. Second, this connection is derivative, since the main connection 
goes through some capacity other than consciousness. Finally, this connection 
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does not seem to be focused on phenomenal consciousness (first-person expe-
rience or qualia), but instead, on access consciousness or self-awareness (more 
on these distinctions below).
Perhaps the most substantive claims about the necessity of consciousness 
for free will come from scientists who discuss free will. For instance, “willu-
sionists,” who say that scientific research suggests that free will is an illusion 
typically reach that conclusion by assuming that free will requires that one’s 
“conscious will” causes one’s actions. Since willusionists argue that scientific 
research shows that conscious will does not cause our actions, they conclude 
that free will is an illusion (see, e.g., Libet 1999; Wegner 2002; Bargh 2008; and 
Harris 2012). Willusionists support their conclusion by arguing that research in 
neuroscience and psychology suggests that conscious mental states and pro-
cesses do not play a causal role in decisions and actions, because non- conscious 
neural or psychological processes happen first.1 These scientists, however, do 
not say much about why consciousness is crucial for free will. They typically 
assert the essential connection with claims such as Roy Baumeister’s: “If there 
are any genuine phenomena associated with the concept of free will, they 
most likely involve conscious choice” (2008, 76; see also Libet 1999 and Wegner 
2002).
Philosophers tend to agree that consciousness is necessary for free will. For 
instance, when they respond to willusionists, they typically dispute the rele-
vance of the neuroscientific studies, the dualist definition of free will, or which 
conscious mental states are relevant to free choices (e.g., important delibera-
tions, not consciousness of an intention to move a moment before an inconse-
quential movement). But these philosophers do not reject the importance of 
consciousness for free will. For example, Al Mele notes that “[i]f all behavior 
were produced only by nonconscious processes, and if conscious decisions (or 
choices) and intentions (along with their physical correlates) were to play no 
role at all in producing any corresponding actions, free will would be in dire 
straits” (2010, 43). And Eddy Nahmias suggests that: “Free will requires that 
one’s actions properly derive from reasons for action that one has at some 
point consciously considered (or at least that one would accept if one consid-
ered them)” (2014, 18).
But it did not take scientists challenging the role of consciousness for phi-
losophers to suggest that it is required for free will. For instance, Galen  Strawson 
1 See Mele (2010) and Nahmias (2014) for various responses to the evidence willusionists use, 
their interpretation of its relevance to conscious intention formation and to free will, and to 
the definition of free will the willusionists (mistakenly) assert as dominant in philosophy and 
as commonsensical.
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writes, “To be responsible… one must have consciously and explicitly chosen 
to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have 
brought it about that one is that way” (1994, 6). Randy Clarke writes, “Free will 
requires a capacity for rational self-determination… a free agent must be able 
to exercise [this capacity] consciously … an agent who is not even capable of 
conscious, effective practical reasoning does not have the variety of rational 
control in acting that we prize” (2003, 16). And Isaiah Berlin writes, “I wish to be 
a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which 
are my own, not by causes that affect me, as it were, from outside” (1958, 203). 
Across diverging theorists—from compatibilists to libertarians to skeptics 
about free will—one truth seems to be self-evident: that free will requires 
consciousness.
Yet, despite the fact that this free will-consciousness connection is so perva-
sive among scientists and philosophers, the connection has typically been as-
serted without much explanation or defense, often taken for granted or left 
implicit. As Gregg Caruso points out, this is an explanatory gap that must be 
filled: “Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and free will is im-
perative if we want to evaluate the various arguments for and against free will” 
(2016, 78). It may be that the connection is under-analyzed precisely because it 
is so intuitive that we tend not to notice it. We’ve never encountered agents 
that seem autonomous and responsible that we did not also take to be con-
scious. But perhaps that will change if we develop autonomous robots (or meet 
intelligent aliens) and we are unsure about their consciousness. Furthermore, 
perhaps we can learn more about the free will-consciousness connection by 
exploring ordinary people’s reactions to such possibilities and trying to tease 
apart which features of consciousness underlie their attributions of free will.
Indeed, until recently, little attention has been paid to ordinary people’s at-
titudes about the connection between consciousness, free will, and moral re-
sponsibility. Given that many free will theorists appeal to commonly held intu-
itions as evidence for their theory, it is important that philosophical theorizing 
about concepts such as free will track ordinary understanding of those concep-
tions, or conversely, provide an error theory to explain why those intuitions are 
mistaken (see, e.g., Murray & Nahmias 2014). While some experimental phi-
losophers and psychologists have conducted studies on people’s intuitions and 
attitudes about free will and moral responsibility, the relationship between 
free will and consciousness has been largely underexplored.2
2 See, e.g., Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner (2006); Nichols & Knobe (2007); Monroe 
& Malle (2010); Monroe, Dillon, & Malle (2014); Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele (2011); Vonasch, 
Baumeister, & Mele (2018).
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Recognizing this gap in the literature, Joshua Shepherd conducted a series 
of studies designed to understand people’s attitudes about the role that con-
sciousness plays in grounding free will and moral responsibility (e.g., 2012, 
2015). Across several studies, Shepherd finds that people are much more likely 
to judge an agent to be free and responsible if the agent is conscious and to 
judge that an agent’s particular actions are free and responsible when they are 
carried out consciously rather than non-consciously.
In one intriguing study, Shepherd asked participants to imagine the exis-
tence of sophisticated humanoids who “look, talk, and act just like humans, 
and they integrate into human society with no problem at all” (2015, 939). 
Some participants read scenarios that describe these creations as possessing 
consciousness: “They actually feel pain, experience emotions, see colors, and 
consciously deliberate about what to do”; while other participants read that the 
robots are not conscious: “they do not actually feel pain … they do not experi-
ence emotions, they do not see colors, and they do not consciously deliberate 
about what to do” (939). Some participants read a scenario in which one of 
these robots, Sal, steals a wallet he finds, while other participants read a sce-
nario in which Sal returns a wallet he finds. Across scenarios describing both 
the bad and good action, participants who were told that the robots were con-
scious tended to judge Sal to be free, blameworthy (or praiseworthy), and mor-
ally responsible, while those who were told that the robots were not conscious 
tended not to attribute these features to Sal (940). Shepherd concludes that 
these results show that most people believe that conscious states and process-
es play a central role in grounding free will and moral responsibility. Shepherd 
speculates about some reasons people may make the connection between free 
will and consciousness, and how some philosophical theories might align with 
or revise ordinary intuitions about the connection. He concludes that his find-
ings suggest that philosophers
either develop a substantive theory of the connection between con-
sciousness on the one hand and free will and moral responsibility on the 
other, or offer justification for jettisoning this seemingly central part of 
our commonsense understanding of free will and moral responsibility. 
(944)3
Here, we describe studies we conducted that build off of Shepherd’s studies, 
and we take up his explanatory challenge. In fact, we hope to use our studies to 
begin to distinguish which features of consciousness, or the capacities they 
3 See, e.g., Huebner (2010); Jack & Robbins (2012); Knobe & Prinz (2008).
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might allow, people see as most essential for free will, and why these features 
or capacities are especially relevant or essential. Our aim is to bring to the sur-
face implicit connections that might underlie the strong intuition among most 
people—including most philosophers and scientists who discuss free will—
that the capacity to have conscious experiences is crucial for free will and re-
sponsible agency. If so, it might be that philosophers can even develop plausi-
ble theories by drawing on the connections underlying ordinary thinking. In 
any case, we’ll try to develop one such theory that we take to be plausible.
2 Some Potential Connections between Consciousness and Free Will
There are several plausible features of consciousness that could be brought to 
bear on free will and moral responsibility. One historically prominent route 
emphasizes the phenomenology of free will. For example, Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1943) suggested that being conscious (or perhaps self-conscious) necessarily 
makes one radically free. Others have argued that the experience of free will is 
necessary for having free will. Galen Strawson, for instance, writes
But why should lack of explicit awareness of [freedom] be supposed to 
have as a consequence lack of [freedom] itself, as lack of any sense 
or conception of U-freedom seems to have as a consequence lack of 
 U-freedom itself? Well, that is the question. But it does seem to be so. 
(1986, 307)
In both cases the idea seems to be that the first-person experience of having 
open alternatives for future choices is essential for possessing free will. Yet, it’s 
not clear why the experience of freedom is necessary for possessing free will. 
Indeed, this suggestion raises more questions than it answers. For example, 
must the phenomenal experience of freedom play some causal role in one’s 
decisions and actions, or could the experience be epiphenomenal? If a causal 
role is required, then the question is what the experience of freedom is causing 
and what agents lack if they can behave in similar ways without the experience 
of freedom. If the experience plays no causal role, then it is even more mysteri-
ous what role it plays in making the agent free or morally responsible.
Another feature of consciousness that might be relevant to free will is its 
role in grounding libertarian free will. One might defend this view in a few 
ways. Perhaps, for example, consciousness bears some relation to a non-
physical mind or soul that can make free choices and causally interact with 
the physical brain and body (e.g., Swinburne 2013). The idea seems to be that 
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the conscious self can be an uncaused cause, free from the deterministic 
chain of cause and effect in the physical world. In addition to the mysterious 
causal interaction between non-physical minds and physical bodies that this 
view suggests, it also does not explain why it is the mind or soul’s capacity for 
consciousness that allows it to be an uncaused cause. Other libertarians have 
connected consciousness to free will via quantum theory, gesturing towards 
the indeterminism of the dominant theory of quantum mechanics or to-
wards the alleged role that consciousness plays in collapsing the wave func-
tion (see, e.g., Penrose 1991; Stapp 2001; and Hodgson 2002). At this stage, 
however, these views seem to try to solve the mystery of (libertarian) free will 
by conjoining the mystery of quantum physics with the mystery of conscious-
ness. Robert Kane, offering a naturalistic libertarian view, suggests that con-
sciousness may allow the unity of the self: “it may be that both the unity of 
conscious experience and the unity of the self-network are somehow related 
to the quantum character of reality” (1998, 195). It is plausible that free will 
requires a unified self and that we have conscious experiences of being a uni-
fied self at a time and across time (an experience some Humeans and Bud-
dhists would say is illusory), and below we suggest there are specific features 
of conscious experience relevant to demarcating the self. It is unclear, how-
ever, why the unity of self should be associated specifically with a libertarian 
theory of free will.
Indeed, some compatibilists about free will and determinism suggest that 
consciousness is relevant because it allows the integration of information such 
that the agent has the ability to access her competing reasons and values dur-
ing deliberation. For example, Neil Levy argues for the “consciousness thesis” 
which says that “consciousness of some of the facts that give our actions their 
moral significance is a necessary condition for moral responsibility (2014, 1).4 
However, like some other compatibilist theories described below, Levy’s does 
not focus on phenomenal consciousness (qualia or the sensory and emotional 
qualities associated with conscious experiences). Rather, Levy focuses specifi-
cally on access consciousness. Information is “access conscious” to an agent 
when it is accessible for use by a wide range of cognitive systems, including 
deliberation, reasoning, and verbal report (Block 1995). It’s controversial 
whether the distinction between these concepts of consciousness maps 
smoothly onto human psychology or fits with ordinary people’s understanding 
4 Note that Levy focuses here on moral responsibility, not free will, and that he is a somewhat 
non-standard compatibilist, in that he thinks determinism does not rule out free will or mor-
al responsibility, but he thinks we have neither because of an argument from luck.
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of consciousness, but Levy uses it to focus on the importance of access con-
sciousness, suggesting that phenomenal consciousness is irrelevant.
Another prominent compatibilist theory may similarly suggest that, for the 
freedom associated with moral responsibility, it is accessibility of information 
to reasoning processes that matters more than phenomenal or qualitative ex-
perience. Reasons-responsive theories emphasize the control that access con-
sciousness enables over one’s decisions and actions as a result of reasoning, 
deliberation, and self-reflection. On Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) account, for 
example, agents are morally responsible for actions that are caused by moder-
ately reasons-responsive mechanisms. As Shepherd (2015, 943) points out, 
however, reasons-responsive theories often emphasize features of decision-
making that are unrelated to conscious experience. Indeed, on some interpre-
tations of reasons-responsive compatibilism, it’s not clear that agents must 
even be conscious in order to have the capacity for free will and moral respon-
sibility (e.g., Yaffe 2012, 182). While access-conscious mental states are certainly 
required on Fischer and Ravizza’s view, it’s not entirely clear what role, if any, 
phenomenal mental states and processes play in enabling free will and moral 
responsibility. Though Fischer and Ravizza argue that free agents must “take 
ownership” of the relevant mechanisms, they don’t say whether these agents 
must be conscious of the practical reasoning processes that they carry out.
Another type of compatibilist account suggests that free will involves deci-
sions and actions caused by the “deep self” or “real self” as labeled by Susan 
Wolf (1990). She is referring to theories that pick out freely willed actions as the 
ones caused by those (first-order) desires that the agent (second-order) desires 
to move her (Frankfurt 1971), or that she identifies herself with (Frankfurt 
1987), or that accord with her considered values (Watson 1975). These theories 
seem to require that the agent has free will only if she acts on motivational 
states that she is consciously aware of and consciously endorses. If so, they also 
seem to link free will to access consciousness or a type of self-reflective aware-
ness. One might wonder whether such higher-order representational states 
require phenomenal consciousness—whether there must be anything it is like 
to experience them—or whether a sophisticated robot (or even humans in 
some instances) could carry out such higher-order representation without any 
phenomenology at all. As Daniel Dennett suggests in describing such robots: 
“our imagined [non-conscious] creatures would be equally able to engage in 
rational self-evaluation. They would be equipped to react appropriately when 
we represent reasons to them. Isn’t that what freedom hinges upon, whether or 
not it amounts to consciousness?” (1984, 43).
Yet another type of compatibilist theory, related to these deep self views, 
suggests that consciousness is not required for free and responsible actions. 
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These “quality of will” (or self-expression) theories say that agents are respon-
sible for those actions that express the agent’s concern or consideration of 
 others (their quality of will), which is sometimes identified as actions express-
ing the agent’s deep self (see, e.g., Arpaly 2003; Smith 2005; Sher 2009; Buss 
2012; and Sripada 2016). These theorists have argued that actions can express 
an agent’s quality of will even when motivated by values that the agent con-
sciously rejects (e.g., Huck Finn protecting Jim even though he thinks he 
should not) or in cases of negligence, when the agent, for instance, does not 
care enough to show up to help his friend move but did not consciously try to 
forget. These instances of responsibility for specific non-conscious actions are 
plausible. However, it’s unclear whether these theorists would argue that it’s 
irrelevant to free will and responsibility whether a creature is phenomenally 
conscious at all (sometimes called “creature consciousness”).
Indeed, most quality of will theorists take their inspiration from Peter Straw-
son, who lays the foundation for the proposal that we will suggest for the con-
nection between phenomenal consciousness and free will. Strawson (1962) 
argues that freedom and responsibility are grounded in our reactive attitudes, 
such as indignation, gratitude, and guilt, that we express in interpersonal rela-
tionships. According to Strawson, agents are morally responsible when they 
are apt targets of these reactive attitudes—for instance, when it is appropriate 
to feel resentment towards them when their actions express a poor quality of 
will towards you, to feel gratitude towards them when their actions express a 
good quality of will towards you, and to feel guilt when your own action ex-
presses poor quality of will towards others. As such, Strawson’s account ties 
free and responsible agency to the capacity to experience and express certain 
moral emotions, and it suggests that we attribute such agency only to other 
agents whom we perceive as feeling relevant emotions and expressing them in 
their actions. Hence, on a Strawsonian account, it might be the ability to con-
sciously experience emotions that bridges phenomenal consciousness and 
free will.
A related view suggests that free and responsible agency is tied to our ability 
to care about what motivates us. On this view, actions expressing our deep self 
or quality of will are those that are caused by what we care about. For instance, 
Harry Frankfurt modifies his earlier views that focused on higher-order desire 
and identification to focus on the role that caring plays for grounding agency. 
He writes that a free agent is “prepared to endorse or repudiate the motives 
from which he acts … to guide his conduct in accordance with what he really 
cares about”; and he adds that what is essential to freedom pertains to “what 
a person cares about, what he considers important to him… Caring is essen-
tially volitional… similar to the force of love” (1999, 113–114). Chandra Sripada 
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develops these ideas, arguing that one is morally responsible for an action only 
when it expresses one’s deep self, and that the actions that express one’s self 
are precisely those motivated by one’s cares (2016). He defines cares in terms 
of what functional role they play in our psychology: they are foundational 
 motives—i.e., intrinsic and ultimate, such that many of our other desires mo-
tivate actions that aim at satisfying our cares—and we desire to maintain our 
cares, and feel a sense of loss when we alter them.
Sripada’s conative account is contrasted with the more cognitive deep self 
approaches described above that seem to require access (or self-) conscious-
ness. His account suggests a more important role for phenomenal conscious-
ness, because it is directly tied to emotion. He writes, “caring is also associated 
with a rich and distinctive profile of emotional responses that are finely tuned 
to the fortunes of the thing that is the object of the care” (2016, 1210).5 For in-
stance, if Paul cares about the plight of Sudanese children, then “if the fortunes 
of the Sudanese children are set back, Paul is susceptible to sadness, disappro-
bation, and despair” (1230–31). Now, Sripada and other theorists writing about 
cares do not explicitly point out that phenomenal consciousness is crucial for 
an agent to be able to have cares, likely because they take it to be understood 
that feeling emotions like sadness, despair, and joy requires the ability to have 
phenomenally conscious experiences. Indeed, it is difficult for us to imagine 
creatures (such as humanoid robots) that lack conscious experiences entirely 
yet are also able to have the sort of emotional responses required for them to 
care about what they do or what happens to them. They might have motiva-
tional states, they might represent them and evaluate them, but they would 
not seem to have the capacities to feel the sort of satisfaction or suffering that 
seem constitutive of caring.
We have now seen two related accounts that situate certain emotions at 
the heart of free and responsible agency, Strawsonian accounts based on reac-
tive attitudes and self-expressive accounts that focus on the capacity to 
care.6 We propose that these connections provide the link between free will 
and  (specifically) phenomenal consciousness. Then, we offer some initial evi-
dence that people’s intuitive understanding of free will points towards this 
proposal.
5 Sripada cites his debt to David Shoemaker’s excellent paper on caring and agency (2003). 
Shoemaker writes, “the relation between cares and affective states is extremely tight” (93) 
and “the emotions we have make us the agents we are” (94).
6 Shepherd and Levy (forthcoming) briefly suggest another idea in this ballpark. They posit 
that the moral knowledge required to be a responsible agent requires moral perception 
which requires phenomenal consciousness in order to understand the intrinsic moral value 
of one’s own and others’ experiences of pleasure and pain.
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3 Emotional Experiences as the Essential Link between 
Consciousness and Free Will
As we’ve seen, different theories suggest different connections between free 
will and consciousness, and the connection might be more or less direct and it 
might be considered contingent or conceptually necessary. Some accounts 
(e.g., some libertarian theories) suggest that the connection is direct and con-
ceptual, such that free will, by definition, requires consciousness of some sort. 
More often, the connection, to the extent it is discussed at all, takes a less direct 
route and suggests a contingent relationship. The idea is that free will requires 
something x, like control, self-awareness, or reasoning, and that x is what re-
quires consciousness of some sort, at least given humans’ particular cognitive 
architecture. For example, a reasons-responsive compatibilist might argue that 
free will requires certain deliberative capacities which happen to require, in 
some cases, conscious processes in creatures like us. However, on such views, it 
is unclear whether consciousness, especially phenomenal rather than access 
consciousness, is necessary for free will or whether it is only contingently re-
lated to free will in virtue of the fact that it enables these deliberative capaci-
ties that are themselves required for free will. Perhaps, for example, some other 
complex cognitive agent could carry out the behaviors that are enabled by de-
liberative capacities without phenomenal consciousness.
Again, this suggests that we might be able to test the free will-consciousness 
connection by considering robots or aliens that are stipulated to have the rel-
evant capacity x and behave just like humans but to do so without phenome-
nal consciousness. To the extent that such creatures are conceivable, we might 
wonder whether they have free will. If such creatures still plausibly have free 
will, then it suggests a more indirect, contingent relationship between con-
sciousness and free will. However, if the creatures plausibly lack free will, even 
though they behave like humans, it suggests that there must be some more di-
rect relationship, such that the capacity of a creature to be phenomenally con-
scious is constitutive of or essential for that creature to have free will.
We suggest a relatively direct connection between phenomenal conscious-
ness and free will. The basic idea is that one thing that matters when it comes 
to being a free agent is that things can really matter to the agent. Moreover, in 
order for anything to matter to an agent, she has to be able to experience the 
negative and positive consequences of her choices, to be able to feel pain, suf-
fering, and disappointment for bad choices, and to feel pleasure, joy, and satis-
faction for good choices, and plausibly to foresee experiencing these feelings 
when evaluating these choices. Feeling pain and pleasure, and emotions such 
as anxiety and joy, requires phenomenal consciousness. These mental states 
67When Do Robots have Free Will?
<UN>
are essential for caring about anything. As Sripada suggests, when someone 
cares about something,
Her emotions are bound tightly to the fortunes of the thing… These ob-
servations suggest that there is a basic conceptual tie between the syn-
drome of dispositional effects [the functional roles] associated with cares 
and what it is for something to matter to a person. (2016, 1211)
Furthermore, when it comes to consequential or moral decisions involving in-
terpersonal relations, it is essential that the agent can also experience the 
Strawsonian emotions such as shame, pride, regret, gratitude, and guilt. After 
all, many of our deepest cares involve other people. So, on this view, the con-
nection between free will and consciousness goes through the capacities to 
feel emotions that ground mattering, caring, and reactive attitudes.
This view suggests that it is inconceivable for anything to really matter to an 
agent that cannot consciously feel anything, even if that agent were sophisti-
cated and intelligent enough to behave just like us. However, it does seem 
 conceivable that such a robot or alien could behave much like us and have 
the capacities for intelligent action, the evaluation of options, and even com-
plex reasoning, without having phenomenal consciousness. If so, it seems 
nothing would really matter to such a creature, that it would not really care 
about what decisions it made. And it seems—to us at least—that it would lack 
free will.
This, then, is the intuitive connection between consciousness and free will 
that we wanted to test and compare to other other potential connections, mo-
tivated by the pervasive implicit or explicit claims about the consciousness-
free will connection, by the relative paucity of explanations for it, and by Shep-
herd’s initial work on this topic.
4 Studies on Attributions of Consciousness and Free Will
Following up on Shepherd’s paradigm, we designed two studies to explore peo-
ple’s attributions of consciousness and free will to humanoid robots. The goal 
was to try to have people consider creatures that look and act like humans 
while avoiding people’s default and implicit attributions of free will and con-
sciousness to humans (and perhaps to any similar biological creatures). As we 
will see, most people seem to have implicit representations of robots as non-
conscious and unfree. In ongoing studies not described here, we use scenarios 
that describe alien lifeforms.
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4.1 Study 1: Participants and Design
Our first study had 373 participants (68.2% female, 31.8% male; mean age 19.78, 
ranging from 18–38), who were undergraduates at Georgia State University. Af-
ter removing 49 for incomplete data, for missing attention checks, or for spend-
ing too little time on the survey, the sample size was 324. This study (as well as 
its follow-up) was approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board, and 
participation was voluntary and conditioned on informed consent. The study 
was administered online via Qualtrics.
This experimental vignette study used a between-group design with ran-
dom assignment to two Learning conditions, as well as to a third control condi-
tion. The Learning manipulation varied whether the humanoid robots were 
able to behave like humans because they could learn based on experiences or 
because they were preprogrammed with all necessary knowledge. The control 
condition did not include robots, but instead discussed humans. All scenarios 
end with a paragraph describing a variety of behaviors that would typically be 
interpreted as involving conscious experiences in humans, such as feeling cold, 
expressing empathy, or making a decision. The primary dependent measures 
consisted of responses to individual statements (from 1 – “Strongly Disagree” to 
7 – “Strongly Agree”) that were summed together to create sub-scale composite 
items representing the attributions of the following capacities to either the 
robots or humans: free will, moral responsibility, basic emotions, Strawsonian 
emotions, conscious sensation, reason and reflection, and theory of mind.
The experimental vignettes read as follows:
In the future, humans develop the technology to construct humanoid ro-
bots with very sophisticated computers instead of brains and with bodies 
made out of metal, plastic, and synthetic materials. The robots look, talk, 
and act just like humans and are able to integrate into human society and 
to interact with humans across any situation. The only way to tell if they 
are a humanoid robot instead of a human being is to look inside of them 
(using x-ray, for example).
(Learning Condition) These robots have various components that pro-
cess information and allow them to learn from their interactions so that 
they can change over time. For example, like humans they are able to 
learn new languages by interacting with people using those languages. 
Their ability to learn allows the robots to adapt to different situations.
(Pre Programmed Condition) These robots have various components 
that were pre-programmed with all of the information they would need 
to behave appropriately in any situation. For example, unlike humans, 
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they are pre-programmed to be able to speak any language when inter-
acting with people using the language. Their program allows the robots 
to behave appropriately across different situations.
Imagine you are asked to observe some of these robots over the course of 
several weeks, and you see different robots carrying out a wide range of 
behaviors. For instance, one of the robots, Taylor, gets a hand slammed 
in a car door and Taylor yells out, grabs the hand, and guards it carefully 
until it can be fixed. Another robot, Sam, knocks over a glass of water 
onto Gillian, and apologizes profusely. Another robot, Kelly, comes 
across a dog whose paw is trapped in a sewer grate and is whining in 
pain. Kelly gently removes the paw while petting the dog’s head. Another 
one of the robots, Frances, is taking a long walk on a snowy evening, 
starts shivering, and takes out some gloves and a hat and puts them on. 
And another robot, Ryan, is at the market purchasing cereal. Ryan stands 
in the aisle for a minute holding both Corn Flakes and Rice Crispies. 
Ryan finally puts back the Rice Crispies and places the Corn Flakes in the 
shopping cart.
In the case of the control vignette, participants were asked to imagine observ-
ing some humans acting in the same ways described in the final paragraph. 
Once participants read one of these vignettes, they were asked to answer ques-
tions according to how they understood the issues, not how they thought oth-
ers might answer. The dependent measures were followed by several manipu-
lation and comprehension checks, and then demographic questions.
4.2 Study 1: Results
Prior to the analyses testing our hypotheses, we sought to determine the inter-
nal validity of the subscales being used to measure various attributions (see 
Table 3.1). Following collection of data, coefficients of reliability were calcu-
lated for each of our “a priori” subscales. All subscale Chronbach’s alpha values 
were deemed to have an acceptable level of reliability (> .70).
Hypothesis 1: Did attributions of conscious capacities differ between robots 
and humans, even though they were behaviorally indistinguishable?
Attributions of conscious capacities were subjected to a two-tailed t-test be-
tween participants within robot vignettes and those within the human control 
vignette. There was a significant difference in all measures of conscious capac-
ity  attribution, such that participants were less likely to attribute these con-
scious capacities to robots than they were to humans (see Figure 3.1). More 
Nahmias, Allen and Loveall70
<UN>
Table 3.1 Subscales and summarized versions of the respective individual statements 
(roughly one-third of these statements were worded with negations and 
reverse-scored). Scale validity and reliability was assessed via Chronbach’s alpha
Scale Corresponding questions Chronbach’s 
Alpha
Free Will (8 items) These robots have free will, can make 
choices, have ability to do otherwise, 
have control over their actions, act of 
own free will when they act in good 
and ways we deem (im)moral, are in 
control (relative to programmers), 
and what they do is up to them.
.842
Moral Responsibility  
(5 items)
These robots are morally responsible 
for their actions, deserve to be 
blamed (relative to programmers), 
deserve to be punished for illegal 
acts, deserve to be blamed for bad 
acts, and deserve to be rewarded for 
good acts.
.734
Basic Emotion (9 items) These robots can feel happiness, 
frustration, anger, sadness, 
disappointment, awe, fear, disgust, 
and can suffer.
.926
Strawsonian Emotion  
(9 items)
These robots can feel guilt when they 
do wrong, shame, pride, regret, 
embarrassment, admiration, 
indignation, and care about what 
happens to them and care about 
what happens to others.
.918
Conscious Sensation  
(4 items)
These robots experience, more than 
just process, the sounds in music, the 
images in art, the smells of food, and 
the softness of a blanket.
.913
Reason and Reflection 
(6 items)
These robots plan, can deliberate, 
can act for reasons like humans do, 
can have principles, can reflect on 
and evaluate their behavior, and can 
imagine alternative for future 
actions.
.779
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Scale Corresponding questions Chronbach’s 
Alpha
Theory of Mind  
(6 items)
These robots can understand others’ 
emotions, can empathize, can predict 
what others will do, can infer why 
others behaved, are aware of their own 
















































































Figure 3.1 Robot scenarios evoked significantly less attribution of 
conscious capacities as compared to the human control 
scenario. All group differences are significant at p < .001 level
specifically, though the robots were behaviorally indistinguishable from hu-
mans,  participants attributed less free will, t(322) = −12.62, p < .001, as well as 
less moral responsibility to them, t(322) = −10.72, p < .001. Similarly, partici-
pants responded that these robots are less able to feel both basic and more 
complex  Strawsonian emotions, t(322) = −20.00, p < .001, t(322) = −17.21, p < .001, 
respectively, as well as less able to experience sensations, t(322) = −14.73, p < 
.001. Participants also attributed lower levels of cognitive abilities to the robots, 
judging them as being less able to reason and reflect, t(322) = −14.94, p < .001, 
and less able to utilize theory of mind, t(322) = −10.28, p < .001.
Note that the attributions of these capacities to robots average near the 
midpoint, suggesting participants were not very confident about what to say 
about these robots, which is unsurprising given the minimal information the 
vignettes provide. However, attributions became more dichotomous once we 
Nahmias, Allen and Loveall7�
<UN>
examine whether participants are considering the robots to be conscious or 
non-conscious (see Hypothesis 3 below).
Hypothesis 2: Were participants more likely to attribute conscious capacities 
to robots that learned as opposed to those that were preprogrammed?
Surprisingly, the ability to learn from experience as compared to being prepro-
grammed had no discernible effect on any of our dependent measures (all 
p-values < .10 – data not shown). One possibility is that this information was 
less important to participants than other information about the robots. An-
other is that they have implicit representations of robots as fully pre-pro-
grammed that are difficult to alter with a few sentences.
Hypothesis 3: Does splitting participants by their response to the question 
“These robots have conscious experiences” create a divergence in the capaci-
ties that they attribute to these robots?
Upon splitting participants based on their response to a dichotomous con-
sciousness question, we found robust differences in the capacities that were 
attributed to the robots (see Figure 3.2). Those that responded that yes, these 
robots have conscious experiences, attributed more free will, t(209) = −5.97, 
p < .001, as well as more moral responsibility, t(209) = −4.72, p < .001. As ex-
pected, the same results were found for basic and Strawsonian emotions, t(209) 
= −7.09, p < .001, and t(209) = −8.57, p < .001, respectively, as well as the robot’s 
ability to experience sensations, t(209) = −7.11, p < .001. Similarly, when partici-
pants saw these robots as able to have conscious experiences, they also saw 
them as more able to reason and reflect, t(209) = −7.70, p < .001, as well as em-
ploy theory of mind, t(209) = −8.01, p < .001. These robust results, though prob-
lematized with selection bias,7 serve to inform the manipulations we devel-
oped for Study 2.
4.3 Study 2: Participants and Design
Study 2 had 474 participants (69.9% female, 30.1% male; mean age 20.0, rang-
ing from 18–55), who were undergraduates at Georgia State University. After 
removing 198 for incomplete data, one excluded condition, missed attention 
checks, or spending too little time on the survey, the final sample size was 278. 
7 The grouping and analysis of individuals based on their responses rather than by proper 
randomization risks an inaccurate representation of the population originally intended to be 
analyzed.
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Participation was voluntary and conditioned on informed consent. The study 
was administered online via Qualtrics.
This follow-up study used a 2 (Learning) x 2 (Consciousness8) between-
groups factorial design, resulting in random assignment to all possible combi-
nations of conditions (i.e., Learning x Conscious, Learning x Non-Conscious, 
Preprogrammed x Conscious, and Preprogrammed x Non-Conscious). The 
Learning manipulation was identical to study 1. The Consciousness manipula-
tion varied whether the robots were described as conscious or non-conscious 
(as worded below). Participants’ responses consisted of responses to individual 
statements (from 1 – “Strongly Disagree” to 7 – “Strongly Agree”) attributing or 
not attributing different qualities to these robots, that were then combined in 
 order to create the subscales, as described above.
The experimental vignettes were identical to experiment 1 until, following 
the Learning manipulation, instead of being asked to imagine the robots carry-
ing out various specific behaviors, participants were given further information 
regarding the robots’ mental states and capacities:
(Conscious) Furthermore, the robots are able to behave just like human 
beings, and they also have components that enable conscious experiences. 
8 For the sake of brevity, a third Epiphenomenal Consciousness condition is not included in 
this analysis. Responses did not differ significantly from the Consciousness condition, likely 
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Figure 3.� The dichotomous attribution of consciousness to 
these robots led to a significant split in all attributions 
of conscious and other capacities. All group 
differences are significant at p < .001 level
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The robots actually feel pain, see colors, and experience emotions. They do 
not just appear to be conscious when they carry out the same behaviors 
as humans.
(Non-Conscious) Furthermore, the robots are able to behave just like hu-
man beings even though they do not have conscious experiences. They 
have components that process information such that they can carry out 
all the same behaviors as humans in just the same ways, but when they 
do so, they just appear to feel pain, just appear to see colors, and just ap-
pear to experience emotions.
The methods and measures were the same as those used in study 1.
4.4 Study 2: Results
Hypothesis 1: Did attributions of capacities differ between robots described as 
conscious versus those that were described as non-conscious?
Attributions of capacities were subjected to a two-way analysis of variance 
with two Consciousness conditions (Conscious vs. Non-Conscious) and two 
Learning conditions (Learning vs. Preprogrammed). As predicted, there was a 
significant main effect of consciousness on free will attributions, F(1, 274) = 
3.89, p = .05, such that participants attributed less free will to robots that were 
described as non-conscious (see Figure 3.3). Though participants saw con -
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Figure 3.3 Compared to robots described as non-conscious, people 
attributed to robots described as conscious significantly 
higher Free Will, Basic Emotions, Strawsonian Emotions, 
and Conscious Sensations. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, and *** 
= p < .001
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sible for their actions, F(1, 274) = .80, p > .05. As expected, participants found 
robots described as non-conscious as less able to feel both basic and more 
complex Strawsonian emotions, F(1, 274) = 13.73, p < .001, F(1, 274) = 6.89, p < .01, 
respectively, as well as less able to experience sensations, F(1, 274) = 22.03, p < 
.001. However, consciousness had no discernible effect on the robots’ ability to 
reason and reflect, F(1, 274) = .55, p > .05, nor their ability to utilize theory of 
mind, F(1, 274) = 2.36, p > .05.
Hypothesis 2: Were participants more likely to attribute conscious capacities 
to robots that learned as opposed to those that were preprogrammed?
As with study 1, the ability to learn from experience as compared to being pre-
programmed had no discernible effect on any of our dependent measures (all 
p-values < .10 – data not shown).
Hypothesis 3: What attributes (if any) mediated the effect of consciousness on 
free will attributions?
We used regression analysis in order to investigate potential mediators for the 
effect of consciousness on free will attributions, and selected mediators based 
on significant primary paths. In other words, only mediators that were directly 
affected by the consciousness manipulation were included in the model. Re-
sults indicate two primary mediators: participants’ attribution of Strawsonian 
Emotions and Basic Emotions (Figure 3.4). In Step 1 of the mediation model, 
the regression of the consciousness manipulation on free will attribution, ig-
noring any mediators, was significant, b = .31, t(276) = 2.00, p < .05. Step 2 showed 
that the regression of the consciousness manipulation on the mediators Straw-
sonian Emotions, Basic Emotions, and Conscious Sensations were all signifi-
cant, b = .40, t(276) = 2.64, p < .01, b = .59, t(276) = 3.72, p < .001, and b = .91, t(276) 
=4.71, p < .001, respectively. Step 3 of the mediation analysis showed that, while 
controlling for the consciousness manipulation, the emotional mediators 
(Strawsonian and Basic) were each significant predictors of Free Will attribu-
tion, b = .37, t(273) = 4.06, p < .001 and b = .19, t(273) = 2.05, p < .05, while Con-
scious Sensation was not, b = .04, t(273) = .79, p = .43. Step 4 of the mediation 
analysis revealed that, while controlling for Strawsonian and Basic Emotions 
(as well the negative control of Consciousness Sensation), the consciousness 
manipulation was no longer a significant predictor of Free Will attribution, b = 
.0034, t(273) = .026, p = .98, 95% CI [-.26, .26], indicating full mediation.9 Thus, 
9 The total effect was tested using a bootstrap estimation approach within Andrew Hayes’ 
PROCESS with 5000 samples (2012).
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it was found that the extent to which people judged the robots as able to expe-
rience Strawsonian and Basic Emotions fully mediated the relationship be-
tween the consciousness manipulation and people’s attributions of Free Will.
These results suggest that phenomenal consciousness plays a particular role 
in the attribution of Free Will, but not an indiscriminate role. In other words, 
the ability to feel emotions and have things actually matter to the individual is 
important in Free Will attributions, yet the ability to have conscious sensations 
(e.g., the ability to experience sounds or smells) specifically plays no significant 
role.
5 Conclusions
Our results provide some support for our proposed connection between con-
sciousness and free will. However, further studies are clearly required to allow 
a more fine-grained understanding of which features of consciousness matter 
most to people’s attributions of free will, as well as their relation to attributions 
of moral responsibility, where we found inconsistent results, and to determine 
what roles learning and experience play in these attributions, given that our 
manipulations of whether the robots learn or are fully pre-programmed did 
not have significant effects. If future research bolsters our initial findings, then 
it would appear that when people consider whether agents are free and re-
sponsible, they are considering whether the agents have capacities to feel 















Figure 3.4 Analysis of attributes that mediate the relationship between consciousness and 
free will attributions. Emotional attribution (Strawsonian and Basic) was shown 
to fully mediate the relationship between consciousness frame and Free Will 
attribution. Bolded lines indicate significant pathways
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to deliberate or reason. It’s difficult to know whether people assume that phe-
nomenal consciousness is required for or enhances capacities to deliberate 
and reason. And of course, we do not deny that cognitive capacities for self-
reflection, imagination, and reasoning are crucial for free agency (see, e.g., 
Nahmias 2018). For instance, once considering agents that are assumed to have 
phenomenal consciousness, such as humans, it is likely that people’s attribu-
tions of free will and responsibility decrease in response to information that an 
agent has severely diminished reasoning capacities. But people seem to have 
intuitions that support the idea that an essential condition for free will is the 
capacity to experience conscious emotions. And we find it plausible that these 
intuitions indicate that people take it to be essential to being a free agent that 
one can feel the emotions involved in reactive attitudes and in genuinely car-
ing about one’s choices and their outcomes. If so, these intuitions support the 
sort of self-expressive views built on the foundations laid by Strawson and 
Frankfurt.
We do not want to defend here a metaphilosophical account of the role of 
ordinary intuitions in philosophical theorizing, a topic of much recent contro-
versy. We will simply conclude by pointing out that most people, along with 
most theorists, seem to think that consciousness is crucial for free will. Few 
theorists offer adequate explanations of the connection. If a theorist aims to 
reject the importance of consciousness to free will, she should explain both 
what drives most people to think otherwise and why those people are mistak-
en. If a theorist aims to understand the connection, it might help to under-
stand why ordinary people see it. In fact, we think that understanding why 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike think that there is a connection be-
tween consciousness and free will might suggest strategies for developing 
plausible theories that explain the connection. If our above results are any in-
dication, these theories will focus on our capacities to actually care how others 
treat us and how we treat them, to feel reactive attitudes in response to such 
treatment, and to experience the emotions necessary for caring about our de-
cisions and the outcomes of those decisions.
Perhaps, fiction points us towards the truth here. In most fictional portray-
als of artificial intelligence and robots (such as Blade Runner, A.I., and West-
world), viewers tend to think of the robots differently when they are portrayed 
in a way that suggests they express and feel emotions. No matter how intelli-
gent or complex their behavior, they do not come across as free and  autonomous 
until they seem to care about what happens to them (and perhaps others). 
Often this is portrayed by their showing fear of their own death or others, or 
expressing love, anger, or joy. Sometimes it is portrayed by the robots’  expressing 
reactive attitudes, such as indignation, or our feeling such attitudes towards 
them. Perhaps the authors of these works recognize that the robots, and their 
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stories, become most interesting when they seem to have free will, and people 
will see them as free when they start to care about what happens to them, 
when things really matter to them, which results from their experiencing the 
actual (and potential) outcomes of their actions.
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Chapter 4
Free Will and Neuroscience: Decision Times and 
the Point of No Return
Alfred Mele
Although I have written many articles and chapters on neuroscientific argu-
ments for the nonexistence of free will, I have not run out of things to say about 
these arguments. Part of the explanation is that experiments on the topic con-
tinue to be conducted and to shed new light on important issues raised by 
earlier experiments. This is fortunate for me, given that I accepted Bernard 
Feltz’s invitation to write a chapter for this volume.
Experiments performed by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet in the 1980s pose 
an alleged challenge to the existence of free will. Some neuroscientists have 
followed Libet’s lead, sometimes using electroencephalography (eeg), as he 
did, and sometimes using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
depth electrodes, or subdural grid electrodes. In Effective Intentions (Mele 
2009, chs. 3, 4, and 6), I argued that the neuroscientific work discussed there 
falls well short of justifying the claim that free will is an illusion. My focus was 
on the data and on whether the data supported certain empirical claims that 
have been combined with theoretical claims about free will to yield the con-
clusion that free will does not exist. There are some interesting new data now. 
In this chapter, I explore the bearing of some studies published after 2009 on 
the question whether we have convincing neuroscientific evidence for the 
nonexistence of free will. Section 1 provides some scientific and terminological 
background. Section 2 tackles a question about the time at which decisions are 
made in Libet-style experiments in connection with an examination of a famil-
iar neuroscientific argument for the nonexistence of free will. Section 3 ad-
dresses a related neuroscientific argument that features a claim about the 
point of no return for actions studied in experiments of this kind. Section 4 
takes up a skeptical argument that might be thought to have a basis in some 
recent neuroscientific work. Section 5 wraps things up.
1 Background
Libet makes the following claims:
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The brain “decides” to initiate or, at least, prepare to initiate [certain 
 actions] before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a 
decision has taken place.
libet 1985, p. 536
If the “act now” process is initiated unconsciously, then conscious free 
will is not doing it.
libet 2001, p. 62
Our overall findings do suggest some fundamental characteristics of the 
simpler acts that may be applicable to all consciously intended acts and 
even to responsibility and free will.
libet 1985, p. 563
Associated with these claims is the following skeptical argument about free 
will. Elsewhere (Mele 2018), I dubbed it the decision-focused skeptical argu-
ment, or dsa for short.
1. In Libet-style experiments, all the decisions to act on which data are 
gathered are made unconsciously.
2. So probably all decisions to act are made unconsciously.
3. A decision is freely made only if it is consciously made.
4. So probably no decisions to act are freely made.1
In Mele 2009, I devote a lot of space to showing that premise 1 is not justified 
by the data and some space to explaining why the generalization in premise 2 
is unwarranted. I return to the former matter shortly, after providing some 
background. An issue with ties to the latter matter is addressed in Section 4.
Decisions to do things, as I conceive of them, are momentary actions of 
forming an intention to do them. For example, to decide to flex my right wrist 
now is to perform a (nonovert) action of forming an intention to flex it now 
(Mele 2003, ch. 9). I believe that Libet understands decisions in the same way. 
Some of our decisions and intentions are for the nonimmediate future and 
others are not. I have an intention today to fly to Brussels three days from now, 
and I have an intention now to click my “save” button now. The former inten-
tion is aimed at action three days in the future. The latter intention is about 
1 It may be asserted that, strictly speaking, even if no decisions to act are freely made, this does 
not preclude the existence of free actions. Even if actions that proceed from unfree decisions 
are not free, what about other actions – actions that do not proceed from decisions (and are 
not themselves decisions)? I do not pursue this question here. Decisions (or choices) to act 
are central the philosophical literature on free will, and the discovery that there are no free 
decisions would be a very serious blow to free will.
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what to do now. I call intentions of these kinds, respectively, distal and proxi-
mal intentions (Mele 1992, pp. 143–44, 158, 2009, p. 10), and I make the same 
distinction in the sphere of decisions to act. Libet studies proximal intentions 
(or decisions or urges) in particular.
In the studies described in this section, participants are asked to report on 
when they had certain conscious experiences – variously described as experi-
ences of an urge, intention, or decision to do what they did. After they act, they 
make their reports. The measure of consciousness in these studies is the par-
ticipants’ reports on this matter. As I put it elsewhere (Mele 2009, p. 22), it is 
“report-level” consciousness that is at issue.
The expression “W time” or “time W” is sometimes used in the literature on 
Libet’s work as a label for the time at which a participant is first conscious or 
aware of his proximal intention (or decision or urge) to flex and sometimes for 
the reported time of first awareness of consciousness of this. The two times 
may be different, of course; and Libet himself thought that although the aver-
age reported time is about 200 milliseconds (henceforth, ms) before muscle 
motion begins, the actual average time is about 150 ms before the beginning of 
muscle motion (1985, pp. 534–35, 2004, p. 128). Here I use “time W” as a label for 
the actual time of first awareness.
In some of Libet’s studies (1985, 2004), participants are asked to flex their 
right wrist whenever they wish. When they are regularly reminded not to plan 
their wrist flexes and when they do not afterward say that they did some such 
planning, an average ramping up of eeg activity (starting 550 ms before mus-
cle motion begins; –550 ms, for short) precedes the average reported time of 
the conscious experience (200 ms before muscle motion begins, −200 ms) by 
about a third of a second (Libet 1985). Libet claims that decisions about when 
to flex were made at the earlier of these two times (1985, p. 536).
The initial ramping that I mentioned is the beginning of a readiness poten-
tial (RP), which may be understood as “a progressive increase in brain activity 
prior to intentional actions, normally measured using eeg, and thought to 
arise from frontal brain areas that prepare actions” (Haggard et al. 2015, p. 325). 
The significance of RPs is discussed shortly.
Chun Siong Soon and coauthors, commenting on Libet’s studies, write: “Be-
cause brain activity in the sma [supplementary motor area] consistently pre-
ceded the conscious decision, it has been argued that the brain had already 
unconsciously made a decision to move even before the subject became aware 
of it” (2008, p. 543). To gather additional evidence about the proposition at is-
sue, they use fMRI in a study of participants instructed to do the following 
“when they felt the urge to do so”: “decide between one of two buttons, oper-
ated by the left and right index fingers, and press it immediately” (p. 543). Soon 
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and colleagues find that, using readings from two brain regions (one in the 
frontopolar cortex and the other in the parietal cortex), they are able to “pre-
dict” with about 60% accuracy (see Soon et al. 2008, supplementary figure 6, 
Haynes 2011, p. 93) which button participants will press several seconds in ad-
vance of the button press (p. 544).2
In another study, Soon et al. ask participants to “decide between left and 
right responses at an externally determined point in time” (2008, p. 544). They 
are to make a decision about which of two buttons to press when shown a cue 
and then execute the decision later, when presented with a “respond” cue (see 
their supplementary material on “Control fMRI experiment”). Soon et al. re-
port that one interpretation of this study’s findings is that “frontopolar cortex 
was the first cortical stage at which the actual decision was made, whereas 
precuneus was involved in storage of the decision until it reached awareness” 
(p. 545).
Itzhak Fried, Roy Mukamel, and Gabriel Kreiman record directly from the 
brain, using depth electrodes (2011). They report that “A population of sma 
neurons is sufficient to predict in single trials the impending decision to move 
with accuracy greater than 80% already 700 ms prior to subjects’ awareness” 
(p. 548) of their “urge” (p. 558) to press the key. By “700 ms prior to subjects’s 
awareness,” Fried et al. mean 700 ms prior to the awareness time that partici-
pants later report: they recognize that the reports might not be accurate (pp. 
552–53, 560). And, unlike Libet, they occasionally seem to treat decisions to 
press keys as items that are, by definition, conscious (p. 548). Possibly, in their 
thinking about their findings, they identify the participants’ decisions with 
conscious urges. If that is how they use “decision,” their claim here is that on 
the basis of activity in the sma they can predict with greater than 80% accu-
racy what time a participant will report to be the time at which he was first 
aware of an urge to press 700 ms prior to the reported time. But someone who 
uses the word “decision” differently may describe the same result as a greater 
than 80% accuracy rate in detecting decisions 700 ms before the person be-
comes aware of a decision he already made. These two different ways of de-
scribing the result obviously are very different. The former description does 
not include an assertion about when the decision was made.
There are grounds for doubt about the accuracy of the reported awareness 
times in these studies. I have discussed such grounds elsewhere (Mele 2009, 
ch. 6; see also Maoz et al. 2015, pp. 190–94), and I will not do so again here. In-
stead I focus on two questions. The first question is this: When are the perti-
nent decisions made in these studies? The second is a question about the point 
2 This is not real-time prediction.
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of no return in action-producing processes. I introduce it in Section 3, in con-
nection with a skeptical argument that is related to dsa.
2 When Do Participants Make Their Decisions?
In Mele 2009, drawing on data of various kinds, I argued that Libet’s partici-
pants do not make decisions as early as 550 ms before the beginning of muscle 
motion (–550 ms). Drawing on the same data, I also suggested there that early 
stages of the readiness potential in his main experiment (a type ii RP, which 
begins at −550 ms) may be associated with a variety of things that are not in-
tentions: “urges to (prepare to) flex soon, brain events suitable for being rela-
tively proximal causal contributors to such urges, motor preparation, and mo-
tor imagery, including imagery associated with imagining flexing very soon” 
(p. 56). Call this group of things the early group. As I pointed out, “If RP onset 
in cases of ‘spontaneous’ flexing indicates the emergence of a potential cause 
of a proximal intention to flex, the proximal intention itself may emerge at 
some point between RP onset and time W, at time W, or after time W: at time 
W the agent may be aware only of something – a proximal urge to flex, for ex-
ample – that has not yet issued in a proximal intention” (p. 57). This point bears 
on premise 1 of dsa, the assertion that in Libet-style experiments, all the deci-
sions to act on which data are gathered are made unconsciously. If proximal 
decisions to flex – momentary actions of forming proximal intentions to flex – 
are not made before W, Libet’s argument for the claim that they are made un-
consciously is undercut.
Also relevant in this connection is evidence about how long it takes for a 
proximal decision or proximal intention to generate relevant muscle motion. 
Does it take around 550 ms, as Libet’s interpretation of his results implies? 
I discussed this issue in Mele 2009, where I offered a data-based argument for 
a negative answer (pp. 60–64). There is additional evidence about this now and 
about what is represented by readiness potentials.
In Mele 2009, I suggested that some of the participants in Libet’s studies 
may “treat the conscious urge [to flex] as what may be called a decide signal – 
a signal calling for them consciously to decide right then whether to flex right 
away or to wait a while” (p. 75). Judy Trevena and Jeff Miller later conducted 
a pair of interesting studies involving a related decide signal. Both studies had 
an “always-move” and a “sometimes-move” condition (2010, p. 449). In one 
study, participants in both conditions were presented with either an “L” 
 (indicating a left-handed movement) or an “R” (indicating a right-handed 
movement) and responded to tones emitted at random intervals. In the 
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 sometimes-move condition, participants were given the following instruc-
tions: “At the start of each trial you will see an L or an R, indicating the hand to 
be used on that trial. However, you should only make a key press about half the 
time. Please try not to decide in advance what you will do, but when you hear 
the tone either tap the key with the required hand as quickly as possible, or 
make no movement at all” (p. 449). (The tone may be viewed as a decide signal 
calling for a proximal decision about whether to tap or not.) In the always-
move condition, participants were always to tap the assigned key as quickly as 
possible after the tone. Trevena and Miller examined eeg activity for the sec-
ond preceding the tone and found that mean eeg “amplitudes did not differ 
among conditions” (p. 450). That is, there were no significant differences 
among pre-tone eeg amplitudes in the following three conditions: always-
move; sometimes-move with movement; sometimes-move without move-
ment. They also found that there was no significant lateralized readiness po-
tential (lrp) before the tone (p. 450). Trevena and Miller reasonably regard 
these findings as evidence that no part of pre-tone eeg represents a decision 
to move. The mean time “from the onset of the tone to a key press … was 322 
ms in the always-move condition and 355 ms in the sometimes-move condi-
tion” (p. 450). If and when the tone was among the causes of a proximal inten-
tion to press, the mean time from the onset of that intention to a key press 
was even shorter. And, of course, muscle motion begins before a key press is 
complete.
In a second study, Trevena and Miller left it up to participants which hand to 
move when they heard the decide signal. As in the first study, there was an al-
ways-move condition and a sometimes-move condition. Trevena and Miller 
again found that pre-tone eeg “did not discriminate between” trials with 
movement and trials without movement, “lrp was absent before the tone,” 
and lrp “was significantly positive after the tone for trials in which a move-
ment was made” (p. 453). They conclude, reasonably, that pre-tone eeg “does 
not necessarily reflect preparation for movement, and that it may instead sim-
ply develop as a consequence of some ongoing attention to or involvement 
with a task requiring occasional spontaneous movements” (p. 454). Regarding 
muscle activity, measured using electromyography (emg), the experimenters 
report that emg “seemed to start about 150 ms after the tone” in both “the 
sometimes-move trials with movements and in the always-move trials” (p. 452). 
If, in the case of movements, a proximal decision or intention to tap a key 
 followed the tone, then, obviously, the time from the onset of that decision or 
intention to muscle motion is even shorter. This casts serious doubt on the 
claim that, on average, proximal decisions or intentions to flex are made or 
acquired about 550 ms prior to muscle motion in Libet’s studies.
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As Aaron Schurger, Jacobo Sitt, and Stanislas Dehaene report, “it is widely 
assumed that the neural decision to move coincides with the onset of the RP” 
(2012, p. E2909). Like Trevena and Miller and myself, they challenge that as-
sumption. In their view, the brain uses “ongoing spontaneous fluctuations in 
neural activity” (p. E2904) – neural noise, in short – in solving the problem 
about when to act in Libet-style studies. A threshold for decision is set, and 
when such activity crosses it, a decision is made. They contend that most of the 
RP – all but the last 150 to 200 ms or so (p. E2910) – precedes the decision. In 
addition to providing evidence for this that comes from the work of other sci-
entists, Schurger et al. offer evidence of their own. They use “a leaky stochastic 
accumulator to model the neural decision” made about when to move in a 
 Libet-style experiment, and they report that their model “accounts for the be-
havioral and [eeg] data recorded from human subjects performing the task” 
(p. E2904). The model also makes a prediction that they confirmed: namely, 
that when participants are interrupted with a command to move now (press a 
button at once), short response times will be observed primarily in “trials in 
which the spontaneous fluctuations happened to be already close to the 
threshold” when the command (a click) was given (p. E2905).
Short response times to the command clicks are defined as the shortest 
third of responses to the command and are compared to the longest third 
(p. E2906). It may be suggested that in the case of the short reaction times, 
participants were coincidentally already about to press the button when they 
heard the click. To gather evidence about this, the experimenters instructed 
participants “to say the word ‘coincidence’ if the click should ever happen just 
as they were about to move, or were actually performing the movement” 
(p. E2907). Participants answered affirmatively in only 4% of the trials, on aver-
age; these trials were excluded (p. E2907).
Especially in the case of the study now under discussion, readers unfamiliar 
with Libet-style experiments may benefit from a short description of my own 
experience as a participant in such an experiment (see Mele 2009, pp. 34–36). 
I had just three things to do: watch a Libet clock with a view to keeping track of 
when I first became aware of something like a proximal urge, decision, or in-
tention to flex; flex whenever I felt like it (many times over the course of the 
experiment); and report, after each flex, where I believed the hand was on the 
clock at the moment of first awareness. (I reported this belief by moving a cur-
sor to a point on the clock. The clock was very fast; it made a complete 
 revolution in about 2.5 seconds.) Because I did not experience any proximal 
urges, decisions, or intentions to flex, I hit on the strategy of saying “now!” si-
lently to myself just before beginning to flex. This is the mental event that 
I tried to keep track of with the assistance of the clock. I thought of the “now!” 
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as shorthand for the imperative “flex now!” – something that may be under-
stood as an expression of a proximal decision to flex.
Why did I say “now!” exactly when I did? On any given trial, I had before me 
a string of equally good moments for a “now!” – saying, and I arbitrarily picked 
one of the moments. 3 But what led me to pick the moment I picked? The an-
swer offered by Schurger et al. is that random noise crossed a decision thresh-
old then. And they locate the time of the crossing very close to the onset of 
muscle activity – about 100 ms before it (pp. E2909, E2912). They write: “The 
reason we do not experience the urge to move as having happened earlier than 
about 200 ms before movement onset [referring to Libet’s partipants’ reported 
W time] is simply because, at that time, the neural decision to move (crossing 
the decision threshold) has not yet been made” (E2910). If they are right, this is 
very bad news for Libet. His claim is that, in his experiments, decisions are 
made well before the average reported W time: −200 ms. (In a Libet-style 
 experiment conducted by Schurger et al., average reported W time is −150 ms 
[p. E2905].) As I noted, if relevant proximal decisions are not made before W, 
Libet’s argument for the claim that they are made unconsciously fails.
The explanation Schurger and colleagues offer of their findings features 
neural noise crossing a threshold for decision. Recall Trevena and Miller’s sug-
gestion that pre-tone eeg in their experiment may “simply develop as a conse-
quence of some ongoing attention to or involvement with a task requiring oc-
casional spontaneous movements” (2010, p. 454). If Schurger and coauthors are 
right, this eeg develops partly as a consequence of neural noise, “ongoing 
spontaneous fluctuations in neural activity” (p. E2904); involvement with the 
task recruits neural noise as a kind of tie breaker among equally good options.
Given what I have said so far in this section, how plausible is it that Soon 
et al. found decisions 7 to 10 seconds in advance of a button press? Partly be-
cause the encoding accuracy was only 60%, it is rash to conclude that a deci-
sion was actually made at this early time (7 to 10 seconds before participants 
were conscious of a decision).4 As I observed elsewhere (Mele 2014, pp. 201–02), 
it is less rash to infer that brain activity at this time made it more probable that, 
for example, the agent would select the button on the left than the button on 
the right. The brain activity may indicate that the participant is, at that point, 
slightly more inclined to press the former button the next time he or she 
 presses. Rather than already having decided to press a particular button next 
3 This is not to say that every moment was equally good. I wanted to avoid lengthening my 
participation in the experiment unnecessarily.
4 Even if the encoding accuracy were much higher, one might reasonably wonder whether 
what is being detected are decisions or potential causes of subsequent decisions.
91Free Will and Neuroscience
<UN>
time, the person may have a slight unconscious bias toward pressing that 
button.
What about Fried and colleagues? Did they find early decisions? Their find-
ings are compatible with their having detected at 700 ms before reported W 
time an item of one of the kinds mentioned in what I called “the early group”: 
urges to (prepare to) press a key soon, brain events suitable for being relatively 
proximal causal contributors to such urges, motor preparation, and motor im-
agery. A spontaneous fluctuation in neural activity may be added to the list. If 
participants made proximal decisions to press a key, the findings are compati-
ble with their having made those decisions as late as the decision time identi-
fied by Schurger and coauthors.
3 When Do Participants Reach the Point of No Return?
Some readers who are persuaded that, in the studies I have discussed, deci-
sions are not made at −550 ms or earlier may believe that, even so, the point of 
no return for the action-generating processes is hit at one or another of the 
early times identified above and that this is bad news for free will. This belief 
suggests another argument for skepticism about free will. I call it psa, where 
P stands for “point of no return.”
1. In Libet-style experiments, the point of no return for processes that issue 
in overt actions is reached well before the corresponding decisions are 
made (anywhere from 550 ms to several seconds before muscle motion).
2. So this is probably true of all decisions to act.
3. If the point of no return for an action-generating process is reached well 
before the corresponding decision is made, then the decision is not freely 
made.
4. So probably no decisions to act are freely made.
Someone who endorses premise 3 of this argument may contend that if the 
point of no return for an action is hit well before the corresponding decision is 
made, the point of no return for the decision is also hit at this early time and 
that, in order for a decision to be free, there can be no time prior to the deci-
sion’s being made at which the point of no return for the making of it has been 
reached. Not everyone will accept this contention, of course; and not everyone 
will accept premise 3.5 But, for my purposes here, premise 3 does not need to 
be challenged. My concern is premise 1.
5 Compatibilists about free will maintain that free will is compatible with determinism (see 
McKenna and Coates 2015 for an instructive review). In a deterministic universe, the point of 
no return for processes is hit very early!
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In a comment on the possibility of “vetoing” an urge, intention, or decision, 
Libet makes the following observation: “In the absence of the muscle’s electri-
cal signal when being activated, there was no trigger to initiate the computer’s 
recording of any RP that may have preceded the veto” (2004, p. 141). Given this 
fact about the design of Libet’s main experiment, his data do not allow us look 
for a point of no return. Suppose we wanted to use Libet’s data to test the hy-
pothesis that the point of no return for muscle motion is hit somewhere be-
tween 550 and 250 ms before muscle motion starts. What we would like to do 
is to look at the data to see whether we ever get readings that look like type ii 
RPs during that span of time but are not followed by muscle motion. Libet’s 
experimental design does not allow us to do that. In the main experiment, we 
get readings only when there is muscle motion.
In Mele 2009, I reported that if I had a neuroscience lab, I would conduct a 
stop-signal experiment of a certain kind to get evidence about the point of no 
return in Libet-style scenarios (pp. 75–76). Such an experiment has since been 
conducted, and it is much more elegant than the one I sketched back then.
The experiment (Schultze-Kraft et al. 2016) takes place in three stages. In all 
three stages, there is a floor-mounted button and a circle presented on a com-
puter monitor. After the circle turns green, participants wait for “a short, self-
paced period of about 2 s” (p. 1080). When they are finished waiting, they may 
press the button whenever they wish. They earn points if they press while the 
light is still green, and lose points if they press after the light turns red. The red 
light is a stop signal.
In stage 1 of the experiment, the stop signals are issued at random times, and 
the participants are informed of this. Movement times are not predicted. eeg 
data from this stage are used to “train a classifier to predict upcoming move-
ments in the next two stages” (Schultze-Kraft et al. 2016, p. 1080).
Stage 2 differs from stage 1 in that movement predictions are made in real 
time using a brain-computer interface (bci). Participants are not informed of 
this before the experiment. The aim is to issue stop signals in time to interrupt 
the participants’ movements.
After participants complete stage 2, they are told that the computer had 
been predicting what they would do and that “they should try and move un-
predictably” (Schultze-Kraft et al. 2016, p. 1080). The participants are now ready 
for stage 3, which is just like stage 2 except that they now have the information 
I just mentioned.
For my purposes, the most interesting finding is the following one: “Despite 
the stereotypical shape of the RP and its early onset at around 1,000 ms before 
emg activity, several aspects of our data suggest that subjects were able to can-
cel an upcoming movement until a point of no return that was reached around 
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200 ms before movement onset” (Schultze-Kraft et al. 2016, p. 1083). If this is 
when the point of no return is reached, premise 1 of psa is false and the argu-
ment crumbles.6
4 Another Skeptical Argument
It may be thought that the basis for another skeptical argument about free will 
is present in my discussion of some recent scientific work. Return to the idea 
advocated by Schurger and coauthors that the neural decision to move in 
 Libet-style studies is produced when neural noise crosses a threshold. It may 
be claimed that, if this is what happens, a conscious process is not involved in 
the (relatively proximal) production of the decision and the decision is there-
fore unfree. It may also be claimed that this conclusion can properly be gener-
alized to all decisions to act. The argument at issue may be set out as follows. 
I call it nsa, where N stands for “noise.”
1. In Libet-style experiments, none of the decisions to act on which data are 
gathered issue from (relatively proximal) conscious processes.
2. So probably no decisions to act issue from (relatively proximal) conscious 
processes.
3. A decision is freely made only if it issues from a (relatively proximal) con-
scious process.
4. So probably no decisions to act are freely made.
In Libet-style experiments, participants are instructed to be spontaneous – 
that is, not to think about what to do. The instructions, if followed, keep con-
sciousness out of the relatively proximal decision-producing process. (Con-
sciousness may be causally involved earlier in the process: for example, 
participants’ conscious understanding of the instructions has a claim to being 
causally relevant to their performance, and a participant may consciously con-
struct or assent to a plan for completing the experiment, as I did.) The main 
role for consciousness in these experiments is linked to reporting: participants 
need a conscious event to report to the experimenter in the case of each 
 particular action. In my case, as I have mentioned, that event was a conscious, 
silent speech act.
So one difference between decisions made in Libet-style experiments (when 
participants are following the instructions) and some other decisions is that 
some other decisions are preceded by conscious reasoning about what to do. 
6 This point of no return should not be confused with a later one for the completion of the 
movement – that is, pressing the button (see Schultze-Kraft et al. 2016, p. 1083).
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The existence of this difference challenges the inference made in premise 2 of 
nsa. From the assertion that, when participants are instructed not to think 
about what to do, consciousness plays no relatively proximal role in the pro-
duction of their decisions it does not follow that, when people consciously 
reason about what to do, their conscious reasoning plays no relatively proxi-
mal role in the production of their decisions. Someone who wants to argue 
that, even in the latter case, consciousness plays no role of the kind at issue 
cannot rely solely on what happens in situations in which there is no conscious 
reasoning about what to do.
Another difference also merits attention. As I observed, during my stint as a 
participant in a Libet-style study I arbitrarily picked moments to begin flexing. 
Arbitrary picking is featured in the Libet-style studies I have described. Partici-
pants are said to have decided when to flex a wrist, when to press a key, or 
which of two buttons to press. There was no reason to prefer a particular mo-
ment for beginning to flex a wrist or press a key over nearby moments and (in 
the study by Soon et al.) no reason to prefer one button over the other. In these 
experiments, participants select from options they are indifferent about. But in 
many cases of decision making, we are far from indifferent about some of our 
options, and many instances of deciding are not instances of arbitrary picking. 
In typical cases, when we make decisions about matters that are very impor-
tant to us, after carefully gathering evidence and painstakingly assessing the 
options, our leading options differ from one another in ways that matter to us, 
and we do not arbitrarily pick.
The primary upshot of the considerations sketched in this section is easy to 
see. Arbitrary pickings in Libet-style experiments differ in obvious ways from 
some of the decisions we make – decisions about matters that we are not indif-
ferent about and that we make after careful reasoning about what to do. And 
the differences are such that we cannot legitimately generalize from the asser-
tion that conscious reasoning plays no relatively proximal role in the produc-
tion of the former decisions to the conclusion that this is true of all decisions 
to act.7
5 Conclusion
The primary purpose of this chapter was to bring relatively recent studies to 
bear on a pair of neuroscientific arguments – dsa and psa – for the nonexis-
tence of free will. As I have explained, these studies add to the body of  evidence 
7 See Mele 2009, pp. 85–87 for a parallel point about premise 2 of dsa.
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supporting the conclusion that both arguments fail. I also argued that a third 
skeptical argument, nsa, fails as well. I do not want to leave readers with the 
impression that, in my opinion, the problems with these three skeptical argu-
ments that I have focused on here are the only problems with them. Elsewhere, 
I have argued against the second premise – a generalizing premise – of dsa 
(Mele 2009, pp. 85–87, Mele 2018), and I have raised worries about the reliabil-
ity of reported W times (Mele 2009, ch.6).8
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Chapter 5




Since Benjamin Libet published the results of his well-known experiments 
 (Libet 1985; Libet–Gleason–Wright–Pearl 1983), it has been heavily debated 
whether these results refute the existence of free will. Most philosophers who 
are experts on the topic of free will have reached the conclusion that Libet’s 
original experiments and other Libet-style experiments have not provided 
enough evidence for denying free will yet.1 However, the problem as to wheth-
er Libet-style experiments could in principle refute free will has not been dis-
cussed as much and it seems that there is no consensus on this matter.
Recently, Marcelo Fischborn (2016, 2017) has attempted to shed light on why 
Libet-style experiments can in principle refute libertarian theories of free will. 
According to Fischborn, Libet-style experiments can in principle refute liber-
tarian free will because (i) libertarian free will is incompatible with a local de-
terminism in the brain that would make choice predetermined by unconscious 
brain states and (ii) Libet-style experiments are in principle able to support 
that there is such a local determinism in the brain.
Against Fischborn, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias (2017) have argued in 
accordance with their earlier papers (Roskies 2006, Nahmias 2014) that Fisch-
born is wrong because it is not true either that libertarian free will is 
 incompatible with local determinism or that Libet-style experiments are able 
to support local or universal determinism.
Although I think that this debate merits attention, both sides share a false 
presupposition, namely, that the different libertarian theories are similar to 
each other with regard to what they claim about the role and location of inde-
terminism in free decisions. Fischborn seems to think that libertarians agree 
1 The fact that the philosophical debate about free will is flourishing without discussion of 
Libet-style experiments proves this point in itself. Nevertheless, there are many works which 
explicitly state this (e.g. Mele 2009, 2011; Walter 2011, Shields 2014).
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(or should agree) that decisions about actions, between which there are no 
freedom-relevant metaphysical differences, have to be undetermined by previ-
ous (mental) states and events in order to the agent has libertarian free will. 
Roskies and Nahmias argue that only universal (and not local) determinism is 
incompatible with libertarian free will. Both presuppositions about libertari-
anism are false and this is why neither Fischborn nor Roskies and Nahmias see 
that different libertarian theories are vulnerable to the Libet-style experiments 
to various extents.
In my paper, I spell out which types of libertarian theories can be refuted by 
Libet-style experiments and which cannot. I claim that, on the one hand, some 
forms of deliberative libertarianism and restrictive libertarianism cannot even 
in principle be denied on the basis of these experiments; and on the other 
hand, standard libertarianism, along with some versions of restrictive and de-
liberative libertarianism, can in principle be refuted by these experiments. 
However, any form of restrictive libertarianism can be refuted in the future 
only if researchers perform new and “untraditional” Libet-style experiments. 
This is because “traditional” Libet-style experiments investigate decisions in 
Buridan-type situations. But these decisions are irrelevant with regard to free 
will, according to the restrictivists.
In the first section, I clarify some terminological issues in order to set the 
stage for a precise analysis. In the second, I attempt to show what the main 
reason is for thinking that Libet-style experiments seem to be problematic for 
libertarian theories. Although showing that actions are unconsciously initiat-
ed does not pose a real challenge for the elaborated philosophical theories of 
free will, Libet-style experiments may be problematic for most libertarian the-
ories because, pace Roskies and Nahmias, libertarians have good reasons for 
saying that local determinism and free will are incompatible. In the third sec-
tion, I argue that because some versions of deliberative libertarianism do not 
claim that decisions about actions are the center of freedom-relevant indeter-
minism, Libet-style experiments are unable to refute them after all. In the 
fourth, I attempt to show why standard centered libertarianism according to 
which there are no relevant metaphysical differences between different types 
of conscious decisions is in principle vulnerable to Libet-style experiments to 
a greater extent. Fifth, I point out the reasons why restrictivist centered liber-
tarianism is less vulnerable to these experiments. Still, I argue that moderate-
restrictivism can in principle be denied by Libet-style experiments if these 
experiments are modified in an important respect. However, proponents of 
hard-restrictivism should not worry about the possible results of these 
 experiments because these theories restrict the set of free decisions to such a 
great extent that they cannot be subjected to a proper empirical test.
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1 Key Notions of the Debate: “Libertarianism”,  
“Libet-Style Experiments”, “In Principle”
In Libet’s original experiment (Libet et al. 1983), the subjects are flexed their 
wrists whenever they wanted. Before they flexed their wrists, they had to mem-
orize the time of their conscious decision to flex when looking at a clock. After 
flexing their hands, they had to report the time of their initial awareness of 
their decision or urge to flex their wrists. Libet used Electroencephalography 
(eeg) to observe electrical activity of the subjects’ brains. He found the follow-
ing. Insofar as the subjects decided spontaneously, the unconscious occur-
rence of the so-called Readiness Potential (RP) preceded what subject report-
ed to be the time of their initial awareness of their decision or urge by 350 ms. 
If the subjects did not spontaneously decide, the time gap was even longer. 
Libet drew the conclusion that the subjects’ brain unconsciously initiated their 
actions, 350 ms earlier than they were aware of their decision. Since, in Libet’s 
view, free will is tied to consciousness, he thought that the subjects did not 
freely initiate the flexing of their wrists.2
Although some philosophers, neuroscientists, and psychologists embrace 
Libet’s conclusions (e.g. Wegner 2002, Hallett 2007),3 many of them call Libet’s 
conclusions and the adequacy of his whole experimental design into question 
(Roskies 2011, Walter 2011, and Shields 2014 give useful and brief summaries 
about the methodological issues). Besides measuring and methodological is-
sues, they worry about whether the electrical signal which was measured by 
Libet is identifiable with unconscious initiations of actions or whether it 
is something else. It is not clear even more than thirty years after Libet’s 
first  experiments what the RP is besides that it is an electrical activity in the 
motor cortex that precedes voluntary muscle bursts.4 Moreover, some call into 
 question whether the measured RP is connected to voluntary action. There is 
2 However, Libet claimed that agents have free will because they are able to stop and not per-
form the initiated action due to so-called “free won’t” (Libet 1985).
3 Although Daniel Wegner and Mark Hallett agree with Libet that agents do not freely and 
consciously initiate their spontaneous actions, they do not believe that ‘free won’t’ or some-
thing similar exists, which could be the basis of independent conscious control of actions.
4 The two most influential interpretations of RP are rather different. The first interpretation 
follows Libet’s interpretation according to which RP reflects neural processes associated with 
unconscious motor preparation of voluntary action. That is, if the RP is earlier than con-
scious awareness of decision, the initiation of the action is unconscious (Libet 1983, 2004). 
This interpretation often goes hand in hand with the claim that RP reflects unconscious deci-
sion for performing a specific action. The other interpretation claims that RP reflects stochas-
tic fluctuations in neural activity that lead to action following a threshold crossing when 
humans arbitrarily decide to move (Schurger et al. 2012). In other words, RP reflects such a 
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some experimental evidence which suggests that the measured RP is a result 
of Libet’s experimental design (Trevena and Miller 2010, Miller et al. 2011).
In order to evade the methodological and measuring issues, many followers 
of Libet have created more sophisticated versions of the original experiment 
(Fried et al. 2011). Others, most notably Chun Siong Soon and his colleagues 
(Soon et al. 2008, 2013), have made more radical changes besides fixing these 
measuring and methodological problems. Soon and his colleagues did not use 
eeg. Instead, they focused on observing specific brain regions using fMRI. 
Since the RP is defined in such a way that it can be detected only using eeg, 
using fMRI means that Soon’s experiment does not attempt to find a correla-
tion between RP and the conscious initiation of action. Moreover, they inves-
tigated not only choices about bodily motions but about mental actions as 
well, given that their later experiment examined decisions about adding or 
subtracting numbers. They found that the outcomes of choosing between 
pushing a right-sided or a left-sided button were predictable on the basis of 
patterns of activation in specific brain regions with roughly 60% accuracy, and 
7 seconds before the conscious experience of the choice (Soon 2008). They had 
similar results in the other experiment with regard to abstract spontaneous 
choices apart from that they could predict with 60% accuracy only 4 seconds 
before the conscious awareness of choices (Soon 2013).
Even though Libet’s early experiments and Soon’s experimental design are 
very different, both of them are called Libet-style experiments. Why should we 
put them into the same category? Because I do not think that one should call 
all neuropsychological experiments about free will Libet-style experiments, 
and since I did not find any definition of what makes an experiment to be a 
Libet-style experiment, I propose the following list of the necessary (and 
 together sufficient) conditions for being a Libet-style experiment.
i. By means of neuroscientific methods, Libet-style experiments try to 
identify such unconscious brain activities/states that determine (or 
which are identical with) decisions about actions through identifying 
correlations between brain activities/states and outcomes of decisions.
ii. Libet-style experiments examine decisions that are considered to be free 
decisions by the majority of laymen and/or philosophers.
iii. In order to ensure that the experiment will investigate decisions that are 
considered free, the experiment examines decisions in decision-situations 
neural mechanism that helps us to make decisions in situations in which there is no good 
reason for choosing one alternative over another.
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for which the influence of unknown intentions and preferences can rea-
sonably be excluded.
iv. During Libet-style experiments, subjects have to repeat the same type of 
decision many times.
v. The researchers have to identify the time when the subjects were aware 
of making their decision.
Although most of these conditions on being a Libet-style experiment are clear 
without further explanation, it is worthwhile focusing on (iii.) a little bit more. 
The reason why the influence of unidentified or unknown prior intentions 
and preferences should be excluded somehow is that, in many cases, prior 
conscious states and intentions explain the exact outcome of the decision. Let 
us suppose that someone consciously decided that whenever she has to de-
cide between two identical buttons, she will push the one on the left. After a 
while, she faces this “dilemma”, and she instantly pushes the left button with-
out conscious deliberation. Even though this freely-formed intention was the 
main cause of her action, pushing the button was such a fast reaction that it 
initiated action unconsciously. Even if a neuroscientist could detect that one 
of her brain states which was unconscious at the time of the initiation of ac-
tion determined whether she pushed the right or the left button, many lay-
men, compatibilist, and libertarian philosophers would think that it does not 
prove that her decision was not free, because it is probable that the uncon-
scious brain state in question is identical with (or is the neural basis of) her 
previously  freely-formed intention to press the left button. In order to evade 
these kinds of interpretative possibilities, the researchers have to choose such 
decision-situations in which they are able to exclude the influence of such 
distal (and free) preferences or intentions. Without focusing their attention 
on such a  decision-situation, they cannot be sure whether, in some sense, a 
prior consciously formed intention initiated the action instead of an uncon-
scious one.
This is the reason why Libet and most of his followers examine decision-
situations in which there are no objective reasons to prefer one alternative 
over another one. In Libet’s original experiments, the subjects have to decide 
when to flex their wrists without any good reason to flex their wrists at any 
particular time during the whole experiment. In Soon’s experiments, the sub-
jects have no objective reason to prefer pushing the left button/adding over 
pushing the right button/subtracting.
I call these experiments traditional Libet-style experiments and I will claim 
that these cannot refute many libertarian theories. The reason is the following. 
Although restricting the focus of the experiment in such a way is a good way 
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to exclude the influence of prior and unknown intentions and preferences, it 
has the disadvantage that the researcher can examine only one type of deci-
sion. These are Buridan-type decisions in which there is no reason to choose 
one alternative instead of any other. But there are some good reasons to think 
that these Buridan-type decisions are so different to other types of decisions 
that one cannot generalize results about the former decisions to the latter 
ones.
As I will argue, this issue has great importance with regard to the refutation 
of libertarian theories. Luckily, there are other possible ways to exclude the 
influence of unknown and prior intentions and preferences. For example, 
Maoz and his colleagues (Maoz 2017) asked their subjects about their relevant 
preferences in order to reasonably exclude the possibility that there are un-
known relevant preferences influencing the choices of the subjects during the 
experiment. Maoz’s research is a new form of Libet-style experiments, and 
I consider it as one of the first instances of an untraditional Libet-style 
experiment.
The second terminological issue that I should handle is what it means for an 
experiment to be capable “in principle” of supporting or proving a particular 
claim. Fischborn has an illuminating example.
It can be true that physics could in principle show that time travel is pos-
sible even if time travel is actually physically impossible. Saying that 
physics can in principle show that time travel is possible (if time travel is 
actually possible) says nothing about the truth or plausibility of the pos-
sibility of time travel; it only says that physics is the right science for an 
investigation on the possibility of time travel.
fischborn 2017, 2
One can paraphrase this quote regarding Libet-stlye experiments in the follow-
ing way. Saying that Libet-style experiments can in principle show that free will 
does not exist (if free will actually does not exist) says nothing about the truth 
or plausibility of the inexistence of free will; it only says that Libet-style experi-
ments are the right experiments for an investigation on the (in)existence of 
free will.
Fischborn’s example is extremely useful, because it can help shed light on 
an important issue. In general, if one asks whether time travel is possible, she 
means about “time travel”, among other things, that the body of the traveler has 
to travel through time in order that the traveler counts as a genuine time trav-
eler. In this case, physics is the right science for an investigation on the possi-
bility of time travel. However, in an unusual case, one can mean by time travel 
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such a process in which only a body-independent soul travels to the future or 
the past. In this unusual case, physics is not the right kind of science for an in-
vestigation on the possibility of time travel.
Similarly, it depends on what one means by the term ‘free will’, if we want to 
know whether Libet-style experiments can in principle support claims that re-
fute its existence. If one accepts a Hobbesian notion of free will according to 
which one has free will if she is able to act in accordance with her desires, then 
Libet-style experiments cannot even in principle show that one has no free 
will. This is because Libet-style experiments can primarily support only such 
claims which are based on the “correlation” of some unconscious brain states/
events and conscious outcomes of decisions. But these correlations do not say 
anything about whether the agent has a capacity thanks to which she can act 
in accordance with her desires. (Because even if such brain states determine 
our decisions, it does not mean that our actions and desires do not fit each 
other in most of the cases).
Here, my main interest is whether Libet-style experiments are able to refute 
libertarian theories of free will. Libertarianism is the conjunction of two the-
ses. One is the thesis of incompatibilism according to which universal deter-
minism is incompatible with free will. The second is the free will thesis which 
says that adult humans without severe psychological disorders have free will. 
Even though all libertarian theories accept these theses, there are great differ-
ences between them. This is partly because they disagree about i) the location 
of the relevant indeterminism and ii) what the exact metaphysical structures 
of different types of decisions are.
I claim that, contrary to Fischborn, Nahmias, and Roskies, the differences 
which are rooted in these disagreements are relevant with regard to whether 
libertarian theories can be refuted by Libet-style experiments. Traditional 
forms of Libet-style experiments can in principle refute only those which claim 
that a) the location of freedom-relevant indeterminism can be found in deci-
sions about actions and b) there is no freedom-relevant difference between 
Buridan-type decisions and other non-coerced decisions. Consequently, they 
can refute standard libertarianism and some deliberative libertarian theories. 
Untraditional Libet-style experiments, if they are performed, will be able to 
refute more types of libertarianism. In principle, they can threaten those which 
claim that α) the location of relevant indeterminism can be found in the deci-
sion process about actions β) there is no freedom-relevant difference between 
hard decisions in which the agent is strongly motivated to perform more than 
one action. But neither traditional nor untraditional Libet-style experiments 
can refute those libertarian theories which say either that A) the location of 
freedom-relevant indeterminism is not necessarily in the decision processes 
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about actions or that B) there is a freedom-relevant difference between 
 decisions under moral temptation and every other type of decisions. In the fol-
lowing sections, I will argue for these claims in detail.
2 How Are Libet-Style Experiments Able to Get  
Libertarians into Trouble?
In the literature, there are two models about how Libet-style experiments deny 
the existence of free will (libertarian or not). According to the first, Libet-style 
experiments are relevant to the free will debate because they support the claim 
that we do not consciously initiate our actions. If it is true, then, as the argu-
ment goes, it is also true that our conscious considerations do not influence 
our actions. And this would mean that we do not have free will. (This kind of 
argumentation, most prominently, can be found in Wegner 2002. Daniel 
 Wegner argues that even intentions have no causal role in producing our 
actions).
In my view, this argument is problematic for many reasons. For the sake of 
brevity, I would like to stress only one difficulty (more detailed criticism can be 
found in Mele 2009). Even if it is true that we do not consciously initiate our 
actions, this does not necessarily mean that our conscious considerations do 
not influence our actions. If a soccer player consciously reaches the conclusion 
that she should try to deflect the ball after the free kick, her conscious decision 
influences her bodily motion even if, later, she unconsciously initiates her 
bodily movement which is aimed at deflecting the motion of the ball. In light 
of this, even if it is an illusion that there is such an activity as conscious initia-
tion of action, it is still quite possible that our conscious considerations have a 
major role in controlling our actions.
This problem merits attention because the vast majority of free will theories 
do not consider the conscious initiation of action as a necessary condition on 
free will and moral responsibility.5 Rather, they stress the importance of spe-
cific causal or non-causal influence of the agent and her reasons for action. 
This is why, if we resist the problematic conclusion that Libet-style experi-
ments can show that conscious considerations do not influence our actions, 
this strategy seems to be harmless after all.
5 Timothy O’Connor (2000, 122) has lamented that elaborated philosophical theories of free 
will do not clarify the role of consciousness with regard to free actions. As far as I can tell, 
experts on this topic still tend to neglect this issue. However, there are some exceptions, for 
instance, Hodgson 2012.
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Now, one may object that Libet-style experiments can prove not only that 
we unconsciously initiate our actions but also that we unconsciously decide 
what we will do. In traditional Libet-style experiments, the subjects have no 
reason to prefer one alternative over the others. Thus, the initiation of action 
cannot be influenced by conscious reasons and previous conscious decisions. 
Therefore, the unconscious initiation of the action is the very source of the 
 action. Since the very sources of our actions are the decisions about ac-
tions, one can say that the unconscious initiation of the action is the decision 
itself.
There are two problems. First, even if the unconscious initiation is the main 
source of the action in question, it does not necessarily mean that considering 
this initiation to be a decision is a good idea. Let us suppose that our universe 
is deterministic and the Big Bang is the main source of every event of the uni-
verse. This surely does not mean that the Big Bang is any kind of decision. One 
may argue that there is a good reason for considering unconscious initiations 
to be decisions from an action-theoretical point of view. But, as far as I know, 
there is no such argument yet. Second, even if the unconscious initiation is the 
main source of the action in Buridan-type situations, it does not necessarily 
mean that it is the case even in situations in which the agent has reasons for 
choosing one of the alternatives. It is still possible that conscious reasons caus-
ally influence this initiation even if the initiation is unconscious. And in this 
case, most theories of free will is not get into trouble.
The second model for how Libet-style experiments can in principle refute 
theories of free will is spelled out by Marcel Fischborn. According to Fisch-
born, who focuses on libertarian theories, Libet-style experiments are in prin-
ciple able to refute the existence of free will because they can support the fol-
lowing kind of laws.
LD1. For any event x, and any subject s, if an x that is a pattern of neural 
activity of type B occurs in s’s brain, then s will decide to push a given 
button.
fischborn 2016, 497
Fischborn suggests a particular way of supporting LD1. Let us suppose that 
Soon and colleagues will find in the future that there is a 100% correlation be-
tween some types of unconscious brain states and some outcomes of Buridan-
type decisions. In this case, the neuroscientists could reasonably conclude that 
there are LD1-like psychological laws which imply local determinism.
Moreover, Fischborn claims that if the neuroscientists could prove many 
instances of LD1, they would be reasonably able to generalize their results. 
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Thus, they could in principle support the claim that not only LD1-type laws are 
true but the following one as well.
dnc. For any subject s, any choice x, and any course of action X, if s 
chooses to do X, then there is a previous event y of a type Y in s’s brain, 
such that whenever an event of type Y occurs in someone’s brain, then 
this subject will choose for the course of action X.
fischborn 2016, 497
But if dnc was true, it would mean that our decisions are locally determined 
by unconscious brain states. From this, according to Fischburn, it follows that 
libertarian theories of free will are refuted because they are incompatible with 
this kind of local determinism.
Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias have argued that this way of refuting lib-
ertarian theories does not work (Roskies & Nahmias 2017). To begin with, it is 
unsure that any Libet-style experiments (or other neuroscientific experiments) 
will support anything similar to LD1. This is because it may be the case that 
there are multiple realizations of mental states, and/or the thesis of extended 
cognition may be true, and/or the claim that neural activities are complex and 
chaotic might be true. Insofar as one of these views is on the right track, it is 
very unlikely that neuroscientific experiments will find laws similar to LD1, 
because they imply that the relations between brain states and mental states 
are too complicated for the existence of universal and deterministic law-like 
relations between brain states and decisions.
To my mind, Fischborn has answered to this argument in a very plausible 
way (Fischborn 2017, 199–200). He has pointed out that this objection has 
nothing to do with the question whether Libet-style experiments can in prin-
ciple prove LD1. For the sake of argument, Fischborn accepts that if any of the 
aforementioned hypotheses are true, then Libet-style experiments cannot sup-
port LD1. (I would even say that this is because if one of these suppositions is 
true, then LD1 cannot be true). But it does not mean that Libet-style experi-
ments cannot in principle support LD1. If there are psychological laws such as 
LD1, Libet-style experiments could support this claim partly because, if LD1 is 
true, then neither multiple realizability, extended cognition, nor the thesis that 
neural networks are complex and chaotic are true. In other words, if LD1 is 
true, Libet-style experiments can show that it is the case.
Roskies’ and Nahmias’ second objection is based on the claim that libertar-
ian free will is incompatible only with universal determinism. Thus, even if 
dnc could be proven, it would not refute libertarianism. Roskies and Nahmias 
are aware that some libertarians have explicitly claimed that free will is 
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 incompatible with local determinism (they mention Kane 1996, Ekstrom 2000, 
Balaguer 2012). However, Roskies and Nahmias argue that libertarians do not 
have good reason for worrying about local determinism because all of their 
arguments for incompatibilism support only the incompatibility of universal 
determinism and free will.
In my view, libertarians argue mainly against the compatibility of universal 
determinism and free will because they try to deny all forms of compatibilism 
regardless of their exact details. But most libertarians deny that agents may 
have free will if all of their decisions are determined by unconscious brain 
states. Even if they do not explicitly claim this, one can be sure about it be-
cause most libertarians think that the decisions about actions should be unde-
termined by preceding brain or/and mental states in order to count as (direct-
ly) free.6 More precisely, most libertarians claim that the very event that is 
choosing an action has to be undetermined. In the literature, these libertarians 
are called centered libertarians, and most of the detailed libertarian theories 
fall into this group.7
Moreover, centered libertarians do not only claim that momentary free deci-
sions about actions are the indeterministic sources of free will but they have 
good reasons for embracing this view (pace Roskies & Nahmias 2017). In order 
to grasp why it is the case, one has to see what libertarians should do for dialec-
tical reasons besides refuting compatibilism. First, they have to show how sat-
isfying the libertarian control-conditions of free action provides more control 
over action than satisfying compatibilist control-conditions. This is because 
libertarians, by definition, deny that satisfying compatibilist conditions of free 
action is sufficient for free action. And if universal determinism rules out free 
action, the reason for it has to be that it undermines the satisfaction of the 
control condition on free actions. (The epistemic condition, which is the other 
widely accepted condition for being morally responsible, has nothing to do 
with the truth or falsity of determinism.) Second, they need to explain also 
how the outcome of an indeterministic process need not be a matter of luck. 
They have to solve this problem because if an action is simply a matter of luck, 
it cannot be controlled by anything. And an uncontrolled action cannot be free 
(Levy 2011). Third, they should provide some evidence for that such an indeter-
ministic process which is not simply a matter of luck exists.
6 That is, the location of indeterminism has to be found somewhere in the decision-process. As 
far as I know, there is only one elaborated libertarian theory which does not accept this claim 
(Ekstrom 2000). In the next section, I will investigate this theory.
7 According to the article about libertarian theories of free will at Stanford Encyclopedia 
(Clarke & Capes 2017), all agent-causal and non-causal theories are centered accounts. Even 
most event-causal libertarians have elaborated centered theories.
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In order to solve the second issue, the libertarians have to posit not only an 
indeterministic process but a controlled indeterministic process. In order to 
reply to the first issue, they have to suppose a controlled indeterministic pro-
cess that is controlled differently with respect to the way that the compatibilist 
agent controls her action. Most libertarians have reached the conclusion that 
the moment of deciding is the event which has to be undetermined in order to 
solve these problems because decisions about actions are considered to be 
those events that are controlled in the most direct way. So there is a hope that 
if decisions about actions are the key indeterministic events which are not de-
termined by previous brain/mental states, then they are still highly controlled 
indeterministic events. Additionally, some libertarians think that there is good 
evidence for libertarian free will if the moment of deciding is considered as the 
key indeterministic free event. They argue that the phenomenological charac-
teristics of these decisions can serve as an evidence for the existence of highly 
controlled but undetermined events. At the moment of the decision, the 
choice seems to be both undetermined and controlled from a first person point 
of view,8 and – according to these libertarians – this phenomenological fact is 
a proper evidence for believing in the existence of sufficiently controlled and 
undetermined decisions until there are no strong counter-evidences that out-
weigh this phenomenological consideration.9
Thus, from a libertarian perspective, there are good reasons for denying 
even psychological and local determinism because they have good reasons to 
claim that the very moment of decisions about actions are those indeterminis-
tic and highly controlled events that are the sources of free will. Or at least, 
these reasons are no worse than other philosophical reasons for embracing 
other philosophical views. Rejecting the relevance of local determinism with 
regard to libertarianism without providing arguments against these reasons is 
insufficient.
Before I address the problem as to whether Libet-style experiments are in 
principle able to refute centered libertarian theories, I investigate which non-
centered or deliberative libertarian theories are vulnerable to Libet-style 
experiments.
8 However, some doubt that these decisions seems to be undeterminded from a first person 
perspective. See Nahmias et al. 2004, Horgan 2011, 2012.
9 This phenomenological argument for free will can be found in Reid 1788: 36; C.A. Campbell 
1957: 168–174; O’Connor 1995: 196–197; Swinburne 2011: 82. Deery 2015 reconstructs the 
 argument with great care, and I borrowed his list about where the argument explicitly 
appeared.
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3 Are Libet-Style Experiments Able to Refute Deliberative 
Libertarianism?
In the literature, those libertarian theories are called deliberative which claim 
that the location of freedom-relevant indeterminism is not (or at least not 
 necessarily) at the moment of choice. For example, Laura Ekstrom (2000) 
claims that it is enough for having free will if the agent’s preference formation 
is indeterministic. Surprisingly, as far as I know, Ekstrom is the only devoted 
libertarian who adopts a deliberative libertarian theory. However, some ex-
perts who officially do not endorse libertarianism have outlined other delib-
erative libertarian approaches. Daniel Dennett (1978) and Alfred Mele (1995 
ch.12) suggested two very similar theories for libertarians. According to Den-
nett, libertarians should claim that the processes determining which consider-
ations occur to one are the heart of libertarian freedom. Similarly, Mele (1995, 
2006: 9–14) shows that the libertarian may claim that the key indeterministic 
processes are those which determine whether a belief (or desire) comes to the 
agent’s mind.
In principle, Mele’s and Dennett’s suggestion could be refuted by Libet-style 
experiments. Let us suppose that someone performs an experiment which is 
very similar to Soon’s and his colleagues’ experiment. And say she finds that 
there is a 100% correlation between different patterns of unconscious brain 
activities which precede the decision by 10 seconds and the different possible 
outcomes of the decision. Since it is plausible to suppose that the processes 
that determine which considerations occur to one are not finished in Buridan-
type situations 10 seconds before the choice, this experiment would support 
strongly the claim that these processes are determined, as well as the outcomes 
of choices, by unconscious brain states.
However, it is not so simple in the case of Ekstrom’s deliberative libertarian-
ist view. Ekstrom’s claims, in contrast with other libertarian approaches, that 
not only decisions about actions but also decisions concerning what desirable 
is can be undetermined and metaphysically free. According to Ekstrom, the 
latter kind of decision are not necessarily about what would be desirable to do 
at a given time but can be about what the good is in general (Ekstrom 2000, 
106–109).
Prima facie, this version of libertarianism is not as vulnerable to Libet-style 
experiments since these experiments investigate only decisions about actions. 
Even if Libet-style experiments show that decisions about actions are deter-
mined by unconscious brain states, it is open to Ekstrom to claim that deci-
sions about what is good are relevantly different in this regard because they are 
undetermined and free. She could argue, for instance, that all decisions about 
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actions are driven by conscious or unconscious brain states because our most 
valuable and rational choices are based on what we consider as good or desir-
able. But decisions about what is good and what kind of things are desirable 
may not determined by other choices. This kind of defense of free will cannot 
be refuted by reference only to Libet-style experiments because they  investigate 
only decisions about actions. One should deny this argumentation on the basis 
of philosophical insights or empirical data. But the neuropsychological experi-
ments which could test whether decisions about what is good are determined 
by previous brain states should be so different to Libet-style experiments that 
it would be misleading to call them “Libet-style experiments”.
If am right, in contrast with Dennett’s and Mele’s deliberative libertarian 
theories, Ekstrom’s view, even in principle, cannot be refuted by Libet-style 
experiments. To put it simply, this is because Libet-style experiments do not 
investigate decisions about what is good (this may be considered to be judg-
ment rather than decision by many philosophers). To generalize the moral of 
this, Libet-style experiments are not able to deny those libertarian theories ac-
cording to which it is not (or not only) decisions about actions that are the lo-
cation of free will.
4 Centered Libertarianism
4.1 Standard Versions
Most libertarians claim that decisions as momentary choices about actions 
should be undetermined to count as (directly) free. The standard version of this 
approach says that there is no relevant difference between non-pathological 
decisions with regard to metaphysical freedom. Every decision is directly free, 
there are no non-pathological decisions which are unfree or only indirectly 
free because they are the consequences of prior directly free decisions. In oth-
er words, every psychologically “normal” decision is directly free regardless of 
the particular type of the decision in question. This version of libertarianism is 
the most common. All non-causal (Goetz 1988, Ginet 1990, McCann 1998, Lowe 
2008, Pink 2004) and agent-causal theories (Chisholm 1966, Taylor 1992, 
O’Connor 2000, Clarke 2003, Griffith 2007, Steward 2012) fall into this group. 
(I know about only one exception. It is Swinburne 2011, which defends a re-
strictive agent-causal theory). Even some event-causal accounts endorse this 
unrestricted version of libertarianism (Nozick 1981, Hodgson 2012).10 In this 
section, I would like to point out that this unrestrictive view on free decisions 
10 There are accounts which are between restrictivist and non-restrictivist views. They ac-
cept that there are indirectly free and determined decisions but they do not say that 
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has the price that these standard centered libertarian theories are quite vul-
nerable to Libet-style experiments.
Libet-style experiments can, in principle, show that decisions are predeter-
mined in Buridan-type situations. For instance, if Soon and colleagues were 
able to predict on the basis of the activity of unconscious brain states whether 
the agent will push the left or the right button with 100% accuracy 7 seconds 
before the conscious awareness of choice, then this would provide strong evi-
dence for unconscious determination with regard to Buridan-type decisions. 
But, and this is the point, insofar as there is no relevant metaphysical differ-
ence between non-pathological conscious choices, this result would provide 
strong evidence that all conscious decisions are determined by unconscious 
brain states. Without question, if it turned out to be true, it would refute cen-
tered libertarianism.
But why do so many libertarians think that there is no relevant metaphysi-
cal difference between non-pathological conscious decisions? The reason 
why is that there is no phenomenological difference between conscious deci-
sions with regard to the prior indeterminacy of these decisions. All conscious 
decisions about actions seem to be undetermined from a first person point of 
view. At the moment of conscious decision, agents have the impression 
whether they decide for A alternative or B alternative is settled only at the 
very moment of the choice in question. This phenomenological characteristic 
of decisions is relevant for many libertarians because they regard it as the best 
evidence for having free (highly controlled but indeterministic) decisions. If 
libertarians do not claim that all decisions which phenomenologically seem 
to be free actually are free, then they cannot maintain that phenomenological 
traits reliably indicate whether a decision is actually free; therefore, they have 
to look after  another justification for believing in free will. And this is not an 
easy task. Consequently, even if claiming that every non-pathological deci-
sion is free has the cost that the theory will in principle be vulnerable to Libet-
style experiments, it may be worthwhile sticking to this idea. Until standard 
centered libertarianism is only in principle vulnerable to Libet-style experi-
ments and not refuted by them, the proponents of standard centered liber-
tarianism can reasonably hope that their theory will not be refuted even in 
the future.
However, many who initially regard centered libertarianism as a plausible 
view on free will would not like to take this risk. After all, this conclusion about 
standard centered views says that even a version of the well-known Libet-style 
 specific types of decisions are necessarily determined. For instance, it seems to me that 
Mele (2006) offers such a libertarian account.
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experiments can in principle show that free will is only a phenomenological il-
lusion. Luckily, for those who would like to neither reject centered libertarian-
ism nor take this risk, there are other versions of centered views that are in 
principle less vulnerable to Libet-style experiments.
4.2 Restrictivist Versions
Libertarian restrictivists claim that only some types of our decisions about ac-
tions are directly free (Campbell 1938/2013, van Inwagen 1989, Balaguer 2004; 
Kane 1996, 2000, 2007). This is because, in their view, only some types of deci-
sions can be indeterministic and sufficiently controlled at the same time. 
 However, they tend to call “free” even determined or not sufficiently controlled 
decisions which are properly influenced by directly free decisions.
There are, so to say, hard-restrictivists who hold that only one type of deci-
sion can be directly free. For instance, C.A. Campbell (1938/2013) famously 
claimed that only decisions that are made in situations of moral temptation 
are directly free. Other restrictivists, for instance Peter van Inwagen and Robert 
Kane, say that there are more types of decisions which are directly free. Kane 
claims that all decisions are directly free in which either the agent has more 
than one motivationally viable option or the agent must make efforts to sus-
tain her intentions against desires and other conditions which make it difficult 
to carry out our purposes once chosen (Kane 1996, 2000, 2007). I call this more 
permissive kind of view moderate-restrictivism.
These theories agree that decisions are not free in Buridan-type situations. 
This is because, in Buridan-type situations, agents have no reasons to prefer 
one possible course of action over another (or over doing nothing at all). For 
example, in Libet’s original experiments, the agents do not have any reason for 
prefer flicking their wrists over doing nothing at any time during the experi-
ment. The subjects are not motivated in either way; thus, neither option is mo-
tivationally viable for them. At best, only one option is motivationally viable 
from trial to trial from their perspective, and it is that which is suggested for 
them by their unconscious processes. So showing that those Buridan-type 
 decisions in which the agent has no reasons to prefer any possible course of 
action are not free is not in contradiction with restrictivist libertarianism. 
 Consequently, results of traditional Libet-style experiments which investigate 
Buridan-type decisions are, even in principle, not able to refute libertarian 
restrictivism.
One may disagree on the basis that restrictive libertarians believe that 
 Buridan-type decisions are indeterministic (van Inwagen 1989). So, the objec-
tion could go, even traditional Libet-style experiments are able to refute the 
views of restrictivist libertarians about decisions.
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It is true that traditional Libet-style experiments can in principle refute the 
views of restrictivists about Buridan-type decisions but it does not mean that 
these experiments are able to refute libertarian restrictivism. For what libertar-
ian restrictivism argues is that Buridan-type decisions are not free. Libertarian 
restrictivists can justify this claim by saying either that they are not free  because 
the outcome of these decisions are a matter of chance or that they are not free 
because they are determined. Peter van Inwagen supposes that Buridan-type 
decisions are based on an “internal coin-tossing”, suggesting that the outcome 
of these decisions are just as lucky as the outcome of a coin-tossing (van Inwa-
gen 1989, 417). However, in the light of traditional Libet-style experiments, the 
restrictivist could suggest that RP is neural noise that helps to form intentions 
through generating an urge to choose something in such cases that the agent 
has no reason to choose any particular alternative. It is even open for the re-
strictivist to say that neural noise is determined by the exact state of the brain 
and that it in turn determines which alternative will be chosen. In this case, the 
restrictivist should not worry even if the researchers could predict the out-
come of the decision with 100% accuracy in Buridan-type situations. The re-
strictivist could say that the neural noise in question has a deterministic role 
only in Buridan-type situations because, in other situations, the agent decides 
on the basis of her reasons.
Although traditional Libet-style experiments are harmless against restric-
tivism, untraditional Libet-style experiments may get moderate-restrictivism 
into trouble. Moderate-restrictivists agree that if the agent has to decide be-
tween two options which, for the agent, seem to be attractive on the basis of 
different sets of reasons, she will make a directly free decision. For instance, if 
one has to decide between donating towards the education of poor children 
and donating towards the care of sick people, and if one has not previously 
ranked the sets of reasons which motivate these actions, then the one will 
make a directly free decision.
Even though this decision could be not be investigated by traditional Libet-
style experiments, Maoz and his colleagues performed a Libet-style experiment 
which could, in principle, show that even these hard decisions are determined 
(Maoz 2017). First, they instructed the subjects to rate how much they would 
like to support different non-profit organizations (npo) with a $1000 donation 
on a scale of 1 to 7. After that, the subjects had to decide between different npos. 
In some cases, they had to choose while knowing that their choice would raise 
the probability that the researcher would in fact give a donation for the chosen 
npo. In other cases, they know that their choices will not influence whether the 
chosen or another npo will get donations. Moreover, the researchers asked 
the subjects to make completely arbitrary decisions in these latter cases. The 
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researchers investigated, among other things, the RP signals during the deliber-
ate and arbitrary decisions.
This experimental setup, in principle, could support the claim that even 
those decisions that are both difficult and based on reasons are determined by 
unconscious brain states. Let us suppose that they find type-A RP signs if the 
subject chooses the npo which is represented at the left side of the screen, and 
type-B RP signs if the subject chooses the one on the right side, regardless of 
how difficult is the choice for the subject. In this case, it would be reasonable 
to suppose that the unconscious RP determined the decision (or it was the 
decision itself).11
Nevertheless, even this untraditional Libet-style experiment has its limits. It 
is easy to see that it cannot refute those libertarian theories according to which 
it is not decisions about actions but decisions about what is good that are the 
source of freedom. This experiment is still a Libet-style experiment focusing 
on decisions about actions. The subjects previously formed their opinion on 
what things are desirable or good, and this is why they could give a definite 
answer to the question of how much they wanted to support different npos. 
Moreover, this kind of experiment is not able to refute hard-restrictivist liber-
tarianism. Hard-restrictivists say that only one decision-type is directly free. 
Namely, decisions which are made during moral temptation. It is open to the 
hard-restrictivist to claim that these decisions are not determined by uncon-
scious brain-states, even if all other decisions are.
For practical reasons, I do not believe that Libet-style experiments could 
refute hard-restrictivism (Campbell 1938/2013). The main problem is that it is 
needed that the subjects do not know about the real aim of the experiment. If 
the subjects know that their decisions between morally good and bad choices 
are the focus of the experiment, and there is no significant reward for making 
the morally problematic choice, then the subjects will not be tempted to make 
the morally bad choice. This is because the fact that they are perceived (and 
probably judged) by the researchers puts such a sociological and moral pres-
sure on the shoulders of the subjects so that they will be not tempted to do the 
bad thing. Moreover, promising a high reward for making the morally bad 
choice would be so unprofessional or unethical that such an experiment is un-
likely to be approved by an ethics committee.
11 The paper was not peer-reviewed when I accessed the article (2017–12–29). Therefore, one 
should not consider these results so relevant yet. But it may be worth mentioning that 
Maoz and his colleagues do not find such a pattern of RP that researchers have found in 
Buridan-type cases. If Maoz’s and colleagues’ results are valid, they are strong evidence 
that deliberative decisions are different to Buridan-type decisions from a neuroscientific 
point of view.
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For instance, let us suppose that researchers perform a version of the 
 Milgram-experiment. The subject is invited to a research center and the re-
searchers say to her that they are investigating the psychological effects of pun-
ishment on the learning and memory. The subject has to give an amount of 
electric shock to someone in another room if she gives a wrong answer. In the 
original experiment, the subject has no idea that the real focus of the experi-
ment is not the effect of punishment but whether the subject will comply with 
the unethical order of the researcher or not. She does not know that the other 
person who “receives” the shocks is, in fact, a confederate of the researchers 
and a skilled actor who pretends that she receives actual shocks (Milgram 
1963).
It is an essential feature of the experiment that the subjects do not know 
that their decisions and actions are the real focus of the experiment. It is easy 
to see why. If they knew the real research question is whether they will obey 
unethical orders, they would try to do their best in order to preserve their per-
ception of themselves as morally good people. Not to mention that, in this 
case, it would be important for them to present themselves as morally good 
persons to the experimenters. In such circumstances, most people would not 
be tempted to act badly even if the experimenters order them to do so. They 
would interpret the whole experiment as a trial in which they have the oppor-
tunity to be a moral hero.
This is even more problematic if one considers the fact that the subjects 
have to repeat the same type of decision many times. Even if the researchers 
can fool the subject once or twice about the real focus of the experiment, it 
would be extremely hard to do this twenty or thirty times.
I have no idea how a mixed Libet-Milgram-type experiment could be per-
formed. Of course, I cannot rule out a priori that more creative researchers 
than I are able to figure out a Libet-type experiment which can in principle 
refute hard-restrictivism. But I think the issue that I have highlighted is chal-
lenging.12 So challenging that one can justifiably believe that it is probable that 
even the best researchers cannot construe such a Libet-type experiment which 
could in principle refute hard-restrictivism. In sum, the main problem is that 
the researchers have to use some kind of device to scan the brain activity of the 
12 As an anonym reviewer of the paper pointed out, hard-restrictivism is so implausible that 
it may not worth to spend so much time and space to discuss the difficulties of devising 
an experimental situation to probe it. However, I think the issue of decisions under moral 
temptation is relevant even if one does not care about hard-restrictivism or libertarian-
ism at all. If someone would like to do neuroscientific experiments about decisions under 
moral temptations, in the light of my arguments, one should conclude that it would be 
wise to choose a non-Libet-style design to get some relevant result.
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subject, but it seems to be impossible to use such a device which is undetect-
able by the subjects. And the subjects would be curious about what the device 
does. The researchers could lie about anything but they could not plausibly 
deny that the aim of the device is to collect data about the subject.
 Conclusion
I argued that traditional Libet-type experiments which investigate decisions in 
Buridan-type situations can, in principle, refute only standard (that is, non- 
restrictivist) centered libertarian theories and such deliberative libertarian 
views which claim that decision processes about actions are the main sources 
of freedom. Although we have to wait for the results of untraditional Libet-type 
experiments, they can, in principle, refute moderate-restrictivist centered lib-
ertarian theories as well because they investigate subjects in such situations in 
which they have motivationally relevant reasons for more than one alternative. 
However, Libet-type experiments are not able to refute all libertarian theories. 
First, there are some deliberative libertarian theories according to which inde-
terministic decisions (or, if you like, judgments) about what is good may be the 
basis of free will. These theories cannot be refuted by Libet-style experiments 
because the latter focus on decisions about actions. Second, they cannot refute 
hard-restrictivist theories which say that agents can bring forth directly free 
decisions only if they are morally tempted. The problem is that if the subjects 
know that the researchers observe their behavior and decisions, they will not 
be tempted to do the morally bad action unless the reward for choosing the 
morally bad action is high. But it would be unprofessional or unethical to per-
form an experiment that gives a high reward for doing something morally bad.
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Results in the cognitive neuroscience of volition and action have been often 
dismissed as ultimately irrelevant, or too week at best, to legitimately tackle 
the philosophical issues of free will and intentional agency. By contrast, this 
chapter seeks to promote a more constructive perspective regarding how phi-
losophy and cognitive neuroscience can jointly improve our comprehension of 
intentional agency.
The chapter is divided into seven sections. In Section 2, I present the causal 
theory of action as the best attempt to provide a reductive philosophical char-
acterisation of intentional action, introducing some early and ongoing debates 
concerning the causal role of conscious mental states. In Section 3, I discuss 
how specific problems for the understanding of intentional agency, as inherit-
ed from the causal theory, originate from widely discussed pieces of empirical 
evidence on how voluntary processes unfold. In Section 4, I go through some of 
the counter-arguments that have been put forward in order to defend the clas-
sic view of intentional agency. To a various extent, these counter-arguments 
target the lack of ecological validity of widely employed experimental para-
digms. In Section 5, I present counter-arguments of a different type, which are 
based on the underlying claim that no clear causal link between unconscious 
neural antecedents and actions can be established on the basis of neuroscien-
tific data.
The preoccupation expressed by some of these criticisms is shareable. 
Nonetheless, I will suggest that the following argument is unwarranted: Be-
cause it does not straightforwardly rule out the causal theory, the  neuroscientific 
angle is irrelevant to understanding intentional agency. In Section 6, I in fact 
argue in favour of a different approach concerning the relation between ex-
perimental research and philosophical analysis. In particular, I suggest that the 
former does not simply have the role of validating the latter, but plays a more 
constructive part in defining the common research target. I articulate these 
claims with some proposals and examples (Subsections 6.1 and 6.2). Some final 




2 Ups and Downs of the Causal Theory of Action
The problem of naturalising intentional agency, i.e., developing an account of 
intentional agency that matches the scientific view of the world, remains a 
crucial challenge for the philosophy of action. In this respect, the causal theory 
of action (Davidson 1963; Searle 1983; Setiya 2007) has taken the lion’s share, 
and has been considered the most suitable strategy for naturalising intentional 
agency in a reductive fashion. Notoriously, its central tenet is that actions are 
intentional if they are appropriately caused by the right mental states, such as 
desires-beliefs pairs (Dretske 1988) or temporally extended plans (Bratman 
2000), working as the reasons for those actions. Intentional actions are thus 
intrinsically complex compounds, constituted by bodily movements and con-
scious intentional states. Indeed, the presence of intentional states distin-
guishes intentional actions from mere bodily movements, such as uninten-
tional reflexes or spasms. A basic requirement in the architecture of the causal 
theory is that intentional states are causally relevant in virtue of their specific 
content (Pacherie 2011), being both relatively abstract or context-independent 
and linked to the overt bodily movement in a motor specific way: It is the con-
tent of my conscious abstract desire to drink water that causes the movement 
of my arm towards that glass on the table.
The causal theory has been held as widely appealing on at least three differ-
ent levels. First, by positing an event-causal link between mental states and the 
corresponding actions, the causal theory does not imply the adoption of what 
Strawson (1962) referred to as panicky metaphysical views, such as agent- causal 
accounts (i.e., the agent, as an irreducible substance, causes events (O’Connor 
2009)) or non-causal accounts (i.e., free intentional actions are uncaused or at 
least non-deterministically caused (Ginet 2008; Sehon 2016)). Given such a re-
ductive aim - mental states are meant to be somehow instantiated by physical 
states -, the causal theory has been also seen as a good heuristic device in order 
to formulate psychological and computationally tractable models of inten-
tional behaviour (Meltzoff 1995; Haynes 2007). Second, by stipulating the caus-
al origination of intentional actions from conscious mental states, the causal 
theory is compatible with the seemingly transparent phenomenology of expe-
rience, whereby intentional actions are perceived as distinct from involuntary 
and automatic movements. Indeed, the subjective feeling of a connection be-
tween mental states and external sensory feedback, through our bodily ac-
tions, is thought to decisively contribute to the sense of agency and control 
over the external world (Haggard 2008).
Third, the causal connection between conscious mental states and overt 
bodily movements, stipulated by the causal theory, displays an immediate 
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 relevance for ethical, normative, and legal practices. In particular, the inten-
tional bodily actions that we are supposedly in control of, as derived from con-
scious intents, are recognised as specific targets of evaluative considerations, 
including responsibility attributions (Lagnado & Channon 2008). These three 
levels are tightly integrated into a unified picture, whereby intentional actions, 
as caused by conscious mental states, elicit the subjective sense of agency and 
are appropriately reached by normative evaluations. In this chapter, I mostly 
focus on the first of these three intertwined levels, concerning the nature of 
the link between conscious mental states and actions. Indeed, despite its im-
mediate intuitiveness, the simple idea that mental states are causally involved 
in the production of the corresponding actions has proven to be deeply 
problematic.
The causal theory falls prey of many criticisms. In particular, according to a 
widely discussed objection (disappearing agent), by focusing exclusively on 
the causal role of mental states, the causal theory is intrinsically unable to pro-
vide a distinctive role for the agent qua agent as the key factor in action pro-
duction. Within the causal theory, the agent is reduced to a passive bystander, 
unable to control the string of events that happens to take place within her 
mental arena (Velleman 1992). The key defence put forward by the causal theo-
rist is exactly that positing a specific role for the agent is not needed in order to 
distinguish intentional actions from bodily movements. Paramount to the suc-
cess of the causal theory is hence specifying the nature of the causal link be-
tween conscious mental states and actions. However, the attempt to provide 
an adequate account of such a causal connection has not gone unchallenged. 
The early and ongoing debate on deviant causal chains (Davidson 1973; Mele 
1997; Schlosser 2010) highlights how conscious mental states can cause the 
agent’s behaviour in an indirect way: By triggering a bodily movement that al-
lows the agent to achieve the very same goal she would have wanted to achieve, 
but without also causing the corresponding intentional action. Typical 
 scenarios feature agents who desire to achieve a self-posited goal but, due to 
the psychological state elicited by the mental state they entertain, accidentally 
execute a bodily movement that realises exactly the same goal. The problem is 
that, to properly contribute to the action, the relevant mental state must work 
as the reason, not just as the aetiological explanation, for the action (Ans-
combe 1957). To move forwards, the causal theorist has thus to clarify not only 
the nature of the single ingredients of the compound (mental state and bodily 
movement), but how these two separate elements enter into a proper relation-
ship forming an instance of intentional agency.
Furthermore, qualifying the nature of such a relationship is crucial for com-
patibilist theories of free will and responsibility, often relying on the  theoretical 
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structure of the causal theory in order to justify agential control in the absence 
of agent causation (McKenna 2011). In particular, according to most actual- 
sequence compatibilist (Haji 1998) and semi-compatibilist (Fischer & Ravizza 
1998) views, the agent is acting freely and/or is responsible for her action, if she 
acts intentionally, i.e., if she acts on the basis of the mental states constituting 
her reasons for action. Crucially, actual-sequence accounts contend that, for 
an action to be intentional, free will is not required at the level of the selection 
between alternatives: I am freely and/or responsibly grasping that glass of wa-
ter to the extent that I intended to do so, independently of whether I could 
have done something else. Acting intentionally is thus often implicitly equated 
to acting voluntarily, namely acting under the control of the conscious (free) 
will. The limit of this equation emerges in the case of actions that are voluntary 
under a certain description (i.e., actions that are not externally imposed, 
 differently from actions performed under coercion or duress), without being 
intentional in the sense prescribed by the causal theory (i.e., they are not ap-
propriately caused by conscious mental states). Deviant causal chains consti-
tute a key example, but this ambiguous status extends to more ordinary cases, 
such as instances of negligent behaviour, habitual actions, absent-minded be-
haviour, and possibly episodes of weakness of will (Arpaly & Schroeder 1999). 
Indeed, compatibilism has traditionally had a hard time in establishing wheth-
er the agent might be held responsible for willed, but not properly intentional, 
actions: It is unclear whether somebody can act intentionally when some sort 
of high order mental state does not exercise a form of authority over the cor-
responding behaviour.
An anti-causalist (Frankfurt 1977) having a deep influence on the develop-
ment of the causal theory (Aguilar & Buckareff 2010), Frankfurt provides a hi-
erarchical account of the authoritative role of conscious mental states in his 
work on the concept of a person. Intrinsic to the concept of a person is the ca-
pacity to identify (with) higher order mental states (i.e., the desire to have the 
desire to drink water) ideally exercising control over the lower level mental 
states (i.e., the desire to drink water) that are ultimately responsible for the 
agent’s behaviour. In the sequence leading to action production, the authority 
of conscious mental states is thus directly rooted in the agent’s psychological 
make-up: For an agent to qualify as a person, she must be able to identify 
(with), or endorse, the mental states from which her actions stem. The epito-
me of the agent who is not acting on the basis of her own free will is the unwill-
ing drug addict who succumbs to her (external) desire to take drugs, and is 
unable to regulate her behaviour in accordance to her higher order mental 
states (i.e., the desire not to desire to take drugs) (Frankfurt 1971). On a similar 
vein, Fischer suggests that an agent is acting freely (guidance control), and thus 
Bonicalzi124
<UN>
responsibly, when she is acting in accordance to what she wants to do (Fischer 
1999). In the next sections, I will label this overriding force of mental states 
over bodily actions, central to the causal theory, as intentional action control.
3 Psychological and Neuroscientific Arguments against Intentional 
Action Control
In the last few decades, the ability of the causal theory to support intentional 
agency has been challenged beyond the sphere of the philosophy of action, but 
once more in a way that questions the nature of the relation between con-
scious intentions and the corresponding bodily movements. The hallmark of 
the debate is the attempt to reconcile the claim that conscious intentions must 
play a role in causing actions with a naturalistic understanding of how cogni-
tive processes unfold. Indeed, a number of findings in cognitive neuroscience 
have been read as potentially undermining intentional action control. If inten-
tional action control is meant to be crucial for intentional agency, the conclu-
sion would be that the same arguments ruling out intentional action control 
would ipso facto rule out intentional agency. In this chapter, I mostly side with 
those who contend that there is not enough empirical evidence for denying 
intentional action control. At the same time, I argue that the empirical investi-
gation might have a different role to play in widening our understanding of 
intentional agency.
Benjamin Libet’s pioneering research on the timing of conscious intentions 
marked a turning point in the debate about action initiation (Libet et al. 1982; 
Libet et al. 1983). In Libet’s classic study, participants were asked to flex their 
right wrist or the fingers of their right hand at their own pace, executing a 
movement (one per trial) whenever they felt a wish or an urge to do so. The 
paradigm thus consisted in asking participants to spontaneously decide when 
to move, while the specific movement they had to perform was set from the 
beginning of the experiment. At the same time, participants were also required 
to watch a clock with a dot circling around it, and to remember the time (W) 
when they felt the desire or the urge to make the spontaneous movement. At 
the end of each trial, participants reported the time W they previously memo-
rised. The beginning of the muscular motion associated to the onset (M) of the 
overt bodily movement was measured by an electromyogram (emg), while the 
electrical activity during movement preparation and execution was recorded 
through an eeg system. The electrical readings from the scalp revealed the 
presence of the so-called Readiness potential (RP), a gradual rise in the 
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 electrical activity in the motor cortex and in the supplementary motor area of 
the brain in the second or so preceding the occurrence of an intentional action 
(Deecke 2000). For non pre-planned actions, the RP began about 550 ms 
(Type ii) before M, and 350 ms before W. Where the action was pre-planned, 
the RP (Type i) was registered as beginning around 1000 ms before M. Results 
comparable with those obtained by Libet have been more recently obtained 
with the aid of different techniques, ranging from fRMI (Soon et al. 2008; Soon 
et al. 2013) to implanted electrodes (Fried et al. 2011). The results showed an 
even earlier onset of the brain activity preceding the action, beginning up to 10 
s before the subjective awareness of wanting to make a movement (Soon et al. 
2008).
Prima facie at least, the aforementioned findings provide a picture of inten-
tional agency that does not match with the causal theory. The most radical 
theoretical conclusion one may draw from the neuroscientific data is some 
version of epiphenomenalism. This is the theoretical thesis that seemingly 
causally relevant conscious processes, such as intention formation or deci-
sions, do not play a causal role in the initiation of the corresponding action 
(Nahmias 2014). An epiphenomenalism of this sort is notoriously advocated by 
psychologist Daniel Wegner. He argues that, if the time of conscious awareness 
is subsequent to the onset of the unconscious neural determinants of the ac-
tion, conscious mental states cannot be the cause of the corresponding bodily 
movements. The apparent causal relevance of conscious mental states is no 
more than a by-product of post-hoc confabulatory inferences regarding action 
initiation. To support the thesis, Wegner discusses a wide array of experimen-
tal data, suggesting a disconnection between the conscious experience of act-
ing and the actual performance of a bodily movement (Wegner 2002).
Empirical evidence has indeed shown that people are less able to mon-
itor their motor performance than the phenomenology of agency suggests 
(Fourneret & Jeannerod 1998). In particular, after brain stimulation of motor 
areas, people may report having experiences of moving where no real move-
ment occurred, or carry out actions without perceiving any sense of agency 
(Desmurget et al. 2009). Furthermore, the subjective sense of agency can be 
altered when intentional actions are modulated by external guidance (prim-
ing), typically leading people to overestimate their own self-efficacy (Linser & 
Goschke 2007; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard 2009). In addition, decades of re-
search in  cognitive and social psychology have highlighted that apparent ratio-
nal conscious choices are often the result of automatic, non-intelligent, pro-
cesses accompanied by little cognitive elaboration (Doris 2016; Nisbett & 
Wilson 1977).  Taken together, these pieces of evidence undermine the clear-cut 
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picture of  intentional action as portrayed by the causal theory, by casting 
doubt on intentional action control. Far from being a tightly integrated, phe-
nomenologically transparent, construct, intentional agency might thus turn 
out to be a black box.
4 Counter-arguments Based on the Lack of Ecological  
Validity of the Experimental Paradigms
With few exceptions (Nadelhoffer 2011), most philosophers have harshly criti-
cised the validity of any theoretical conclusion drawn from neuroscientific ex-
periments investigating intentional agency. Widely shared objections empha-
sise the lack of ecological validity of this kind of investigation, pointing out 
that the adopted experimental paradigms are unsound because ultimately un-
able to really tackle issues such as intentional agency and free will.
One suggested limitation depends on the type of free intentional action that 
experimental subjects are required to perform, which is deemed as unable to 
elicit feelings vaguely similar to a desire to act (Mele 2009). Such a limitation 
would make the corresponding results hardly generalisable to daily life sce-
narios in which individuals are in the position of making choices between op-
tions with appreciably different consequences. Given the absence of real rea-
sons, of the type featuring in the causal theory, motivating them to act, 
participants have to be artificially instructed to make reportable unplanned 
intentional actions in a relatively constrained time window. In sharp contrast 
to this model of intentional action, Balaguer suggests that individuals are truly 
acting freely only when they make choices between options about which they 
are authentically torn, such as life-changing decisions about different job op-
portunities (Balaguer 2009). In contrast, the decision-making context associ-
ated to neuroscientific paradigms looks more similar to a situation where I am 
in front of a shelf in a supermarket and have to repeatedly choose between 
identical boxes of cereals - something I can do almost automatically or at least 
without the vigilant monitoring of conscious mental states. A related interpre-
tative problem might arise if the type of actions experimental subjects make 
are so low-level that they become automatic or absent-minded: As a conse-
quence, the data might be scarcely informative regarding the neural bases of 
conscious intentions. In this case, the absence of early conscious awareness 
might indicate that participants were not actually performing a full-fledged 
intentional action, but a merely voluntary action. Since many voluntary ac-
tions are performed in the absence of conscious intentions to act, some critics 
have plausibly argued that the absence of early conscious awareness per se 
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might be considered irrelevant for denying free will (Lavazza & De Caro 2010; 
Nahmias 2014).
A second recurring criticism, also regarding the type of intentional actions 
featuring in neuroscientific experiments on voluntary processes, concerns the 
exclusive focus on immediate intentions. Many causal theorists indeed defend 
a two-tier account of intentions, whereby intentions concerning the immedi-
ate present are distinguishable from long-term intentions concerning the fu-
ture. Examples of this distinction can be found in Searle (prior intention vs 
intention-in-action (Searle 1983)), Mele (distal vs proximal intention (Mele 
1992)), and Bratman (future-directed intention vs present-directed intention 
(Bratman 1987)). For example, according to Bratman’s influential theory of 
agency, it is the distinctively human capacity to entertain future-directed in-
tentions that provides the necessary connection between motivation and de-
liberation (Bratman 2007). In a similar vein, Shaun Gallagher has suggested 
that higher order planning, and not single specific motor actions, may harbour 
free will (Gallagher 2006).
A third criticism relies on the fact that participants are mostly required, es-
pecially in experimental settings adopting Libet’s paradigm, to report the time 
W, namely the timing at which they consciously experience they wanted to 
make a movement. This moment of awareness seemingly corresponds to a 
second-order state or meta-state (i.e., the consciousness of the wish to make a 
movement), rather than to a first-order intentional state (i.e., the wish to make 
a movement). It is nonetheless unclear whether this meta-state must have a 
specific causal role in order to support intentional action control. It seems in-
deed plausible to assume that the awareness of being in a given motivational 
state occurs later than the motivational state itself (Roskies 2010; see also Den-
nett & Kinsbourne 1992 for an early criticism about the temporal mismatch 
between the subjective experience of will and the perceived position of the 
clock hand).
By my lights, these criticisms target real deep issues in the experimental 
tradition initiated by Libet. However, whereas it is plausible to argue that Li-
bet’s experiments offer an impoverished, laboratory-based, representation of 
daily life choices, it would be inappropriate to claim that they do not offer an 
example of a type of intentional action people are in the position to perform. 
Indeed, despite the decision between identical boxes of cereals having no ap-
preciable consequences, our intuition is that we are performing a free inten-
tional (i.e., willed) action in grasping box A. The mere fact that we do not care 
about the possible consequences of an action does not turn an intentional ac-
tion into an unintentional one. In this sense, one of the reasons why agency 
experiments mostly feature actions bearing no relevant consequences  depends 
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on how intentional actions are often conceptualised in cognitive neurosci-
ence: Intentional or voluntary actions, as derived from specific motor circuits 
in the brain, originate from internally self-posited goals. In contrast, uninten-
tional or involuntary actions, such as reflexes or involuntary movements, are 
triggered by external environmental stimuli or internal automatic states of the 
system (Passingham et al. 2010). Internally set goals may or may not depend on 
higher order reasons for acting, without this necessarily affecting the motor 
system. In principle, there is no clear cut, non-arbitrary, divide between high 
complex actions, as derived from conceptual reasoning, and simple spontane-
ous movements. To some extent, selecting between alternatives with no ap-
preciable differences quintessentially exemplifies spontaneous decisions. If 
participants decide to move at t1 (option 1) and not at t2 (option 2) in a Libet’s 
experiment, such a decision cannot be attributed to any immediately notice-
able feature of the two options (external signal), but is seen as more likely to 
derive from purely endogenous processes.
Furthermore, in response to this type of objection, some recent experimen-
tal paradigms obtained comparable results (i.e., presence of RP for voluntary 
movements) while creatively bypassing the paradox of artificially prescribing 
people to perform intentional actions. For example, Khalighinejad et al. inves-
tigated the preparatory process (RP) prior to voluntary motor actions, by 
adapting a perceptual decision task in which participants were required to de-
tect the motion of a display of dots towards the left or the right side of the 
screen. In each trial, participants had no clue about when the dots would have 
started moving coherently to the right or to the left. If participants did not wish 
to wait anymore, they had the option to press a skip button and move to the 
next trial. Voluntary actions were then operationalised as self-initiated skip re-
sponses while waiting for the display of dots to move coherently towards the 
left or the right. This way, the experimental paradigm was able to elicit the 
performance of intentional, or at least voluntary, actions without artificially 
probing participants to act (Khalighinejad et al. 2018; see also Murakami et al. 
2014).
Finally, it is certainly plausible that, while walking through the aisles of the 
supermarket, I grasp a box of cereals remaining completely absent-minded. 
Such an absent-minded action can be easily intended as voluntary, if not inten-
tional. It is indeed plausible that the lack of conscious awareness at the time of 
the action does not turn the action into an involuntary one. The very simple 
actions participants are required to perform in neuroscientific experiments 
seem to be of the type that might be executed completely absent-mindedly 
(thus without conscious awareness), remaining nonetheless voluntary. How-
ever, this assumption would require not to take into account the specific 
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 experimental setting, whereby participants are explicitly asked to pay atten-
tion to their conscious mental states in order to report them at a later stage. 
Despite being of the type that can be performed absent-mindedly, the choices 
typically made in neuroscience experiments are thus unlikely to be made 
 absent-mindedly. Indeed, the corresponding experimental paradigms often 
explicitly require people to pay attention to their conscious intentions. Using 
Libet’s temporal judgment task in an fMRI study, Lau et al. investigated the 
differences in the BOLD signal by comparing a condition where experimental 
subjects had to report the time at which they felt the intention to move vs a 
condition where they had to report the time at which they actually executed 
the movement. The data showed that, when participants were explicitly re-
quired to pay attention to their intentions, as it was the case in the classic Li-
bet’s task, the blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal in the brain 
areas representing intentions (pre-SMA region of the medial prefrontal cor-
tex) was enhanced (Lau et al. 2004. See also Haynes 2007). So, whereas con-
scious awareness might not be required for voluntary actions in general and for 
the type of actions performed in neuroscientific experiment in particular, its 
late (i.e., following the onset of the RP) appearance in cases where subjects 
were explicitly asked to pay attention to their intentions cannot be so easily 
dismissed as irrelevant.
5 Counter-arguments Based on the Lack of Causal Clarity
The RP has been interpreted as a reliable build-up of neuronal activity consis-
tently preceding voluntary bodily movements, and thus specifically associated 
to motor preparation (Kornhuber & Deecke 1990). However, the potentially 
causal nature of the relationship between the RP, the time W, and the subse-
quent overt movement is still a matter of debate. Indeed, given that a clear 
causal linkage between the RP and the bodily movement cannot be estab-
lished, the claim that bodily movements are caused by unconscious neural an-
tecedents, and not by conscious mental states, seems to falter. In discussing 
whether the RP causes W, Haggard and Eimer provided evidence that the on-
set of the RP varies independently of W. In particular, trials where participants 
show an early W were characterised by a late onset of the RP, compared to tri-
als characterised by a late W. A better candidate for causing W might be the 
Lateralised readiness potential (lrp), an increase in the electrical negativity in 
the area contralateral to the subsequent bodily movement, and reflecting the 
preparation of a specific movement after the action selection is made. Coher-
ently, the lrp began earlier for actions with an early W, compared to actions 
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associated to a late W. This important result suggests that the origin of W is 
likely to be related to a specific bodily movement rather than to a general pre-
conscious motor preparation (Haggard and Eimer 1999).
For what concerns the relation between the RP and the overt bodily move-
ment, an open possibility is that the RP plays a preparatory role without being 
sufficient for the movement to occur: In the absence of a causally relevant con-
scious decision to move, the subject might not execute the corresponding 
movement, despite the presence of the RP. In this light, Pockett and Purdy 
observe that the RP is neither necessary (single trials and even single experi-
mental subjects may not show any RP) nor sufficient (changes in the electrical 
activity of the brain strictly resembling the RP waveforms do not necessarily 
originate movements) for action production (Pockett & Purdy 2011). Establish-
ing a clear causal relation between the RP and the subsequent bodily move-
ment implies at least the presence of the RP at the level of the single trial. By 
contrast, Libet’s findings are based on averaging a number of trials where par-
ticipants performed identical spontaneous bodily movements. In case the con-
scious decision to move is needed for the action to occur, conscious mental 
states might not have a role in action initiation, but might contribute (at least 
in full-fledged, non absent-minded intentional actions) to deciding whether to 
act or not. Libet himself, with a criticisable dualistic move, hinted at a similar 
solution, by arguing that, in the 150 ms preceding the onset of the movement, 
the subject could still decide to abort the action (Libet 1985).
By delving further into this possibility, some recent lines of research have 
been read as potentially reconciling the received view on intentional action 
with findings in the neuroscience of agency. In particular, Schurger et al. 2012 
have questioned the widely accepted assumption that the RP can be truly rec-
ognised as the signal, within the motor system, of planning, preparing, and 
initiating a voluntary action. In contrast, they observe that changes in the neu-
ral activity preceding the bodily movement may merely reflect internal physi-
ological noise, depending on spontaneous fluctuations and thus not specifi-
cally related to motor preparation. Within the proposed model, the timing at 
which the motor action occurs can be explained by means of an accumulator 
model: the bodily movement randomly occurs when the spontaneous electri-
cal activity reaches a threshold, corresponding to the neural decision to move. 
The specific shape of the RP, normally detected before voluntary bodily move-
ments, would be no more than an artefact due to the process of averaging the 
relevant epoched data time-locked to the onset of the bodily movement. Inter-
preted as averaged noise, the RP could hardly be seen as a signal of precon-
scious intentional motor preparation, playing rather a dispositional and pre-
dictive role. More speculatively, Schurger et al. suggest that the neural decision 
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to move now, corresponding to the random crossing of the sensory-motor 
threshold, might be close in time to the timing of the awareness of wanting to 
make the movement (occurring about 150 ms before the action). The temporal 
overlapping between the neural commitment to move (the real decision) and 
the subjective awareness of wanting to make a movement might suggest that 
the received picture of intentional agency and the neuroscientific data are not 
so distant as it may seem.
The neuroscience of volition has devoted a considerable amount of research 
to identifying the point of no return, i.e., the timing after which a subject cannot 
prevent herself from acting (Libet 1985; De Jong et al. 1990). In a study looking 
at people’s ability to veto their spontaneously initiated movement,  Schultze- 
Kraft et al. (2016) successfully detected the presence of a signal like the RP in 
real time, at the level of the single trial. In each trial, subjects were instructed 
to make intentional unpredictable bodily movements unless they received a 
stop signal from the computer. In the first part of the study, a Brain-Computer 
Interface (bci) was trained to recognise the typical RP for each subject and 
predict upcoming movements. In the second part of the study, the bci pre-
dicted bodily movements in real time (by relying on neural antecedents) and 
sent a stop signal to the experimental subject. The results showed that, after 
the onset of a RP-like signal was detected, it was still possible for the subject to 
avoid moving in case the stop signal was sent earlier than 200 ms before emg. 
This can be taken as evidence that the RP does not necessarily lead to the oc-
currence of the bodily movement, which can be still cancelled by the subject 
until a point of no return.
The results are compatible with those by Schurger et al. 2012 to the extent 
that they suggest that the real decision to move (or to abort the action) does 
not coincide with the onset of the RP but, more or less, with the timing of con-
scious awareness. Clearly, the point of no return and the neural decision to 
move are not expected to play the same causal role. While the neural decision 
to move might be a necessary causal component of an intentional action, the 
point of no return can be just a temporal threshold after which an uncon-
sciously initiated movement cannot be aborted. However, this temporal asso-
ciation between the real commitment to move (i.e., neural decision to move 
and point of no return) and the awareness of wanting to make a movement has 
been hailed as having the potential to reconcile the neuroscientific findings on 
voluntary processes with more traditional views on intentional agency (Sch-
urger et al. 2016).
The power to inhibit self-initiated actions is a key feature of human action 
control. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the aforementioned findings pro-
vide a picture of agency that is truly compatible with the one framed by the 
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causal theory. Indeed, these models do not make explicit assumptions about 
the origin of the neural commitment to move, supposedly following the onset 
of the RP and preceding the overt bodily movement. Clearly, the temporal 
closeness between the commitment to move and the time of conscious aware-
ness per se cannot be interpreted as evidence of the fact that conscious mental 
states cause bodily movements: Also conscious decisions might originate from 
unconscious brain processes. In this light, recent experimental data suggest 
that the decision to inhibit or delay an action is similarly driven by antecedent 
and unconscious brain activity (Filevich et al. 2013).
6 A Plea for a More Constructive Role to Play for  
Neuroscientific Findings
Overall, most of the aforementioned discussion points originate from a similar 
underlying theoretical position, questioning whether neuroscientific experi-
mental findings pose a real threat to the received view about the link between 
mental states and actions. Such a received view, which is well represented by 
the causal theory, sees conscious mental states as causing intentional actions, 
thus allowing agents to exercise intentional action control over their behav-
iour. In this respect, many argue that the neuroscientific findings that seem-
ingly contradict the causal theory are too fragile to justify a rejection of the 
corresponding picture of intentional agency (Pereboom & Caruso 2018).
Whereas I also agree with this conclusion (i.e., there is not enough evidence 
that the causal theory is wrong), I claim that the problem with this argumenta-
tive strategy is that it implicitly assumes that specific philosophical claims (e.g. 
about agency or free will) can be directly (dis)proven by means of empirical 
investigation. According to this model, philosophical theorising is necessarily 
prior to empirical investigation, which has an essentially (dis)confirmatory 
role with respect to previously formulated philosophical claims. However, 
while the causal theory might work as a general framework for intentional 
agency (i.e., conscious mental states have a role in action production) and is 
clearly incompatible with other proposals (i.e., epiphenomenalism), single 
claims that might be inferred from the theory (i.e., how mental states should 
behave within the system) display little empirical translatability. As a result, 
when taken too literally, the causal theory may get things backwards. By con-
trast, my starting point is that the causal theory is meant to provide an artefac-
tual model, and not a mechanistic explanation, of voluntary processes.
In my views, the results from cognitive neuroscience are not to be treated as 
a touchstone for philosophical claims, but can directly contribute to fuelling 
philosophical theories. The aspiration of the chapter is thus to suggest that 
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philosophical analysis and cognitive neuroscience can actually work together, 
in a mutual exchange, to ameliorate our comprehension of intentional agency. 
This implies that, if needed, some features of intentional agency as framed 
by the causal theory must be set aside. To begin with, the understanding of 
intentional agency offered by the causal theory has little in common with the 
 definition of intentional or voluntary processes at play in the empirical inves-
tigation. As previously mentioned, the former insists on the appropriateness 
(e.g. the end-state cannot be achieved through a deviant causal chain) of the 
causal link between intentional mental states and bodily actions. The latter 
more broadly distinguishes between internally generated actions, as derived 
from autonomously set goals, and externally prompted movements, elicited by 
 stimuli present in the environment (Passingham et al. 2010). This theoretical 
incommensurability, beginning at the basic level of operational definitions, 
ramifies into more high level discussions about the role of conscious mental 
states (Mele 2010). However, in the next two subsections, I will advance some 
proposals and introduce a few examples about how results in cognitive neuro-
science and philosophical analysis can jointly contribute to foster understand-
ing of intentional agency.
6.1 Multi-level Intentions
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the most radical theoretical conclusion 
one may draw from the empirical data on voluntary processes is some form of 
epiphenomenalism. In response to that, many have argued that the presence 
of unconscious neural antecedents does not prove that the conscious decision 
to move has no causal role. This claim might be justified by some of the pieces 
of evidence discussed above, both in a negative (e.g. no evidence of a direct 
causal connection between the onset of the RP, W, and the bodily movement) 
and in a positive (e.g. possible role of the neural decision to move in associa-
tion to W) fashion. The emerging idea from research in cognitive neuroscience 
is that conscious mental states might not play a role at the time of action initia-
tion, but could be crucially involved in other stages of action production, such 
as the decision to move now (Schurger et al. 2012), or the selection between 
abstract action alternatives (Rowe et al. 2000). This move already implies a de-
parture from the causal theory, to the extent that action production is not seen 
as a substantially unitary process, firmly guided by a conscious intention to act 
that remains active from action planning to action execution (i.e., from my 
conscious abstract desire to drink water to my hand grasping that glass on the 
table).
Research on the cognitive architecture of the brain has shown that the pro-
cess of selecting between alternatives, planning, and executing an action in-
volves multilayer interacting structures. At the level of action selection 
Bonicalzi134
<UN>
 between alternatives that are present in the environment, the integration of 
sensory information and internal representation of the state of the system is 
the basis for computing an action plan that is ultimately realised by muscular 
contraction. In the case of internally generated actions, the initial intention to 
act is abstract in the sense that it does not include all the details of motor ex-
ecution, which are fixed by specific motor programs deriving from sub-actions 
(i.e., stages that are intermediate between abstract intentions and motor pro-
grams). The prefrontal cortex (pfc), and in particular the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (lpfc), has long been identified as the area of the brain where action 
generation and control take place (Duncan & Owen 2000; Miller & Cohen 
2001). The proposed models of the functional organisation and cognitive archi-
tecture of the lpfc generally agree on the organisation of action control along 
an anterior-posterior axis, subserved by different sub-areas characterised by 
specific functions (Badre 2008; Bunge & Zelazo 2006; Koechlin et al. 2003; 
Koechlin & Summerfield 2007; Fuster 2004; Petrides 2005).
In particular, the cascade model proposed by Koechlin et al. 2003 and Koech-
lin & Summerfield (2007) describes action control as a hierarchically ordered 
process made possible by a cascade of top-down control from rostral to caudal 
lpfc and premotor regions, with anterior areas devoted to deliberative, ab-
stract, temporally extended, action control (Grafton & Hamilton 2007; Hag-
gard 2008; Hamilton & Grafton 2007; Kilner 2011). The model proposes that 
different areas of such a control network in the lpfc are responsible for execu-
tive control, defined as the capacity to select specific actions in relation to 
goals, thus resolving the entropy or competition between multiple action rep-
resentations. Throughout this multilayer system, executive control and action 
coordination would nevertheless be guaranteed by the tight integration of in-
formation across the various specialised prefrontal regions. In fact, each stage 
in the hierarchical structure both exerts control over lower level representa-
tions and is controlled by the higher stages. These different sub-regions differ-
entiate according to various degrees of flexibility and capacity of abstraction 
(i.e., their capacity to generalise across sets of representations) from the im-
mediate action context.
Action control might thus be implemented by means of a complex hierar-
chical structure where different area jointly contribute to producing a given 
end-state. Within this framework, looking for a specific intentional state as 
able to play a specific causal role throughout the whole process of action pro-
duction looks inevitably problematic. A more promising strategy consists in 
revisiting the structure of the causal theory, by accommodating this more com-
plex view about how voluntary processes are causally integrated. For example, 
Pacherie has argued that goal-directed behaviour involves different levels of 
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action specification, subserved by three types of intentions. Distal intentions 
(D-intention) operate at the highest, and more abstract, level, by setting up the 
overarching goal of an action and the appropriate sub-goals that are necessary 
to reach it. Proximal intentions (P-intentions) transfer the general action plan, 
set up at the previous level, into the current situation of action and select 
the appropriate motor planning. Finally motor intentions (M-intentions), 
 corresponding to motor representations, are in charge of setting the finest 
 parameters and values in order to execute the action, by using external sensory 
information. Crucially, Pacherie suggests that the content of motor intentions 
may not always be accessible to consciousness (Pacherie 2008, 2015).
6.2 Disappearing Intentions
Acknowledging the limitations of the causal theory, some philosophers have 
recently moved towards solutions that bypass the aforementioned theoretical 
criticisms (e.g. disappearing agent, deviant causal chain), by suggesting that 
intentional actions have to be treated as primitive, intrinsically unified, phe-
nomena in our psychological ontology (Ford 2011; Levy 2013, 2015; O’Brien 
2010). According to Levy, the reductive program advocated by the causal theory 
must be abandoned since intentional actions are not analysable in terms of 
primitive constitutive elements (i.e., intentional mental state and bodily move-
ment). In contrast, intentional actions are to be conceived as basic. Levy 
 defines intentional actions as bodily movements that people can stop and con-
tinue making intentionally. One of the benefits of this account is that it can be 
extended to voluntary, non-intentional, actions, such as instances of negligent 
behaviour, habitual actions, absent-minded behaviour, and possibly episodes 
of weakness of the will: If you absent-mindedly step on somebody’s toes, you 
can then step back (Levy 2013). In comparison, bodily movements such as re-
flexes or spasms fail to satisfy the credentials for intentional or voluntary agen-
cy because you cannot intentionally decide to stop them. Abolishing the con-
junctive causal representation of intentional action further favours the unified 
treatment of intentional bodily and mental actions - the latter being notori-
ously problematic within the causal theory. In fact, in the case of mental ac-
tions, a clear separation between causes and effects is hard to establish: How 
can I come to pay attention to a content without somehow already attending 
to that content? (Proust 2001).
Such a perspective is genuinely productive to the extent that it eliminates 
the strong dichotomy between different types of voluntary processes. General 
types of human voluntary behaviour lie along a continuum that goes from 
simple reflexes to higher complex functions (Haggard 2014), whereby the 
 respective tokens are characterised by varying degrees of action control. 
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This view resonates with a scientifically reputable view of intentional agency 
that characterises voluntary processes in terms of freedom from immediacy 
(Gold and Shadlen 2007). Furthermore, a crucial role is played by the agent’s 
ability to decide whether to act or not (or, as in Levy 2013, to continue to act or 
not) that has been clearly identified as a key element of action control (Hag-
gard 2008). However, to avoid the pitfall of treating empirical findings as the 
test-bed for theoretical models, it should be specified that such a capacity to 
refrain from acting or stop acting, as the key feature of intentional or voluntary 
actions, is not to be taken in its literal sense. Indeed, as previously mentioned, 
we know from neuroscience that people are not able to prevent their inten-
tional actions from occurring after a point of no return. So, paradoxically, peo-
ple are acting intentionally even when they are not (anymore) in the position 
of preventing themselves from acting. The proposal of treating intentional ac-
tions as primitive bypasses causality (of mental states with respect to inten-
tional actions) tout court: The unit for further analysis becomes the intentional 
action as a whole.
A related strategy consists in diminishing the centrality of intentions as dis-
crete entities governing the physical body, without giving up on causality as 
such. The operation is similar to what suggested in the previous section to the 
extent that a partial departure from the causal theory might be required. In-
deed, we might have to accommodate a wider notion of causation with little in 
common with the link between intentional states and actions articulated by 
the causal theory. In contrast with previously discussed hierarchical models of 
action control, Schurgher & Uithol 2015 and Uithol et al. 2014 have pursued a 
strategy of this sort. They suggest that the kind of information processing oc-
curring at the level of the pfc during action control is ultimately incompatible 
with the representation of intentions as context-independent, inherently 
causal, discrete (in terms of content and functional role) entities. The authors 
argue in favour of a more dynamic and context-dependent model that does 
not fit a literal interpretation of the causal theory: The problematic step con-
sists once again in moving abruptly from the theoretical model framed by the 
causal theory to the expectation that similarly contextual-free and discrete 
neural realisers are present in the brain.
In support of their position, the authors bring empirical evidence speaking 
against the thesis that context-free, discrete, states can sit at the top of the 
action-hierarchy. To mention one example, research by Fuster (2001) and Fus-
ter et al. (1982, 2000) on single cell is interpreted as showing that even the most 
anterior parts of the lpfc (i.e., the area usually associated to high level, ab-
stract, deliberative control) must rely on context-sensitivity to integrate 
 information over time. Uithol et al. 2014 observe that distinguishing the 
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 contribution of different areas of the control network according to the differ-
ent capacity for abstraction is misleading. Such a distinction is modelled on 
the gradient that goes from abstract intention (the intention to drink water) to 
concrete bodily action (grasping that glass on the table) framed by the causal 
theory. In contrast, the differences between areas of the lpfc is to be under-
stood in terms of the type, source, and complexity of the information that are 
processed and integrated in order to produce a given end-state. In particular, 
more anterior areas integrate information pertaining to different types and 
sources (e.g. information from multiple senses), while caudal areas, which are 
devoted to low-level motor control, have to deal with specific information 
within the same type (e.g. effector-specific). Action control as a whole is thus 
realised through the integration of interdependent control processes in con-
tinuous relationship with contextual elements: Increasing complexity does 
not per se deny some form of mentally-related causality, but the kind of 
 causality at play is substantially different from the one framed by the causal 
theory.
7 Conclusions
As human beings we are able to interact with the environment in various dis-
tinct ways, ranging from very simple motor actions to the implementation of 
long-term plans. In this chapter, I have argued that the major challenge for 
philosophy and cognitive neuroscience is to give reason to such a variety of 
instances of voluntary behaviour in a coherent manner. My overall goal was 
not to offer a coherent story of how intentional and voluntary agency unfold, 
but to provide some suggestions about possible fertile research pathways at 
the intersection between the philosophy and the neuroscience of action.
In philosophy, the causal theory frames intentional action control in terms 
of the causal authority exercised by conscious mental states over actions. Most 
philosophers have thus denied that findings in cognitive neuroscience can rep-
resent a real threat for the classic architecture of intentional agency as such. 
Whereas recognising that specific criticisms to experimental paradigms are 
appropriate, I have advocated a different perspective, whereby empirical find-
ings are not necessarily to be treated as the touchstone for philosophical 
claims, but possibly contribute to building the theory itself. In this light, mov-
ing beyond rigid dichotomies, I suggested that some elements of the causal 
theory (e.g. discreteness of mental states, conscious access to all types of inten-
tional states) might have to be abandoned in favour of a more articulated and 
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Chapter 7
The Mental, the Physical and the Informational
Anna Drozdzewska
1 Introduction
One of the core experiences we share as human beings is the impact our inten-
tions and decisions have on our life. We think that the decisions we make, from 
the major ones like getting married, to small ones, like taking a bottle of water 
from the fridge on a warm and sunny day, are what causes the actual physical 
overt actions. However, this shared conviction is problematic for a number of 
reasons, including questions like: do choices exist at all given the potentially 
deterministic nature of the universe; are our decisions causal in the action gen-
eration or rather the physical brain activations determine all our actions. Most 
of these questions are parts of a larger framework, the free will problem, which, 
rather than being a homogenous issue, is an umbrella term for a number of 
interconnected problems.
In recent decades, two most popular angles, discussed in connection to free 
will, although this division should not be treated as exhaustive, have emerged: 
(1) is free will possible given the deterministic nature of the universe, and 
(2) can the conclusions of neuroscientific experiments truly show that our in-
tentions are not causal in the processes of action generation, and therefore we 
are not free. In this chapter I will argue that these discussions often dismiss 
one, important component, not only needed for the possibility of free will, but, 
moreover, implicitly assumed by most of the positions, namely the causal effi-
cacy of the mental. I will argue that, if mental, as mental, does not have a caus-
al impact on the physical, free will is in dire straits or, as Fodor famously put it:
[…]if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my 
reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and 
my believing is causally responsible for my saying…, if none of that is lit-
erally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false 
and it’s the end of the world.
fodor, 1990, p. 156
This chapter will have two central, interconnected, goals: (1) to argue that the 
causal efficacy of the mental is one of the necessary conditions for free will, 
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and (2) to show that understanding causality as information transfer, might 
clarify the mental causation debate, while at the same time, possibly avoiding 
the challenge of the Causal Exclusion. To achieve these goals I will first (Sec-
tion 1) show why mental causation is an important, yet often overlooked, com-
ponent of the free will debate. There, I will argue that the assumption of the 
causal efficacy of the mental is present in both philosophical discussions, as 
well as neuroscientific experiments. I will then discuss the different aspects of 
the mental causation, from the relationship between the mind and brain to the 
Causal Exclusion argument I will argue that in order to preserve the possibility 
of free will and accommodate the data from neuroscientific experiments, non-
reductive physicalism is our best bet. This, however, means that we have to find 
a solution to one of the most notorious problems in philosophy of mind, the 
Causal Exclusion argument. While some potential solutions have been pro-
posed in the past, including the famous approach by Woodward (2003), here 
I will hypothesize that another approach might be better suited to capture 
the complexities of mental to physical interactions, namely causality as infor-
mation transfer. I will argue that this way of framing causality has strong 
 advantages over other approaches as it allows us remain in Kim’s original un-
derstanding of causality( as a process), captures the wide-spread approach to 
the brain process in neuroscience (brain as information processing), and has 
the potential to better explain the connection between brain and mind.
2 The Ubiquitous Assumption
Why is mental causation so important for the existence free will? In the discus-
sions on voluntary or intentional action, it has become a standard to explain it 
though evoking a reason for action (e.g. Davidson, 1980), or an intention (e.g. 
Mele, 2009), both of which have two components: a belief and a desire. Both 
are often treated as goal directed (to further distinguish them from reflexes, 
which are not considered free), mental rather than purely physical, and not 
reducible to some specific brain activation. Therefore, the usual way of think-
ing about a voluntary action (without thinking about determinism or indeter-
minism) is as a result of a causal chain, where the cause of said action is either 
an intention, or a reason. Alternatively, a way in which an action is identified 
as free is through its mental cause. Depending on the time lapse between 
the intention and the action, we can identify distal (connected to actions far 
in the future), and proximal (liked to immediate action), but regardless of this, 
the presence of the intention as the main feature of the causal chain which 
results in a voluntary action seems to be necessary. All those components are 
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widely accepted as mental (either in ontological or purely descriptive sense), 
and are considered to enter the causal chain as such. While approaching our 
decisions as mental also goes in line with our general intuitions about our-
selves, it  becomes problematic when we think about how it actually connects 
with our physical body, a problem that has been on the philosophical radar for 
centuries now. The issue is further emphasized when we include the neurosci-
entific findings in our considerations.
In the experimental domain, the interest in the causes of voluntary actions 
can be traced to the experiments by Kornhuber and Deecke (1965), but more 
frequently it is discussed in connection to the modified version of those con-
ducted by Libet (Libet et al. 1982; 1985). For him an action is voluntary if it 
meets three conditions:
(a) it arises endogenously, not in direct response to an external stimulus 
or cue; (b) there are no externally imposed restrictions or compulsions 
that directly or immediately control the subject’s initiation and perfor-
mance of the act; and (c) most important, subjects feel introspectively 
that they are performing the act on their own initiative and that they are 
free to start or not to start the act as they wish.
libet 1985, pp. 529–530
Here an action is voluntary (and therefore free) when it is not an automatic 
response to a stimulus coming from the agent’s immediate environment, it 
should be under agent’s control, and he/she should recognize themselves as 
the agent, thereby experiencing the feeling of acting. The feeling of acting out 
of own initiative is a key component and can be equated with making a deci-
sion to perform an action. Therefore, similarly to philosophical arguments, 
Liber thinks of a free action as one that is goal oriented, and is caused by a deci-
sion of an agent. Therefore if an action that an agent would consider as arising 
from his own decision, was in fact caused by other factors, it would not be de-
fined as free. To further explore the origin of fully spontaneous actions (the 
only ones that could have the potential to be free) Libet conducted a series of 
experiments. He asked the participants to perform a simple overt action: move 
a finger or flex a wrist while looking at a dot of light projected on a clock-like 
surface. The participants were then asked to remember the position of the 
light point at the exact moment they decided to move, while the eeg machine 
was recording their neural activity. The results obtained by Libet showed a 
consistent spike of activity in the motor cortex (where the movement would be 
initiated) 500 ms before the onset of the movement. Yet, on average, the par-
ticipants only reported their decision to move as taking place around 200 ms 
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before the movement. This led Libet to conclude that the causal origins of the 
movement lie not in the conscious decision, as he considered necessary for 
voluntary actions, but rather in a non-conscious brain activation. Therefore, 
the brain “decides” for us when to execute the movement, and free will, if it 
exist at all, is limited to being a veto power, exercisable during the 200 ms be-
tween the decision and the movement, over an action already underway.
Many problems with Libet’s experiments have been identified, from the 
doubious nature of the readiness potential, to the usage of the clock, which 
could possibly influende the readings. However the most basic assumptions of 
the experiment are rarely questioned. Libet clearly thinks that in order for an 
action to be free, it has to be caused by something mental (the decision) as op-
posed to something physical (the brain activation), and this assumption has 
remained the standard approach in neuroscience. The definition of the com-
ponent might change- from decision to intention, but its nature, as a mental 
event, remains present. Therefore also here, as in philosophy, the next question 
that comes to mind is how.
While both philosophers (e.g. Mele) and neuroscientists (e.g. Haggard) 
seem to agree that a voluntary action requires a specific type of cause, namely 
a mental one, the relation between the mental and the physical and its impor-
tance to the argument on free will is often pushed to the side. At the same time 
intentions are sometimes defined as […] a mental state, which may be associ-
ated with particular brain states (Pacherie and Haggard, 2010, p. 70), which set-
tles for a vague notion of association, without further explaining how such 
connection could impact the causal chain leading to the voluntary action. 
Sometimes dualism is assumed to be necessary for free will to have a chance at 
existence (e.g. Haggard, 2011, Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009), but those discus-
sions are quickly dismissed (e.g. Mele 2009, 2014). Yet, Mele himself argues that 
Whenever human beings perform an overt intentional action, at least one of the 
following plays a causal role in its production: some intention of theirs; the acqui-
sition or persistence of some intention of theirs; the physical correlate of one or 
more of the preceding items. (Mele, 2009, p. 11), thereby assuming that it is pos-
sible for a voluntary action to be caused by the physical item, only if it is cor-
related with the mental one.
The main advantage of Mele’s position is the space it leaves to incorporate 
the conclusions of neuroscientific experiments into a broader philosophical 
debates. It shows that the sole fact there is a physical activation linked to the 
mental is not in fact that surprising (after all we all have a brain), and that the 
physical can have a role in the causal chain that results in a free action, without 
automatically disproving free will. This can happen because of the relationship 
between the mental and the physical. The main disadvantage is the lack of 
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clarity on the type of relationship that connects the two, and, as always in the 
cases of nonreductive physicalism (which Mele’s position is the classical ex-
ample of), the susceptibility to the Causal Exclusion argument.
To summarize what we know so far:
(1) the voluntary action is most often defined though its causes- if it is men-
tal, the action could be voluntary (it could also not be, there is a number 
of other conditions, the mental causation does not solely guarantee free 
will), if it is physical the action surely is not voluntary;
(2) this assumption is shared by both philosophers and neuroscientists alike, 
and seems to be the basic feature of what constitutes a voluntary action;
(3) when it comes to the relationship between the mental and the physical, 
dualism is not necessary, and the fact that the physical is a part of the 
causal chain is not problematic. The physical could still play a role, but 
only in so far it is connected to the mental.
If we accept what has been said so far here, it is clear that there is a need for an 
account that shows exactly how the mental and the physical are connected, 
and how the mental plays the causal role (in its connection to the physical). If 
it is not dualism, it is either reduction or nonreductive physicalism. Since the 
first one leaves the mental (as mental) powerless, and therefore puts free will 
in peril, it seems that nonreductive physicalism is the better option, where the 
mental is linked to the physical through some form of dependence relation-
ship, i.e. supervenience or realization, but cannot be reduced to it. Mental is 
defined not ontologically, but functionally, through the role it plays in the caus-
al chain leading to the action-outcome. Moreover, nonreductive physicalism 
allows for multiple realization of the mental, one of the notorious problems of 
the reductive approaches, according to which the same mental event can be 
realized by a variety of physical realizations. It also allows for seamless accom-
modation of the scientific results to the philosophical debate, without entail-
ing that free will is not possible. However, its ultimate success depends on 
 finding a satisfactory solution to the Causal Exclusion Challenge, and without 
it positions such as the one held by Mele, are not sufficient to explain the pos-
sibility of free will.
3 The Causal Exclusion Challenge
While nonreductive physicalism, as we have seen before, is the most promis-
ing option for us, the consistency of its premises was challenged by the causal 
exclusion argument, most famously described by Jaegwon Kim. The four 
 premises are (1) principle of mental causation, (2) principle of irreducibility, 
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(3)  principle of causal closure, and (4) no-overdetermination principle, which 
read:
(1) Some physical effects have mental causes (the principle of mental 
causation)
(2) Mental causes are distinct from physical causes (the principle of 
irreducibility)
(3) If a physical event has a cause at t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t 
(the principle of causal completeness of the physical or the causal clo-
sure of the physical domain, Kim, 2005)
(4) Events cannot have more than one sufficient cause occurring at a given 
time (the exclusion principle)
The first premise states that at least some mental events can have causal im-
pact on the physical realm. The premise is very general and it allows for the 
mental to be either connected or disconnected from the physical realm, there-
by being compatible with both nonreductive physicalism as well as dualism.
The second premise rejects the reduction of the mental to the physical 
realm. Also here the premise is very broad, and as such, is compatible with 
both dualism and nonreductive physicalism as the mental could also be inde-
pendent from the physical.
The third premise necessitates that, if an event has a cause at all, it has a 
physical cause. The premise, by itself, does not limit the causes to one; there-
fore it allows for multiple causes.
The fourth premise of nonreductive physicalism limits the number of suffi-
cient causes to only one, except for the cases of genuine overdetermination. 
This principle does not refer specifically to the realm of the mental, but rather 
states that each event has only one sufficient cause, while at the same time not 
claiming that such event has to be either mental or physical. However, when 
combined with the premise of the causal closure it entails that there can be 
only one physical cause.
Causal Exclusion has been one of the major philosophical puzzles, and we 
can identify two general groups of approaches: (1) to reject one of the premises 
of the causal exclusion, or (2) to redefine the notion of causation we are oper-
ating with. Often the two are combined, and one of the premises is rejected 
because the modified notion of causation allows for it (as in the case of 
interventionism).
List and Menzies (2017), who modified the first premise, to state that an 
agent’s action is free only if it is caused by the agent’s mental states, while other 
premises of the argument remained mostly unchanged, presented an ap-
proach particularly relevant to the free will problem. The authors explore 
which one of the premises could in fact be rejected, and conclude that the only 
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one we can potentially give up, without getting ultimately into more trouble, is 
the no-overdetermination principle. In other words, one effect could have 
more than one sufficient cause, meaning we can manipulate more than one 
event to obtain a change in the effect. In case of a voluntary action would mean 
it is caused by both the mental and the physical event, and each one of them is 
its sufficient cause. The authors argue that such understanding of the causal 
chain is possible thanks to an interventionist approach to causation (a cause is 
a cause though making a difference to the effect, most famously argued by 
Woodward (2003)).
The approach of List and Menzies is similar to arguments by causal com-
patibilists, who also reject the no-overdetermination argument, and claim that 
in the case of mental causation we are dealing with two sufficient causes. 
There are two strains of causal compatibilism, where:
(1) there are two, in some sense, independent causes, the mental and the 
physical, and the mental does not overdetermine the physical, but is the 
cause of the outcome, and
(2) the mental and the physical, while connected, do cause something to-
gether but their causal contributions differ, and, in some cases or under 
some understanding of causation, the dynamics between the mental and 
the outcome is more telling than the one between the physical and the 
outcome.
List and Menzies’ account specifically resembles more the independent over-
determination solution. Then both the occurrence of the physical, as well as 
the occurrence of mental (in a world with free roaming souls), would bring 
about the same effect. Moore (2012) argues that the independent overdetermi-
nation solution will not work, and one of the reasons for it is the same as the 
one used in justifying the existence of the principle in the first place, namely 
the amount of overdetermination that would have to exist as a result. Mental 
causation is ubiquitous, and if mental overdetermines the physical, it would 
have to do so thousands of times a day, which seems to be against the odds. 
Secondly, accepting independent overdetermination, might lead to undermin-
ing the causal completeness of the physical. If the physical cause is sufficient, 
it seems no other cause is really necessary, however it seems permissible that, 
based just on this premise, two or more sufficient causes exist (depending on 
how we define sufficient). Yet, if the mental cause is sufficient, we could also 
conclude that the physical cause is not sufficient, which would violate the 
premise of causal closure directly. This, in turn, would result in the agent not 
being free once again.
Therefore we find ourselves in a predicament, we need causal efficacy of the 
mental for free will to be a possibility, but to get there we need to solve the 
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Causal Exclusion problem. What I want to propose in this chapter is an at-
tempt to rethink the issue, and how we got there, and to modify how we under-
stand causes and causation, which could leave us avoiding this major issue 
altogether.
4 The Neuronal Basis of Mental Causation
Most of the experiments in neuroscience investigate the causes of our actions 
by focusing on the final stages of motor planning and the action initiation pro-
cesses. There, deliberation processes and distal intentions are not taken into 
account, presenting a picture that could be considered limited. Additionally, 
they focus on overt actions, and some argue that only overt actions can be vol-
untary (e.g. Haggard, 2011). As such, the discussions often do not aim to explain 
the specific interactions between mind and brain, nor do they go beyond the 
immediate causes.
A different way to think about the free will issue was proposed by Tse (2013). 
He expands the actions under consideration to include internal ones, and sees 
free will as a part of the whole decision process, starting from the moment of 
acquisition of a new piece of information. In other words free will, rather than 
in the last moment of action execution, would be intertwined in the larger 
decision making process, where a variety of steps can play a significant role in 
the outcome, thereby making the last moment of decision less important. 
What becomes much more relevant, however, is the causal efficacy of the men-
tal, which is dealt with by Tse through his criterial causation.
Criterial causation relies on a set of criteria that control the neuronal firings, 
conditions that have to be met in order to activate the neuron. If a new infor-
mation fulfills those criteria, the neuron will react, which will lead to a cascade 
of neuronal activation that can ultimately lead to an action. If it does not, the 
neuron remains inactive, and nothing happens. The multiple realization, an 
important feature of nonreductive approaches (which it seems Tse favors, 
since free will is based on the mental being causal, as mental), is accounted for 
since the […] set of conditions on input […] can be met in multiple ways and to 
differing degrees. (Tse, 2013, p. 22). At its core Tse’s model of criterial causation 
is model of how an acquisition of a piece of new information can have a physi-
cal impact, and change the behavior of the whole system. This systemic change 
comes from the change of firing criteria of the neurons, based on a three stage 
model, where:
(1) new physical/informational criteria are set in a neuronal circuit on the 
basis of preceding physical/mental processing at time t1, in part via a 
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mechanism of rapid synaptic resetting that effectively changes the inputs 
to postsynaptic neuron,
(2) at time t2, inherently variable inputs arrive at the postsynaptic neuron, 
and
(3) at time t3 physical/informational criteria are met or not met, leading to 
postsynaptic neural firing or not. (Tse, 2013, p. 133).
Two things seem to be at play here- the information that changes the criteria 
according to which the neuron fires, and its physical realization, the vehicle of 
information. The physical realization of informational criteria happens on the 
neuronal level, where the information from the input triggers the neuron to 
fire if such criteria are met. Neurons transform, and communicate the informa-
tion by changing individual action potential spikes into spikes that are being 
transmitted to other neurons, and place criteria for firing that can be met only 
by a specific subset of information, so only that subset can trigger the neuron 
to fire. Mental events can cause future mental and physical events by changing 
the criteria for firing used by neurons for the future inputs. The criteria that 
have to be met are somehow encoded in the incoming information, and as new 
piece of information has the power to change the current neuron-firing crite-
ria. If those change, upon the subsequent arrival of a similar information piece, 
the neurons will react based on the new criteria. Tse illustrates this using the 
example of Orion, where prior to having any knowledge about the pattern that 
the stars of Orion create, no neurons will react to said pattern. However, once 
the criteria (i.e. the input looking like the constellation of Orion) is set, the 
next time we will see that pattern, a specific neuronal connection, or singular 
neuron will fire. Tse argues that the patterns of information (such as Orion) are 
multiply realizable, and the same content, while being realized in stars, beans 
or grains of sand, could trigger the neuronal reaction. At the same time, it is 
clear that both the physical realizer and the abstract informational content are 
taken to be causal on his account, thereby potentially necessitating the rejec-
tion of the no- overdetermination principle, which does not allow two suffi-
cient causes (although it is not clear if, on Tse’s account both would be taken to 
be sufficient). As such, Tse’s proposed solution resembles views of causal com-
patibilists (e.g. Bennett, 2003; Moore, 2017 for an overview) and intervention-
ists (e.g. Woodward, 2015).
However, a number of issues can be identified with Tse’s approach, most 
notably what he means by causation is unclear: an experimental approach 
could suggest interventionism, the description of neuronal firings could rather 
suggest a mechanistic approach. And that lack of clarity in terms of what is 
understood as causes is, in my opinion, detrimental to fully showing how this 
account has the potential to explain the causal efficacy of the mental realm. 
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It also has other issues, including ascribing to neurons features usually bound 
to agents, like the ability to decide (e.g. Bishop, 2014). Moreover, even if the ac-
count could potentially show that the mental can in fact be causal, it can be 
insufficient as a stand-alone account of free will, as most of the decision mak-
ing process would be unconscious, which, in turn, can be a major issue for 
components such as the control of own actions. At the same time, if linked 
with an appropriate understanding of what constitutes a causal link, the posi-
tion could be seen as a first step to bring together nonreductive physicalism 
and the neuroscientific experiments, showing how mental, on a very low level, 
could potentially be causal. This however, alone, only allows to include the 
neuroscientific findings into the discussion more seamlessly but does not seem 
to solve the Causal Exclusion argument (it is still unclear how the mental could 
be causal along with the physical). Yet, Tse’s account could be seen as a first 
step in seeing the mental as somehow connected to the notion of information, 
which in turn could give us further clues about the relationship between the 
mental and the physical.
5 Causality as Information Transfer
There are two main reasons to think that understanding causality as informa-
tion transfer could be beneficial and applicable to the mind-brain debate: 
(1) the brain is an information processing machine, and (2) the way we talk 
about the mental to physical relationship seems similar to the relationship be-
tween the abstract content of information and its physical realization. Accord-
ing to Tse the transfer of information produces the change in physical world, at 
the same time not having to follow any of the energy conservation laws. In the 
pattern of Orion, it is not only the physical pattern of the stars, but the pattern 
combined with the abstract meaning that generates the change. Without the 
abstract content identified with Orion’s pattern, while we have seen the same 
pattern repeatedly, we can hypothesize it generated no change in the neuronal 
connections. If we see the mental and the abstract content of information as 
similar (which seems plausible), we could argue that through the transfer of 
information, the mental can make an effect on the physical world, through the 
abstract information level. Therefore, if there are parallels between the mental 
and the abstract content of information, and the physical and the ealization of 
that content, understanding causality as information transfer could provide us 
with the most promising platform to discuss causal efficacy of the mental. 
However, such approach has two challenges: (1) if the mental is similar to the 
meaning of a piece of information, how can that be shown, and (2) how would 
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causation as information transfer be able to account for the causal efficacy of 
the meaning of said piece of information. Or, in other words, how we could 
develop an explanation that avoids the challenges of causal compatibilism and 
interventionism, while at the same time accounts for the causal efficacy of the 
mental.
Most of the accounts of information transfer come from mathematics (e.g. 
Shannon, 1948), but since they specifically get rid of the meaning of the piece 
of information as irrelevant, they would not serve our purpose. The most no-
table attempt in philosophy has been developed by John Collier’s (1999), and 
while his approach is specifically described as physical causation, and as such 
might not suffice to describe the relationship between mind and brain, an ex-
tension of his theory to include the semantic part of the information could be 
added (which Collier himself seems to allow). Such extension could be offered 
by Floridi’s (e.g. 2004, 2011) theory of semantic information, seen as orthogonal 
to the classic approaches to information. Recently other accounts (e.g. Illari, 
Russo, 2014) have emerged claiming that everything can be described informa-
tionally, therefore the position could be both highly applicable, and can be 
seen to avoid certain problems identified in connection to the standard pro-
duction accounts (e.g. absences as I have come late to work because the bus 
did not arrive are problematic). While not yet accomplished, I want to argue 
that also in the case of mental to physical causation, causality understood as 
information transfer, could have potential to avoid certain issues.
Firstly, what is causality as information transfer. Collier himself defines it as 
[…] the transfer of a particular […] quantity of information from one state of a 
system to another. Physical causation is a special case in which physical informa-
tion instances are transferred from one state of physical system to another. (Col-
lier, 1999, p. 215).
In his approach, Collier draws from Shannon’s theory and treats informa-
tion quantitatively rather than qualitatively (which in the case of mental cau-
sation would be a major problem). Causality is understood here as a transfer of 
some piece of information in its physical form, which could be seen as compat-
ible with the type of processing Tse has in mind when he describes the neuro-
nal firings, which ultimately lead to a behavior. Therefore, a particular piece of 
information would be transmitted between neurons, leading to a change in the 
firing criteria. However, the picture is not complete without the abstract part of 
the piece of information, its meaning.
While the initial work of Collier bears strong resemblance to Shannon’s ap-
proach, in his later work Collier (2012) describes an information channel as 
a family of isomorphisms (also discussed by Dretske, 1999, and Floridi, 2010). 
Illari and Russo (2016) describe the covariance of isomorphisms as:
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[…] two systems a and b are couples in such a way that a’s being (or type, 
or in state) F is correlated to b’s being (of type, or in state) G, then such 
correlation carries for the observer of a the information that b is G. For 
example, the dishwasher’s yellow light (a) flashing (F) is triggered by, and 
hence is informative about, the dishwasher (b) running out of salt (G) for 
an observed O, like Alice, informed about the correlation.
illari and russo, 2016, p. 260
Importantly, the ismorphisms definition described by Illari and Russo involves 
the agent, who is informed by the already existing correlation between the 
flashing light of the dishwasher and low salt levels. This assumes that, at some 
point, the new information (the flashing yellow light) conveyed a new mean-
ing (the low salt levels) to the agent, and following Tse’s account, established a 
new firing criteria on the neurons. The addition of an agent, interpreting the 
information provided by the flashing light of the dishwasher, is new both to the 
information transfer accounts of Shannon and Collier, however, some form of 
coder and interpreter on both sides of the information channel could be as-
sumed on both accounts. In both cases, Illari and Russo’s and Collier’s, isomor-
phism entails the existence of two systems, each consisting of a set of objects, 
and each of the objects, has a set of attributes. Isomorphism happens when 
attributes of one set of objects (like the flashing light) tell us something about 
attributes of another set of objects (like the low level of salt).
Up to this point the account can be used to explain how the agent gets in-
formed, and acts based on the information. However, this by itself is insuffi-
cient to show that the mental is causal, to leave room for free will (even if we 
consider the whole, extended in time process that leads to action, from learn-
ing the new piece of information, to acting the next instance it comes into our 
attention again), or even to satisfactorily explain the agent’s actions. Or, as neu-
roscientists have put it
[…] even if a full specification of ordered synaptic potentials is the exclu-
sive causal story, then, as functionalists of all sorts have long emphasized, 
reciting the specification would be a poor explanation of what happened, 
because there’s nothing systematically special about these particular syn-
aptic sequences that ties them to bearing reports form one occasion to 
the next.
ross, spurrett, 2004, p. 615
Therefore the only physical causal chain is potentially insufficient, and the ac-
tion of adding the salt to the dishwasher seems to need both: (1) the mental 
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knowledge, or a belief that the flashing light signifies the low level of salt, and 
(2) the physical flashing light, that both somehow contribute to the final ac-
tion. In other words, understanding causality as information transfer can bring 
us closer to incorporating seamlessly the results of neuroscientific experi-
ments into the discussions on action generation. Combined with Tse’s criterial 
causation idea, causation understood as information transfer can give us an 
interesting account of how we acquire new information, and how that infor-
mation is then relevant in the process of decision making, on a very low level. 
However, if we want to get to free will, we seem to, again, hit the Causal Exclu-
sion question: was it the flashing light or the belief that it signifies the low salt 
level that made us go and add the salt to our dishwasher?
6 Do We Even Need Another Notion of Causation?
What constitutes a causal link and what connection is there between causality 
and explanation? These are two of the questions we have to face when we 
think about causation. Throughout the ages, causality has been defined in a 
variety of ways, from law-based regularities (e.g. Hume), to modern production 
accounts (causality as transfer, e.g. Dowe, 1992), mechanistic approaches 
(Craver, 2007) and interventionism (Woodward, 2003).
Currently the most broadly applied approach, also to the mental causation 
problem, is interventionism, where causation is understood as making a differ-
ence (the cause should make a difference to the appearance, or the probability 
distribution of the effect). In its current form it was presented by Woodward 
(2003), and has been often argued to be the effective solution to the Causal 
Exclusion (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007; Woodward 2015). However, as pointed 
by Baumgartner (e.g. 2009, 2012, 2013) the mental to physical relation (superve-
nience) does not allow for independent manipulation of competing causes 
and, at the same time, holding all other variables in the set fixed. If the two are 
necessary for establishing a causal link, as interventionists suggest, such link 
cannot be identified. There has been a significant amount of back and forth 
regarding the problem, with Woodward (2015) arguing that the non-causal de-
pendencies that hold between two variables should exclude those from the 
requirement of independent manipulation. This could be interpreted to entail 
that establishing that something is a cause, in case of two variables connected 
by non-causal dependencies, both of which could potentially be a cause, relies 
on the choice of which variable to manipulate, as this would automatically 
exclude the other variable from consideration. If we want to determine if our 
reaching for the fridge was caused by our intention to get a cold beverage or by 
Drozdzewska158
<UN>
the neuronal firings (on interventionism depending what we manipulate: the 
intention or the neuronal firings), that choice will determine which one would 
be considered a cause. Therefore, establishing that the mental is a cause is a 
metaphysical choice: whatever property we will choose to manipulate will de-
termine our conclusions about the causal links. The account could therefore 
be used to argue against, rather than for, mental causation, when the physical 
supervening basis is chosen for manipulation (and the mental is excluded be-
cause of the non-causal dependencies connecting the two). As we have seen in 
the previous sections of this article, interventionism is currently most often 
used to answer the Causal Exclusion challenge. Its proponents often argue 
that, given the definition of causality, it is permissible to have two sufficient 
causes, therefore the fourth premise is not really a problem. But as I have 
 argued, it is difficult to see how interventionists would avoid the issues that 
causal compatibilists face. Ultimately for some, including me, answering the 
exclusion challenge with a metaphysical choice just does not seem sufficient, 
but does the problem lie within the notion of causality? Or is there an issue 
with the way we think about causal chains and causes themselves?
Another potential approach, applicable especially in neuroscience, is the 
mechanistic one, most fully described by Craver in his 2007 book. The ap-
proach extends beyond biology and neuroscience, including the classic exam-
ples of machinery. Yet, as Craver argues, equating mechanistic causality with a 
notion of a machine is too restrictive to account for the advanced neuroscien-
tific processes. However, in spite of the account’s applicability in neuroscience, 
it is sensitive to the causal exclusion argument, mainly because of its multi-
level explanations, which can refer to
[…] the behaviors of organisms, the processing functions of brain sys-
tems, the representational and computational properties of brain  regions, 
the electrophysiological properties of nerve cells, and the structures and 
conformation changes of molecules.
craver, 2007, p. 9
Moreover, as was already pointed out in the quote from Ross and Spurret, and 
since the mental is multiply realizable, there is nothing special about the spe-
cific neuronal firings. Moreover, because of the causal exclusion, it is difficult 
to show how the mental could be causal via mental, which is difficult on the 
mechanistic approach.
With the variety of different types of causalities, some (e.g. Psillos, 2009) 
have argued that what is described there, are not different causalities but rath-
er different symptoms of the same thing, like in the case of a common cold. 
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This is a position already expressed by Anscombe (ref?) who argued that the 
notion of causality is far too general. Moreover, in other areas, e.g. medicine, 
some (e.g. Williamson and Russo, 2007) have argued that evidence of just one 
form is not enough, and causality can be established only when we have evi-
dence of both mechanistic connection and evidence of correlation.
Given the problems encountered by the various theories of causality, espe-
cially when applied to the mental causation domain, and the potential need 
for a variety of evidence to even establish the causal chain, one might wonder 
if another notion of causality is what we need. So far in the article I have ar-
gued that yes, a new account is necessary, and seeing causality as information 
transfer can allow for a more natural way of thinking about causes and effects, 
especially when applied to mind- brain relationships. It seems that the notion 
of information transfer could very well fit both the neuroscientific jargon as 
well as the common intuitions about what happens in our brain. However to 
fully provide us with a picture of how this works, we would need another “lev-
el” of description- the meaning of information, and its causal powers in the 
causal chain. The account, while providing those two frameworks, does not 
require that two different types of causality are at work in generating one out-
come, which would be unlikely. As such it is also compatible with the rejection 
of the no overdetermination principle, as, depending on how we define a 
cause, we are dealing with two, strictly linked, connected through superve-
nience, collaborating causes. But this might not be completely sufficient, since, 
as we have seen before, causal compatibilism (and such an account would po-
tentially be an instance of it) falls short from providing a complete account of 
mental causation.
7 How to Move Forward
The discussions on mental causation, also those related to free will, seem to 
largely focus on two groups of issues: (1) what is causality, what does it mean to 
be a cause, and (2) how does the mental relate to the physical, and how it can 
be seen as a cause via being mental. However, it seems that the one thing miss-
ing is the question whether we are thinking about the causes themselves 
 correctly. Also, here the information transfer account can help to clarify cer-
tain things. When we talk about a new piece of information being a cause, we 
never mean just the physical realization of the abstract meaning, nor do we 
ever talk about just the meaning. We tend to see information as one cause that 
consists of those two components: the physical vehicle and the meaning. Ap-
plying the same way of thinking to mental causation would leave us with one 
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 mental-physical cause, which are not in competition, leaving one cause, with 
two necessary components. Such approach would differ from the compatibil-
ist accounts, as it would get rid of the notion of two, dependent or indepen-
dent, sufficient causes. It would also be allowed on the account of causation as 
information transfer as a very natural way of thinking about information. It 
would also avoid the Causal Exclusion argument, as again, no two competing 
causes would be there. However, while this picture is attractive, further work is 
needed to consider possible shortcomings of such an approach.
The article presented here had two main aims: (1) to show that the causally 
efficacious mental is necessary for the possibility of free will, and (2) that none 
of the current approaches to causality provides a satisfactory solution to the 
problem, when discussed in connection to free will. I have argued that under-
standing causality as information transfer can avoid the shortcomings of the 
currently popular approaches such as interventionism. However, to show that 
mental can be causal qua mental, rather than just because of the physical 
properties, more is needed, firstly, an information causation account that in-
cludes the semantic level of causation, secondly, possibly the rethinking of the 
notion of a cause. I have argued that the account of causation as information 
transfer is a more natural way to talk about mental causation than the current 
positions, but the real work begins now, in finding a seamless way to bring 
these theories together.
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Chapter 8
Free Will, Language, and the Causal Exclusion 
Problem
Bernard Feltz and Olivier Sartenaer
1 Introduction
The starting point of the present paper is the rather commonsensical idea that 
mental causation qua mental – that is, at the very least, some minimal degree 
of irreducible mental causation – is a necessary condition, though perhaps not 
a sufficient one, for free will (see e.g. List & Menzies 2017). In other words, it is 
the thought that one can only feel entitled to consider human actions as being 
freely willed insofar as, among other things, their ultimate origin – what ulti-
mately caused them – is not wholly microphysical in nature (on the model of, 
let’s say, a bunch of interrelated neurons firing). Much has been said in recent 
literature about how exactly to make sense of such a thought, essentially by 
addressing the question of how mentality could be said to be causally potent 
in spite of its undeniable dependence on a neural basis.1 Here we venture into 
a different kind of exploration, more specifically related to the question of 
what irreducible mental causation can be or, more particularly, where it could 
come from. In this perspective, the particular question we would like to ad-
dress is the following: could it be the case that what makes mental causation 
apparently so special or unique is that it is deeply rooted in complex forms – 
perhaps only to be found in human communication – of language? Put differ-
ently, could some form of irreducible linguistic causation be at the basis of the 
kind of mental causation that would be appropriate, among other things, for 
having free will?
Here is how we plan to deal with such a question. First, we briefly introduce 
the causal exclusion argument, essentially as an excuse to allow for mapping 
the space of the possible ways in which linguistic causation could in principle 
1 A recurrent strategy in this respect is to embrace some form of causal pluralism by consider-
ing that mental causation is not of the same kind as physical causation. See e.g., mental cau-
sation as “fact causation” (Lowe 2008) or “criterial causation” (Tse 2013).
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be related to physical causation (Section 2). We then identify one (family) of 
these ways that would be appropriate to ground the kind of mental causation 
necessary for free will (Section 3). On the basis of this purely formal exercise, 
we then turn to the more ambitious objective of trying to provide plausible em-
pirical support for the targeted (family of) schema(s) of linguistic-to- physical 
causation, building on recent neuroscientific work on neural plasticity (Sec-
tion 4).
2 Linguistic-to-Physical Causation: Mapping the Conceptual 
Landscape
As of today, the causal exclusion argument certainly is one of the main chal-
lenges that any proponent of irreducible mental causation has to face. The 
moral of the argument is indeed essentially the following: between irreducible 
mental causation and a minimally monistic stance any neuroscientist should 
be attached to, a choice has to be made. This notoriously leads to a rather dra-
matic dilemma. Either one has to give up on genuine mental causation and, 
with it, free will, or one has to embrace some variation of Cartesian-style dual-
ism, which prima facie doesn’t fit that nicely into the current scientific picture 
of how minds are usually supposed to work in our world.
Besides vindicating this important moral, the causal exclusion argument 
has a useful pedagogical advantage. Insofar as it is structured around premises 
that usually act as demarcation lines between competing views on the 
 mind-body relationship, it allows for giving an interesting overview of the con-
ceptual landscape of the mind-body problem. Even more than that, for the ar-
gument can easily be generalized to any type of “higher-level” or “non-physical” 
causation, it can help to appreciate the diversity of available positions on any 
mode of articulation between any causal realms. Obviously, the ones that will 
be of interest here are the physical and the linguistic, from which the notations 
employed below naturally follow.
One possible way of framing the argument is to point out that the following 
set of four statements is inconsistent, Li and Pi being different events under-
stood as property instances occurring at times ti:2
[Dependence]. Every Li synchronically depends on an underlying Pi.
2 There currently exist several formulations of the argument. The present one is close in spirit 
to Kim’s (2005, 39–45), where the dependence premise is cashed out in terms of nomological 
supervenience.
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[Distinctness]. Every Li is distinct from any underlying Pi, in the sense that 
Li has some causal potency of its own, “over and above” any Pi’s causal 
potency. More precisely, Li is a cause of some Pj (with tj > ti).
[Closure]. Every Pj that has a sufficient cause has a sufficient cause Pi that 
is part of the same “P-level”.
[Exclusion]. No single event can have more than one sufficient cause at 
any time.
Although these four premises are mutually inconsistent, holding only three of 
them allows us to define a coherent picture of the linguistic/physical articula-
tion. Four families of positions are thereby available:3
– Varieties of dualism deny [dependence], making higher-level causal events 
essentially independent from any lower-level basis. Such a view can come in 
an interactionist version, where [distinctness] involves, as mentioned 
above, some form of downward causation that crosses the inter-level onto-
logical gap. Some versions are non-interactionist or parallelist, as they es-
chew any commitment to the clause of downward causation present in 
[distinctness].
– Varieties of reductionism deny [distinctness], making higher-level events 
either non-existent (eliminativist reductionism), causally redundant (reten-
tive reductionism) or causally impotent (epiphenomenalism).4
– Strong emergentism denies [closure], to the effect that the recognition of 
irreducibly causal higher-level events renders (most versions of) physical-
ism false. In this kind of scenario, linguistic events, though dependent on 
the physical world, are ontologically different from – and are able to caus-
ally influence the course of – physical events.
– Weak emergentism denies [exclusion], construing Li’s causal action on Pj as 
essentially redundant with Pi’s causal action on Pj. One way of cashing out 
this idea is through non-reductive physicalism built under the perspective 
of the “subset account” of powers, according to which L and P are different 
properties insofar as L’s powers form a subset of P’s powers.5
3 See Wilson (2015) for similar analysis, though more precise and complete.
4 Of course, that epiphenomenalism is here classified as a variety of reductionism is indicative 
of a causal realist stance that turns out to be a widespread background assumption in this 
kind of debate. We are well aware that epiphenomenalism can be considered as a form of 
antireductionism in other contexts (see e.g. Baysan, forthcoming).
5 See again Wilson (2015). Here we also adopt her terminology, keeping in mind that both the 
weak and strong varieties of emergence are to be considered in an ontological way. For a 
taxonomy that takes this into account, see Guay & Sartenaer (2016).
Feltz and Sartenaer166
<UN>
3 Linguistic-to-Physical Causation: The Strongly Emergentist 
Option(s)
Though rather coarse-grained, this brief overview of the ways in which linguis-
tic and physical events can come to be causally related is enough for our pres-
ent purpose of identifying a schema that could be conductive to free will. Al-
though the importance and the very formulation of each of the four premises 
of the causal exclusion argument can be discussed – they are actually vividly 
debated in the literature – we suppose here that [dependence] and [distinct-
ness] are non-negotiable ingredients of any reasonable account of free will.6 
As a result, and insofar as the package [dependence] + [distinctness] is coex-
tensive with emergence (see e.g. Sartenaer 2016), we take it that some form of 
emergentism is a necessary condition for free will.
Of course, emergentism can come in many varieties, each one with its own 
commitments, stakes and problems. So a next step is to further identify the 
kind of emergentism that would be appropriate for free will. We already 
showed in the previous section that emergentism can come in (at least) two 
varieties – weak and strong – depending on whether it is consistent or not with 
[closure] or [exclusion]. Such a way of distinguishing between both families of 
emergentism hides what actually is their real demarcation criterion, which can 
be formulated through the following question: on the occasion of Li emerging 
from Pi, are the causal powers of Li also (possibly) exercised by Pi? Put differ-
ently, are the emerging higher-level powers also (possibly) present at the basal 
level?
If one takes the answer to these questions to be affirmative, then higher-
level events, though existing and causally potent, don’t add anything causally 
new to the world’s ontology. They simply happen to do something that is in any 
case already done, so to speak. This first case, corresponding to weak emer-
gentism, is consistent with Kim’s “causal inheritance principle”, according to 
which instances of realized properties have the same powers as the instances 
of their realizers (see e.g. Kim 1993, 326). Accordingly, weak emergentism can 
generally be seen as encapsulating the “preformationist” claim that powers of 
emergent entities are always already preformed in their bases (Sartenaer 2018). 
Because of this, this first option has to be discarded, as one cannot imagine 
making sense of the authorship condition of free will on the basis of the 
6 In a nutshell, our motivation for this claim is rather commonsensical: an ideal account of free 
will should encapsulate (some degree of) irreducible non-physical causation – hence 
[distinctness] – in a way that is consistent with the widespread recognition that higher-level 
events are always somehow grounded in physical events – hence [dependence].
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 assumption that, whatever an agent freely does, his neurons (let’s say) have 
already done it. In that kind of case, there would indeed be no principled rea-
son for considering the agent as being free while denying that her neurons also 
be. If one is free, so must be the others, but since the others clearly aren’t, then 
the first cannot be either. It thus seems, albeit somewhat unsurprisingly, that 
free will doesn’t get along with causal redundancy.
This leaves us with the second option, available as soon as one is keen to 
answer the aforementioned demarcation question negatively. In that perspec-
tive, higher-level events have causal powers that are neither “inherited from” 
nor “preformed in” their physical dependence bases, so that they really bring 
causal novelty to the world’s ontology – of course at the expense, as we’ve seen, 
of the causal closure of the physical world. This position has received many 
labels over the years, like, e.g., “property dualism” or “interactionist monism”. 
We settle here for “strong emergentism”, capturing the claim that higher-level 
events strongly emerge from lower-level physical events as soon as the first 
ones exert causal powers that the second ones cannot possibly exert [“strong” 
distinctness], while the very existence of the firsts depends on the existence of 
the seconds [dependence]. It is such a strong variety of emergentism that we 
take to constitute a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for free will, as 
it certainly allows for capturing the authorship condition in a robust way.7
This being said, two refinements can be made. First, it has now become 
rather standard to make use of another conceptual distinction in order to fur-
ther compartmentalize the conceptual landscape of emergentism. As such, 
some variants of strong emergence would be classified as “synchronic”, for the 
emergent higher-level property is supposed to be instantiated at the same mo-
ment as his lower-level, basal property. This is the canonical way of looking at 
emergence, which is implicitly at stake in the usual formulation of the causal 
exclusion argument as discussed in the previous section. Another variant of 
emergentism, recently come to the fore especially in philosophy of science, 
construes the emergence relation as essentially diachronic, the emergent be-
ing instantiated later than its basis. More than a mere detail, such distinction 
is of the utmost importance when it comes to metaphysical discussions, as 
the  dependence relations at play in both cases are very different. Typically, 
while  synchronic versions of emergence construe [dependence] in terms of 
7 While focusing directly on mental causation rather than linguistic causation, other philoso-
phers have already defended the idea that strong emergence is necessary for free will. See for 
instance O’Connor (2000) and Lowe (2008) in a libertarian, agent-causalist setting. For a 
compatibilist take on the issue, see Kistler (2010), where the emergence involved is somehow 
weaker (without being weak in the sense described here), insofar as it is associated with 
downward causation construed as the action of a constraint.
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 constitution, composition, realization or supervenience, diachronic varieties 
interpret it as being some sort of causation. Since we will later take as paradig-
matic examples of linguistic downward causation cases where linguistic oc-
currences have been produced or generated by human beings, it is the dia-
chronic version of (strong) emergence that will be of interest here, along the 
lines of, for example, O’Connor & Wong’s (2005) dynamical theory of emer-
gence (see Figure 8.1).
As a side remark, one can point out that recent variants of diachronic strong 
emergence eschew any commitment to the idea that the emergent should be 
of a higher-level than its basis, making emergence a concept that is not neces-
sarily holistic in character (Humphreys 2016; Sartenaer 2018; Guay & Sartenaer 
2018). Though it could be interesting to probe this line of thought further, it is 
not the place to do it here.
A second refinement is based on the plausible hypothesis that, in a putative 
case of linguistic, downwardly oriented causal influence, the emergent linguis-
tic event8 is not causally sufficient for bringing about the corresponding physi-
cal effect, for it is reasonable to expect that physical determinants are also at 
play. Accordingly, although strong emergentism tolerates that some physical 
effects are wholly determined by higher-level emergent causes, such a radical 
claim is not mandatory. As it appears in figure 8.1, it can also be the case that it 
is the conjunction of Pi and Lj that causes Pk, provided that – and this is the 
non-trivial matter on which strong emergentism essentially rests – the powers 
of Lj are not the same as the ones of Pi, to the extent that [closure] cannot pos-
sibly hold. Put differently, Lj is at least a necessary cause of Pk.
Before closing the present section, two remarks are in order, the second be-
ing incidentally the occasion of summing up our previous discussion. First, up 
to now, linguistic causation and higher-level linguistic events have been only 
conceived of as “linguistic” by way of stipulation. At this stage, we are totally 
noncommittal about any possible specificity of language that would make it 
fare in an idiosyncratic way in the debates about non-physical causation. As it 
has been clear, we simply exploited the high degree of generality of these de-
bates, where the very nature of the higher-level realm under consideration is 
usually left unspecified.
Second and more importantly, our discussion has been purposively con-
fined so far to the domain of “armchair” metaphysics, to the effect that the 
schema of linguistic-to-physical causation that we identified only describes a 
possible and coherent mode of articulation between both these causal levels. 
8 The various levels of “linguistic event” will be detailed in section 4.2. At this stage, it can be 
considered that the concept of “utterance” is relevant.
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As such, our endeavour has therefore been mainly descriptive and speculative. 
We only contended that the diachronic, strong emergence of higher-level 
 linguistic events out of underlying physical events, together with the recogni-
tion that the associated, irreducible linguistic causation is only responsible 
for the advent of subsequent physical events to the extent that it acts 
 together with underlying physical causes, is an adequate schema for mak-
ing sense of the commonsensical authorship condition of free will. It is an-
other question whether such a schema refers to any real causal dynamics 
in our world. This is up to science to tell us, and this is the issue to which we 
turn now.
4 Does Neuroscience Support the Identified Schema?
We have just seen that the schema of linguistic-to-physical causation could be 
a theoretical case of downward causation in a diachronic strong emergence 
perspective. We would like now to show how such a schema could be empiri-
cally relevant in relation with a neuroscientific point of view concerning lan-
guage learning processes. Such a question has a double dimension. First of all, 
we would like to analyse learning processes in general, and secondly language 
learning processes specifically. Afterwards, in reference to philosophy of lan-
guage, we would like to show how language-use in such a relation with the 













Figure 8.1 (i) “Traditional”, synchronic strong emergence, where the conjunction of 
[dependence] and [distinctness] conflicts with [closure], as [exclusion] is taken 
to hold. (ii) Diachronic strong emergence, which only differs from (i) in that 
[dependence*] is construed causally. In both cases, the failure of [closure] doesn’t 




4.1 Neuroscience and the Mechanisms of Learning
Learning is a process strongly linked to memory. In all learning process, mem-
ory has an important part. Moreover, in our study of the relation between free 
will and causality, the relation with neuroscience is of great importance. This 
is why, before introducing the processes specific to language learning and 
downward causation, we would like first to look at the cellular mechanisms of 
memory.
The work of Nobel Prize winner Eric Kandel (2006) on this topic is classic. 
Without entering into details of the experiments, we can explain that it was in 
work on the mollusk Aplysia that Kandel’s team first of all found evidence of 
two types of learning in behaviour. Certain behavioural reactions are learned 
for the short term – of the order of a day – while others are learned and re-
tained for several weeks.
The researchers then focused on the mechanisms of memory at the cellular 
level. By studying the synaptic connections between sensory neurons and mo-
tor neurons, they found that short-term memory was linked to an increase in 
the release of glutamate in the synaptic cleft; this is a functional modification 
of the synapse. The synapse becomes more sensitive, leading to a faster stimu-
lation of the motor neuron.
Long-term memory, on the other hand, involves an anatomical modification 
of the synapse, as the sensory neuron develops extensions towards the motor 
neuron. This process involves synthesis of proteins which requires the activity 
of the cell nucleus. As for short-term memory, this generation of synaptic bou-
tons is accompanied by an increased release of glutamate, which corresponds 
to an increased sensitivity for the organism. Since this sensitivity takes the 
form of a new anatomical structure, it takes place over a much longer 
time-scale.
These fundamental mechanisms discovered in the context of Aplysia will 
be observed throughout the animal kingdom, in particular in mammals and 
human beings. The processes of learning vary in time. And, as in humans, short 
term memory and long term memory are accompanied by functional modifi-
cations and anatomical modifications, respectively.
As an example of this, Eric Kandel cites Thomas Ebert’s work on musicians. 
With his colleagues at the University of Konstanz, Ebert’s team compared im-
ages of the brains of violinists and cellists with those of non-musicians. This 
study revealed that the cortex area reserved for the right-hand fingers did not 
differ between musicians and non-musicians, whereas cortex area representa-
tions of the left-hand fingers were greatly extended in a proportion ranging 
from one to five in the brains of musicians. The size of a body part representa-
tion in the cortex thus depends on the intensity and complexity of its use.
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Kandel draws interesting general consequences on the anthropological lev-
el: the architecture of each person’s brain is unique. As soon as each behaviour 
has such an impact on the brain’s architecture, each brain integrates the his-
tory of each individual. In consequence, even identical twins with identical 
genes have different brains because of their different life experiences.
Moreover, as we will see in the next section, such a mechanism can also be 
interpreted as a mechanism of downward causation. That concerns immedi-
ately the problematic of emergence and free will. Before this work of interpre-
tation, we would like to refer to other mechanisms involved in learning; these 
mechanisms are linked to selectionist explanations.
In Neuronal Group Selection Theory (ngst), Gerald Edelman (1990, 1992, 
2006), another Nobel Prize laureate, proposes a learning mechanism belong-
ing to the logic of selectionist explanations. The genetic program induces a 
process of redundant connections linking sensory, motor and emotional cen-
ters within the brain. This is what Edelman calls the global cartography. This 
connectivity allows a multiplicity of various behaviours. An important mecha-
nism here is selective stabilization: that implies that a nerve circuit used in the 
brain will be stabilized.
In this context, learning is linked to a trial and error-based strategy. Redun-
dant structure allows for a multiplicity of behaviours. Selective stabilization 
mechanism in global cartography, which links sensory, motor and emotional 
centers, leads to the reinforcement of circuits which permit adapted behav-
iours. The circuits most used are reinforced to the detriment of other circuits, 
which remain very unstable, or even degenerate.
These second types of learning mechanism lead to the same conclusions as 
Kandel’s mechanisms: the structure of the brain is deeply marked by personal 
history. The brain’s fine structure is the result of the personal history of each 
individual.
4.2 Learning Language: Philosophy of Language and Neuroscience
Having introduced the neuroscientific mechanisms of learning, we would like 
to analyse the particular dimensions of language learning from the point of 
view of philosophy of language. This is in order to show how the proposed 
neurological mechanisms can meet these specific constraints. We will next 
propose an analysis which links these results to the topic of emergence and 
downward causation. Finally, we will demonstrate what the link between 
downward causation and language can contribute to our understanding of free 
will.
Habermas (2005) stresses at the outset that human cognition involves 
two dimensions: linguistic and social. Learning a language implies social 
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 interactions. It’s in this context that Habermas distinguishes “subjective mind” 
from “objective mind”. Objective mind is “a collective knowledge preserved in 
symbolic form”. It includes grammar, logic, semantics but also systems of 
meanings culturally shared. Habermas speaks about a “space of symbolically 
structured reasons”. “The rational motivation of convictions and actions takes 
place in this dimension and follows logical, linguistic and pragmatic rules that 
are not reducible to natural laws”. (Habermas, 2005, 173) (91) In this context, 
“subjective mind” refers to individual activity: each individual who partici-
pates in “objective mind” is on the one hand capable of understanding and 
using a common language, can participate in a shared conversation, can share 
proposed meanings and values; and on the other hand, each individual be-
comes able to nurture this conversation through innovation and the creation 
of new concepts. The learning of language is precisely the intersubjective pro-
cess by which the individual appropriates “objective mind” and becomes able 
to implement his “subjective mind”, becomes about to keep his own word and 
give himself his own system of meaning.
Habermas advances the hypothesis that “objective mind”, the rules that 
structure language and the fundamental concepts of a culture, could have a 
structuring effect on the brain itself. In some ways, we could talk about an im-
plementation of “objective mind” in the brain. “The meaning’s systems can, in 
turn, influence the brains of participants through the grammatically regulated 
use of symbols. […] In the course of ontogeny, the individual brain apparently 
acquires the dispositions required to “access” the programs of society and cul-
ture”. (Habermas 2005, 175)
It’s precisely this hypothesis that we would like to put forward with refer-
ence to the learning mechanisms described (among others) by Kandel and 
Edelman. Indeed, whether it is the functional and structural modifications or 
whether it is the processes of selective stabilization, learning leads to modifi-
cations of the cortex that we can interpret in Habermasian terms as an imple-
mentation of “objective mind”.
This implementation allows access to “subjective mind”, the individual’s ca-
pability to participate in conversation which characterizes his culture. The ac-
tive entry of the individual into language over the course of ontogenesis re-
quires the learning of rules of grammar, logical rules, and the meaning of 
concepts. Language learning gives access to shared meanings within objective 
mind and makes is possible to progressively take part in the process of elabora-
tion of meanings which characterizes all culture. In this sense, the neuroscien-
tific mechanisms of learning constitute the empirical basis for understanding 
the implementation of language in an individual.
A reference to more specific linguistic studies will permit an easier relation 
to causation and the cellular mechanisms of learning. In a recent introduction 
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to The Handbook of Language Emergence (Wiley, Blackwell, 2015), Brian Mac-
Whinney distinguishes “six major, partially independent hierarchies: auditory 
phonology, articulatory phonology, lexicon, syntax, embodied roles, and com-
municative structure” (MacWhinney, 2015, 4). Each of these levels concerns 
partially distinct neuronal areas and all these levels are interconnected. Lan-
guage learning is particularly complex because learning is always linked with 
action. Auditory phonology is the most passive activity: a baby registers the 
phonemes present in his environment. That is important while it prepares the 
utilization of such phonemes. Articulatory phonology is already more active 
because it proceeds not only to repetitions of phonemes, but to articulations of 
phonemes conducting to the production of words. With words, we participate 
to the lexicon level. The integration of words in sentences implies the integra-
tion of grammar constraints, thus directly concerns syntax. A more elaborated 
relation to language implies an embodied role and social relations. “At the 
most elementary level, communicative structures involve speech acts that can 
then be grouped into adjacency pairs from which higher-level structures such 
as topic chains and narrative structure can emerge. Each of these hierarchies is 
tightly linked to others”. (MacWhinney 2015, 4)
Habermassian implementation of “objective mind” concerns all these lev-
els. By integrating progressively all these levels in interaction with his social 
environment, a child becomes able to participate to social conversations, first 
in a passive manner, later in an active manner. Subjective mind refers to the 
acquired progressive ability to have its own discourse and to participate to the 
social production of innovative discourses. Moreover, different meaning’s sys-
tems are present in “objective mind”. Each individual has to choose between a 
plurality of meaning’s systems to organize his personal existence. These preci-
sions in more specific linguistic terms will facilitate the articulation to the mo-
lecular mechanisms of language learning.
4.3 Learning Language and Causation
The moment has come to take up again the question of causation. We advance 
the hypothesis that language learning process mobilizes a type of downward 
causation in accordance with the metaphysical schema described in Section 3. 
The link we propose above between Habermas’s conceptions of language 
learning and the neuroscientific mechanisms of learning indeed suggests a 
strong diachronic emergentism. This argument involves two dimensions: one 
at an ontogenetic level and one at the level of the activity of the language-user 
herself (Feltz 2013).
At the level of ontogenesis, things are clear: language plays a role of down-
ward causation because these are the intersubjective interactions which lead 
to learning, and lead to the implementation of rules in the brain. Participation 
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in “objective mind” leads to learning, that is to say, the implementation of rules 
in the brain of the subject who becomes capable of participating in the conver-
sation, who is then provided with “subjective mind”. These processes of learn-
ing clearly reveal a dynamic which is characterized by downward causation.
More precisely, the first stages of language learning, auditory phonology, ar-
ticulatory phonology, lexicon and syntax could approximately be considered 
as a specific form of perception. It is the case for auditory phonology. It is also 
partially the case for articulatory phonology and the other levels, but, in these 
last levels, learning is not only repeating and imitating behaviour present in 
environment. Learning language conducts to the ability to produce new sen-
tences, and progressively leads an individual to be able to construct his own 
meaning’s system. Learning language is an active process, in interaction with 
cultural environment, which renders able to actively participate to social dis-
cussions. That is what Habermas means by “subjective mind”.
Regarding the activity of the language-user herself, things are more com-
plex. As figure 8.2 shows, linguistic activity presupposes the learning of lan-
guage (P0); this, as we’ve just argued, consists in the implementation within 
brain connectivity of rules of grammar and meanings at time t0. We thus pre-
suppose that all the six levels of language learning have been realized. The 
brain state at time t1 causes the sentences L2 expressed at time t2. Linguistic 
logics lead to reasoning and conceptual inventions that have an effect on the 
structure of the brain at P3 so that, at time t4, the individual expresses these 
new propositions L4. In fact, we need to speak here of a continuous back and 
forth between language and the brain.
The image of a computer can be equally helpful here: the work of calcula-
tion takes time, the implementation of algorithms takes time, before the 
Language learning
Implementation of “objective mind”
P0






Figure 8.2 The diachronic, strongly emergent dynamics between the linguistic and the 
physical realms, as discussed in the text
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 production of a result that appears on the display. Linguistic activity cannot be 
performed independently of the activity of the brain, but the activity of lan-
guage continually modifies the fine structure of the brain. “Subjective mind” is 
implemented by “objective mind”, but permits novelty via the rules of language 
themselves. The brain state P3 depends on the brain state P1, but not entirely. 
It’s necessary to integrate linguistic activity and its own logic in order to fully 
explain how state P3 gives rise to expressions L4.
Linguistic activity therefore takes the form of an interaction between lan-
guage and the fine structure of the brain. The characteristics of language which 
involve the capacity for the production of innovation according to its own 
rules imply this continuous interaction. The impact of language via downward 
causation is therefore difficult to dispute in the processes of learning. To learn 
a language is to integrate “objective mind” into the connectivity of one’s ner-
vous system. Language has an impact on the structure of the nervous system 
and therefore downward causation is implied here. The place of downward 
causation in the use of language is more complex since we have to think of a 
constant interaction between language and the structure of the brain. The use 
of language involves the activity of the brain, but at the same time it also im-
plies modifications in the connectivity of the brain.
Language thus has an impact on the connectivity of the brain. Language has 
his own logic of functioning. In a culture, language belongs to what Habermas 
calls “objective mind” which includes lexicon, syntax, but also “communicative 
structure” which includes meaning’s systems. By “subjective mind”, individual 
can participate in the evolution of “objective mind”. In this sense, language can 
be considered as a mean to escape to a strict biological determinism. That 
doesn’t automatically imply free will. Language could be another deterministic 
constraint. That is the position of many philosophers (e.g. Lacan, Levi-Strauss, 
Althusser or Atlan). By contrast, Habermas defends a philosophy of language 
where language is open to diversity in the “objective mind”. Each individual has 
thus to make a choice between various meaning’s systems present in a culture. 
That is “subjective mind”. If language has its own logic, it can lead to escape to 
strict biological determinism. It can conduct to production of novelty. It can 
conduct each individual to adopt a specific meaning’s system.9
9 This position could be compared with Dennett’s view, which articulates free will with the 
activity of language and the property of linguistic reprogramming. On this point, we agree 
with Dennett’s position. We are a little more distant concerning determinism. Dennett is 
compatibilist, while our approach to downward causation in relation with the neurological 
mechanism of learning opens the way to an uncompletely deterministic world. Addressing 
these issues properly would require an extensive treatment that would go far beyond the 




In this paper, after having provided a general, conceptual map of the possible 
ways in which linguistic causation could be related to physical causation (Sec-
tion 2), we proposed a metaphysically coherent picture of linguistic downward 
causation that would be satisfying for securing the authorship condition of 
free will. In particular, it was the main purpose of Section 3 to emphasize that 
this could be achieved under the perspective of a diachronic and strong ver-
sion of emergentism, with respect to which emergent linguistic events causally 
depend on underlying physical events and, at the same time and in spite of 
such dependence, linguistic events could be the place of irreducible causal 
powers. We then turn in Section 4 to some recent neuroscientific works in or-
der to assess the empirical plausibility of such a schema, supplementing the 
discussion with the philosophical insights of Habermas’ distinction between 
“objective mind” and “subjective mind”. In particular, it has been contended 
that Kandel and Edelman’s works on neural plasticity offer an empirical basis 
for the implementation of “objective mind” and the activity of “subjective 
mind” under an emergentist perspective adequate for free will.10
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